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ABSTRACT 
Object Expression: Diligent Realism in the Works of Roland Barthes, Elena Ferrante, Karl Ove 




Advisor: André Aciman 
 
In the past twenty years, ambiguous yet meaningful encounters with objects have become a trope 
in contemporary fiction. Collections and archives, found objects and commonplace articles of 
modern life have especially substantiated literature that engages themes of displacement and 
selfhood. The method of incorporating objects into these works ranges from explicit cabinets of 
curiosities to more subtle appearances, but in each case material reality is the conduit for 
fundamental expressions of character. These authors draw the reader’s gaze toward an object as a 
way to indirectly articulate subjective experience, conspicuously displacing the central concerns 
of a text. This study examines how this outwardly misleading focus might be an effective 
technique for representing the psyche.  
Using insights about language, memory, and identity from the personal writing of Roland 
Barthes, each chapter surveys the objects in prominent works of fiction: The Days of 
Abandonment by Elena Ferrante, the “Seasons Quartet” by Karl Ove Knausgaard, Lost Children 
Archive by Valeria Luiselli, and Austerlitz by W. G. Sebald. As a whole, the study contends that 
these authors use objects to dramatize the psychological conflicts of their characters by 
personalizing the encounter with material reality. Furthermore, it posits that objects might retain 
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a fundamentally linguistic quality when arranged in a work of fiction, and could therefore be 
“read” as part of the text on the page. The object serves as a meeting place between the 
subjective and the social in these works, and as such invites multiple associations that transcend 
limitations of individual perspective.  
Not only does this use of objects present an evolution of narrative symbolism, it 
illustrates a style of realism, one that might be called diligent, in which a steady focus on objects 
reveals a psychological drama indirectly. What is overt about the object at times indicates what is 
understated about the character, and this staging of passive or circumstantial narration reflects 
modern demands of representation. This study analyzes such realism through the lens of object 
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INTRODUCTION 
Roland Barthes and the Language of Objects 
 
In the past three decades, there has been a proliferation of literature that takes objects as central 
structural components. These works range from novels to autofiction and memoir, and the 
objects they employ are often commonplace items or actual artifacts drawn from the world 
outside the book. Objects have always served as emblematic props in literature, the handmaidens 
of artifice that are sometimes so representative of a novel that they become a kind of mascot for 
the entire work—the scarlet letter, the madeleine, Emma Bovary’s wedding bouquet. However, 
in many novels of psychological and physical displacement written in the last thirty years, 
objects have become more than evocative symbols. Objects are employed in these works as 
pivots from one subjectivity to another, and suggest not only anachronism and longing, but a 
hidden, unarticulated element of the story. The objects in these recent works function as prisms 
through which perspective is complicated, enlarged, or directed. This is literature in which a 
character’s psyche is revealed in juxtaposition with a thing, so much so that the story appears to 
be concerned in equal measure with both the human and the inanimate. 
In these works, objects are endowed with resonance, and their appearance (or 
disappearance) generate narrative development. Dubravka Ugrešić fills The Museum of 
Unconditional Surrender (1999) with purses, family heirlooms, and photo albums to unravel 
lives not her own and to reckon with the trauma of exile and persecution. In Annie Ernaux’s The 
Years (2008), the narrative is determined by commercialized objects that constitute the 
materialism of contemporary life. Paul Harding’s Tinkers (2009) proceeds through the 
reconstruction of clocks and the sale of household goods from a cart. Teju Cole’s Open City 
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(2011) is a trove of encounters with urban objects that ironically and subtly convey a Black 
man’s mind contending with a colonial past. Much of Susan Howe’s work uses objects and 
archival material, especially Spontaneous Particulars (2014). Yoko Ogawa’s Memory Police 
(2019) chronicles political alienation via the disappearance of objects. Judith Schalansky’s An 
Inventory of Losses (2020) details the absence of twelve objects as an approach to understanding 
memory. In The Ancestry of Objects (2020), Tatiana Ryckman dramatizes a lustful 
bildungsroman in the relationships between the objects that surround her characters. Maria 
Stepanova’s In Memory of Memory (2021) circles around the artifacts of her family in an attempt 
to locate her position within a nexus of inherited trauma. 
This preliminary list can go on, but four writers in particular epitomize a literary 
engagement with objects. Elena Ferrante surrounds the characters in all her novels with dolls, 
dresses, books, cookware, and jewelry that consistently attend the identity crises she portrays. 
Karl Ove Knausgaard grapples with fatherhood and selfhood via descriptions of everyday things 
for his unborn daughter in his “Seasons Quartet” (2018-9). Valeria Luiselli packs Lost Children 
Archive (2019) with objects that inform both character actions and narrative voice, and calls 
attention to the technique by invoking a theory-laden and object-obsessed “archive.” And in all 
his works, but especially in Austerlitz (2001), W. G. Sebald commissions objects to direct and 
field his characters as they reckon with lost versions of themselves. From old rucksacks to 
porcelain figurines, dusty pool cues to a blue sequined shoe, objects populate Sebald’s narrative 
like mute sentinels, pointing his characters forward. 
These works are concerned with a variety of themes—domesticity, fatherhood, 
immigration, exile—but the consistency of their method is striking. That objects form the 
backbone of these narratives almost betrays a wariness of traditional techniques of plot, as if a 
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drama that proceeds only by carefully described characters and pending dénouement were too 
blatantly literary. Instead, privileging an object’s thingness—its taciturn persistence amid 
comings and goings—propels the narrative by nonetheless invoking the relationships and 
histories that are either cumbersome or impossible to state directly. The power of an object to 
suggest has come to be more valuable for the writer than the more explicit expediencies of plot. 
Objects appear to link languages that exist alongside one another: cultural and political 
languages as well as the psyches of multiple and separate subjectivities. These objects are not 
symbols, nor are they solely mimetic. Rather, this mode of literature makes the case for narrative 
as an assembly of objects for the very reason that their presence is at once undeniable and 
undetermined. 
As objects have become more prominent in works of literature, scholarship on this 
subject has likewise gained traction. A basic survey of the theoretical tradition that considers 
objects as a means of revealing something fundamental about art and human relationships might 
include a core set of major thinkers—Eliot, Benjamin, Wittgenstein, Heidegger, Bachelard, 
Adorno, Foucault, Baudrillard, Deleuze, Barthes—each of whom considered objects in the 
articulation of broader theories. These thinkers were concerned with culture, but they used 
objects as tools or entry points to illustrate and ascertain their positions. Literary criticism, 
phenomenology, semiotics, history, and sociology have all found in the concept of the object and 
the relations that surround it fertile ground for the analysis of contemporary society and art. In 
circling the distinctly modern question of the human position in the world, objects proved a 
natural foil throughout the twentieth century.  
Various strains of object-oriented theory have found purchase in the past twenty years. 
Under the banner of “new materialism,” these often consider objects as active, generative 
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subjects themselves, capable of determining, expressing, and animating a range of meanings.1 
Arjun Appadurai’s early work on the social determinations of objects has been advanced by 
thinkers such as Bruno Latour, who has used what he terms multiple modes of material 
effectivity to consider new approaches to sociological studies.2 Scholars such as W. J. T. 
Mitchell and Bill Brown have pursued art criticism through the lens of object relations.3 From a 
phenomenological perspective, thinkers including Levi R. Bryant, Graham Harman, Timothy 
Morton, and Steven Shaviro have advanced a version of speculative realism termed object-
oriented ontology, arguing that objects exist independently of their relations and therefore cannot 
be any less privileged in their being than human subjects.4 Meanwhile political theorist Jane 
Bennett has posited a “vital materialism” whereby objects actively determine human experience 
and therefore may be considered moral ends in their own right.5 Karen Barad used objects to 
elaborate what she terms “agential realism” to revise feminist and post-structuralist theory, while 
Jussi Parikka has taken up a similar materialism to rework media studies.6  
 
1 A nice counter to this position can be found in Christopher Wood’s essay, “Image and Thing, A Modern 
Romance” where he argues that the “anthropomorphizing” of objects is motivated by a perception of a 
lack in the artwork or in art itself. 
2 Arjun Appadurai, ed., The Social Life of Things: Commodities in Cultural Perspective (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1986); Bruno Latour, “The Berlin Key or How to Do Words with Things,” 
in Matter, Materiality and Modern Culture, ed. P. M. Graves-Brown (New York: Routledge, 2000), 10-
21, in which he writes, “things do not exist without being full of people.” 
3 W. J. T. Mitchell, What Do Pictures Want?: The Lives and Loves of Images (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 2006); Bill Brown, “Thing Theory,” Critical Inquiry 28, no. 1 (2001): 1-22, 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/1344258. 
4 Levi R. Bryant, The Democracy of Objects (Ann Arbor: Open Humanities Press, 2011); Graham 
Harman, Tool-Being: Heidegger and the Metaphysics of Objects (Chicago: Carus Publishing, 2002); 
Timothy Morton, Realist Magic: Objects, Ontology, Causality, (Ann Arbor: Open Humanities Press, 
2013); Steven Shaviro, The Universe of Things: On Speculative Realism, (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 2014). 
5 Jane Bennett, Vibrant Matter: A Political Ecology of Things (Durham: Duke University Press, 2010). 
6 Karen Barad, Meeting the Universe Halfway: Quantum Physics and the Entanglement of Matter and 
Meaning (Durham: Duke University Press, 2007); Jussi Parikka, A Geology of Media (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 2015). 
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In literary scholarship, object relations have informed studies on longing, poetics, 
memory, structure, character, and modernity. Employing a critical lens that recalls Bachelard’s 
Poetics of Space, Susan Stewart used miniature and gigantic objects, as well as collections and 
souvenirs to examine the “formation of a notion of the interior” and the narrative expression of 
longing.7 More recently, she has expanded this approach by considering the material ruins of 
culture and the aesthetic hold decay has on literary works such as those of Wordsworth, Goethe, 
and Blake.8 After reviving a Heideggerian distinction between the object and a thing in his essay 
“Thing Theory,” Bill Brown went on to a study of materialism in early twentieth century 
literature in the work of Mark Twain, Frank Norris, and Henry James.9 Allan Hepburn turned to 
the appearance of art objects in fictional works of the 1970s and ‘80s and used this approach to 
delineate questions about aesthetics and value.10 Marianne Hirsch has analyzed photographs, 
“testimonial objects,” and household items in modern fictional works of displacement to advance 
her theory of postmemory and inherited trauma.11 And by applying the term “archive” and 
contrasting material resonance with Foucauldian discourse, J. J. Long has argued that the 
appearance and grouping of objects in certain fictions, especially those of W. G. Sebald, allows a 
distinctly nuanced approach to the questions and demands of modernity.12 
 
7 Susan Stewart, On Longing: Narratives of the Miniature, the Gigantic, the Souvenir, the Collection 
(Durham: Duke University Press, 1992), xi. 
8 Ibid., The Ruins Lessons: Meaning and Material in Western Culture (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 2020). 
9 Bill Brown, A Sense of Things: The Object Matter of American Literature (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 2003). 
10 Allan Hepburn, Enchanted Objects: Visual Art in Contemporary Fiction (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 2010). 
11 Marianne Hirsch, The Generation of Postmemory: Writing and Visual Culture After the Holocaust 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 2012). 
12 J. J. Long, W. G. Sebald: Image, Archive, Modernity (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010). 
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Each of these studies suggests some potential merit to approaching literature through the 
analysis of the objects that distinguish them. The relationship between subject and object is 
productive or revealing for the very reason that it demands interpretation. It recalls, in fact, the 
distinction that Barthes makes in Camera Lucida between the studium of a photograph, the 
presumed interest and explicit signification of an image on the one hand, and the personal, 
accidental “prick” of an image on the other, the punctum.13 All photographs make objective 
claims, Barthes suggests, but some of them “wound” us personally. The idea of the punctum has 
been widely celebrated and explored, but this often forgoes the other side of the coin, the 
studium, and most of all the relationship between the two. There is a strange kind of conversion 
of experience that Barthes tracks between the studium and the punctum of a photograph, wherein 
the one informs the other, and even this is not always what actually appears in the photograph, 
but what the viewer remembers (or misremembers) after seeing it. Considering the Winter 
Garden Photograph of his mother, Barthes writes it “was indeed essential, it achieved for me, 
utopically, the impossible science of the unique being.”14 While Barthes never explicitly 
expanded this dialectic beyond photographs, it does seem perhaps possible and worthwhile to 
extend it to objects.  
 For instance, in the diary that Barthes kept for more than a year after his mother’s death, 
he writes occasionally about travelling. Work and other responsibilities draw him away from the 
house he shared with maman and where he continued to live—to Casablanca, Morocco, Gabès. 
At first it does not matter where he is, for his sorrow is boundless, consuming him at all times, in 
all places. But nearly a year after his mother’s passing, when her absence has become somewhat 
more familiar and therefore slips further into the periphery, he begins to resent leaving. Barthes’s 
 
13 Roland Barthes, Camera Lucida, trans. Richard Howard (New York: Hill and Wang, 1981), 25-7. 
14 Ibid., 71. 
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mother died in October 1977, and in April of the following year he writes, “Now that maman is 
no more, I no longer have that impression of freedom I had on my trips (when I would leave her 
for short periods of time).”15 Then at the beginning of August he writes, “Disappointment of 
various places and trips. Not really comfortable anywhere. Very soon, this I cry: I want to go 
back!”16 Two days later he makes a note that is almost like a personal promise: “Make no trips 
except those during which I have no time to say: I want to go back!”17 And two weeks later he 
bears down on this feeling again, “I no longer bear travelling” he writes. “Why is it that I keep 
trying, like a lost child, to ‘get back home’—though maman is no longer there?”18 
 This entry sets off a series of short mediations that consider the home the two shared, and 
especially the daily demands on Barthes in that place, among those things. As Barthes circles 
around what is not only an instinct to stay put but the actual fear of leaving, he discovers that his 
aversion centers on the shared language he is able to maintain with maman in this house. There is 
a kind of transaction between the living and the dead; not an internal discourse, but an actual 
presence in the daily concerns—a way of living—for those who remain. In Camera Lucida 
Barthes insists that in a sense, he and his mother never “‘spoke’ . . . never ‘discoursed’” but 
simply lived together, “the frivolous insignificance of language, the suspension of images must 
be the very space of love, its music.”19 As Barthes presses down on this same dynamic in 
Mourning Diary, he understands his own absence from this house as the abandonment of this 
communion with his mother; in travelling he does not fear forgetting maman, but feels that in 
another place he cannot remain in possession of her. If he is not at home to manage the cooking, 
 
15 Roland Barthes, Mourning Diary, trans. Richard Howard (New York: Hill and Wang, 2010), 114. 
16 Ibid., 176. 
17 Ibid., 182. 
18 Ibid., 190. 
19 Ibid., Camera Lucida, 72. 
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clean the clothes, arrange the furnishings as she once did, then he loses her all over again. “To 
travel is to separate myself from her—still more now that she is no longer there—that she is no 
more than the most intimate expression of the quotidian.”20  
Such an expression does not consist only in performing daily tasks or being around the 
objects that were once maman’s—it becomes a matter of values. The manner in which one 
arranges a home with furnishings both practical and decorative determines how life will be lived 
in that space. If your house is filled with appliances, you will microwave your food and dry your 
clothes in a tumble dryer. Whether a house is cluttered or curated, routinely cleaned or filled with 
cheap furniture—these arrangements are a matter of taste and temperament, and reflect the 
values of the inhabitant. And this is the crux of Barthes’s longing: by assuming his mother’s 
interaction with the objects of the house, he engages with her as in a conversation. It is not that 
these objects were once handled by her or that it was in this particular space where she lived, but 
that by living through these items, Barthes lives with his mother still. “I try to continue living 
day by day according to her values,” he writes, “that alliance of ethics and aesthetic that was her 
incomparable fashion of living.” And again in a separate note: “To share the values of the silent 
dailiness (to manage the cooking, the cleaning, the clothes, the choice and something like the 
past of objects), this was my (silent) way of conversing with her.”21 
This is an unusual way to encounter objects and the past in a literary context. We are 
familiar with the madeleine, but Proust’s objects serve only a preliminary function of transport, 
of collapsing time. The madeleine is hardly more than a device, a way into the story of a 
childhood. The object could be anything, and does not so much determine a present narrative as 
it does invite reminiscence. On the other hand, the airplane overhead, passing cars, the tolling 
 
20 Ibid., Mourning Diary, 190. 
21 Ibid., 190, 192. 
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bell all direct the narrative gaze of Mrs. Dalloway and her crowd, but the bell, car, and plane 
themselves matter little. It is not the active engagement with these things that propel us through 
Woolf’s London, nor the understanding of their context that determines the experiences of her 
characters. Though Barthes’s notes are no polished piece—nothing more than jottings intended 
for a book that would never be written—his concern with the specificity of objects as the basis of 
an entire, personal language is a curious liberation of “the thing” from “what it symbolizes.”  
The most important part of Barthes’s daily routine is keeping flowers on the bedside table 
in the room where his mother lived and slept and died. It is one of the premier reasons why he 
does not wish to travel nearly a year after her death. As he prepares for a trip to Morocco in July 
1978, he writes that removing these flowers overwhelms him with “the horrible fear (of her 
death).”22 A month later, one can almost sense his relief at being back in this room as he notes its 
“locality,” the significance of this space epitomized and made visible by the flowers he has 
returned to the bedside. He wants to remain at home always, “so that the flowers here will 
always be fresh.”23 Keeping the flowers fresh is its own kind of dialogue between mother and 
son, past and present. The flowers are finite, they wilt and die, and unlike the daily ministrations 
Barthes likely made for his mother that are no longer required, these flowers will always need 
refreshing—the potential for engaging the value they embody is infinite, something Barthes can 
always do, so long as he is at home.  
The word at the heart of this chore is instrumental, whether Barthes realizes it or not. He 
does not “replace” the flowers, but keeps them fresh. He uses this word, fresh, a few times 
throughout the diary to convey multiple aspects of his mourning. In one instance, his mother’s 
death is thought of as an abrupt fact, something so close to Barthes that is as though it is always 
 
22 Ibid., 158. 
23 Ibid., 191. 
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happening. “Mourning: not diminished, not subject to erosion, to time. Chaotic, erratic: moments 
(of distress, of love of life) as fresh now as on the first day.”24 But he also uses the word to 
describe his mother—that she gave “an impression of freshness,” like “Cezanne’s blue.”25 In 
another instance he employs the word to convey the telescoping of time that his mother’s death 
has caused him to experience as he recalls his life with her. He is watching a film that mentions 
rice powder, which brings his early childhood back to him: “the self never ages. / (I am as ‘fresh’ 
as in the ‘rice-powder’ days).”26 When he uses the word again to describe what he does to the 
flowers at maman’s bedside, it is as though all of these resonances come to be embodied in this 
object—the immediacy of his mother’s passing, the tenuous experience of time, and her very 
essence are all wrapped up in keeping the flowers fresh. 
Before his trip to Morocco, Barthes notices this very quality of representation as lived 
experience. He recalls Winnicott’s psychotic who fears a catastrophe that has already occurred. 
This was an idea put forward in a paper likely written around 1963 but not published until 1974 
that describes a psychic defense in which a patient bypasses the incorporation of a “primitive 
agony” (separation from the mother, for instance) into conscious ego-identity, and subverts the 
trauma of such an event into the unconscious. Such a person essentially lacks the maturity or 
psychic framework to incorporate trauma into a conscious self, and therefore persists in fear of 
this breakdown and “must go on looking for the past detail which is not yet experienced.”27 This 
substitution of a self-created inner reality for an external one prompts the psychotic to search the 
 
24 Ibid., 72. 
25 Ibid., 172, 134. 
26 Ibid., 112. 
27 D. W. Winnicott, “Fear of Breakdown,” in D. W. Winnicott: Psycho-Analytic Explorations, ed. Clare 
Winnicott, Ray Shepherd, Madelein Davis (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992), 91. 
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future for events that have happened in the past, suffering thereby a feeling of living an unlived 
life.28 
Nearly a year after his mother’s death, Barthes writes “I fear a catastrophe that has 
already occurred. I constantly perpetuate it in myself under a thousand substitutions.”29 This 
kind of active suffering, he suggests, prevents him from writing a proper text about maman, 
confined instead to scraps. It is as though the fragmented pursuit of Barthes’s own mourning 
embodies the disassociation with the trauma that has already occurred. His language—the 
conscious organization of the self in relation to reality—is not fully formed, he is still searching 
for the future manifestation of the past. And yet he finds within the nonlinguistic—the objects, 
the routines, the flowers—a language for his trauma. In contending with the things that 
surrounded his mother, Barthes both embodies a fear of breakdown—he affirms his psychosis—
and orients himself in relation to the past. 
Barthes finds that trauma is a linguistic act, that language provides the integrative power 
by which the finality of the past enters into the whole of the present. “My suffering is 
inexpressible but all the same utterable, speakable. The very fact that language affords me the 
word ‘intolerable’ immediately achieves a certain tolerance.”30 The naming of an experience 
gives substance to that experience. Yet when Barthes encounters his unwillingness to leave his 
home and his fear of removing the flowers from his mother’s bedside table, he gestures toward 
an in-between space of language. Here the flowers come to enact a linguistic function by 
allowing Barthes to commune with his loss in the present tense. They offer a language in which 
he can say, “This is intolerable.” In other words, there is something like a linguistic need that 
 
28 This idea is expanded and given good grounding by Thomas H. Ogden, in “Fear of Breakdown and the 
Unlived Life,” International Journal of Psychoanalysis 95, no. 2 (2014): 205–223. 
29 Barthes, Mourning Diary, 203. 
30 Ibid., 175. 
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compels Barthes to keep the flowers fresh—they are the language of his suffering, and their 
utterance (their refreshing) locates Barthes in the present tense, in a lived life. 
Though Barthes is only making notes, saying what cannot be said appears to sit at the 
heart of The Mourning Diary. Such literariness is in part what gives the collection substance as a 
book, fit to collect, organize, and publish. Barthes is investigating what it means to name his own 
suffering, and finds that doing so straddles the sayable and the unsayable. This tension drives the 
work, and even the pages themselves are mostly white space with a few suggestive, incomplete 
lines of text. The irony of Barthes’s position is not wasted, and the extreme vulnerability of the 
writing gives it a unique urgency. There is hardly any sheen here between author and subject; 
whereas the self’s constitution in language is so carefully performed in his autobiography, here 
Barthes proceeds almost by apophasis, showing the reader pieces of himself indirectly. It is as if 
in Mourning Diary, he pushes himself beyond this edge of language, and that through objects 
this secondary language becomes available to the subject. In allowing the significance of the 
interaction with objects to be felt, yet leaving the meaning of such an interaction free of analytic 
tampering, Barthes lets these things speak and anchors the psychology of his own loss. 
This unplanned and unperformed instance of object-as-text and object-as-image 
anticipates a style of writing that has become central to contemporary literature. Writers across 
the board use objects in just this way to achieve narrative ends in the understated, indirect 
literature of displacement and psychology. This study, then, synthesizes the use of objects in 
determining narrative. It delineates how objects translate experience in the works of Ferrante, 
Knausgaard, Luiselli, and Sebald, making the case that an analysis of these texts through the lens 
of object-relations proves a revealing critical mode. While this study refrains from 
anthropomorphizing objects, it does take seriously the claims of the new materialism and 
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evaluates how such scholarship might be constructive in literary criticism. Maintaining a 
distinction between an object and a thing, the following chapters attempt to understand why 
objects have become so widely incorporated into current literature by focusing on the space 
between a subject and an object. There a dynamic emerges that obliquely discloses characters to 
the reader, much like the fresh flowers reveal Barthes to himself. 
The first chapter uses Ferrante’s Days of Abandonment to examine the psychological 
associations that can be invested into objects and then turned into a driving narrative. This 
extends the private language of things that Barthes brushes against in Mourning Diary and shows 
how it can be arranged into a dramatic work of fiction. In Chapter Two I turn to Knausgaard’s 
“Seasons Quartet” in which he blends memoir and essay in simple descriptions of commonplace 
things addressed to his unborn child. Here Knausgaard attempts to strip away the associations 
around objects and uncover the variety of experience and an excavation of the self. Chapter 
Three takes up Luiselli’s Lost Children Archive, analyzing the formal collection of objects under 
the banner “archive” and considering how objects in the hands of children shift the language that 
surrounds immigration, history, and personal narratives. Finally, Chapter Four considers 
Sebald’s Austerlitz and the manner in which objects might both reveal and satisfy an unlived life. 
Throughout, Barthes will remain a touchstone, both guide and antagonist. While much of the 
scholarship on object relations outlined above emphasizes the cultural associations of certain 
materials, I have introduced Barthes here to shift the sensibility of the discussion toward 
language. The relationship that Barthes identifies between the studium and the punctum, and in 
his yearning for fresh flowers, is fundamentally linguistic, and the chapters that follow explore 
the same unspoken yet distinctive “prick” of an object. 
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In the following texts, there appears a diligent effort to reformulate genre by collapsing 
the distinctions between writer, narrator, and protagonist. We might categorize this in Barthesian 
terms as texts that use an image-repertoire in which several masks (personae) take over the story 
to represent an entire psyche.31 Such a text achieves not essayistic metaphor—a discourse that 
asks “What is it? What does it mean?”—but the metonymy that puts forward a different 
question: “What can follow from what I say? What can be engendered by the episode I am 
telling?”32 The distinction is one that Barthes traces from Jakobson, but brings to bear in various 
texts of his own, especially Roland Barthes by Roland Barthes. Whereas Mourning Diary is 
really only a set of notes toward a book that was never written, Barthes’s autobiography is a fully 
realized text, written just a couple years before maman’s death and with the fully-performed 
image-repertoire of a polished work of art. Here the ideas that are simmering at the surface of 
Barthes’s loss are dilated and extended in a proper artifice of text. By turning toward a few select 
iterations of the object and its encounter as detailed here, it is possible to see, in a preliminary 
way, how the linguistic relationship between thing and subject arises and is employed. 
At one point, about halfway through his memoir, Barthes pauses to list a number of what 
he calls anamneses—small, insignificant snippets of memory. A landau with two horses; a dairy 
woman who gifts hot chocolate and croissants; being hoisted on to his mother’s shoulders, 
wrapped in a sheet, and chasing a bat from the bedroom with fire tongs; soup and toast by the 
fire on Sundays; buying magazines in a shop full of the smell of frying potatoes; little perfumed 
cones burned to keep mosquitoes away; a bonbon in the shape and with the taste of a raspberry; 
Colonel Poymiro straddling a chair; the afternoon snack of cold milk with sugar and the old 
 
31 Ibid., Roland Barthes by Roland Barthes, trans. Richard Howard (New York: Hill and Wang, 1977), 
120. 
32 Ibid., “Longtemps, je me suis couché de bonne heure . . .” in The Rustle of Language, trans. Richard 
Howard (New York: Hill and Wang, 1986), 278. 
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white bowl with a defect in the glaze that made it so difficult to know if the spoon, “as it turned,” 
was touching the defect or some yet undissolved sugar. There are sixteen of these anamneses 
(though Barthes makes it clear there could be more) and they are “the action—a mixture of 
pleasure and effort—performed by the subject in order to recover, without magnifying or 
sentimentalizing it, a tenuity of memory.”33 Later, he remarks that only the anamnesis is exempt 
from signification—that it is a matte, insignificant haiku, the only possible utterance that escapes 
the image-system.34 
It is a curious insistence, for surely these snatches of memory mean something to Barthes. 
Regardless of whether they are “fond” memories, they do represent the subject’s past and 
substantiate the existence of the self through time. And despite Barthes’s insistence that they are 
recorded here without magnification or sentimentality, the fact of their record does magnify 
them, and not a few hit sentimental notes (on the streetcar from his grandparents’ house headed 
for soup and toast by the fire? Wrapped in a sheet with maman?). One must resolutely take 
Barthes at his word that these are matte recollections, yet it does make sense why he might make 
such an attempt. Everything he puts down on the page about himself is a representation, an 
aspect of the image-repertoire of “Roland Barthes.” Even among the various personae and 
masks, ranging first to second to third person voice, any utterance exists within what Barthes 
calls the image-repertoire and can therefore be probed with What does that mean? and becomes 
part of the value of an autobiography—to arrange the significance of one’s life, to signify where 
the meaning takes shape.  
But Barthes is wary of oversimplification: he is both conscious and unconscious of what 
defines and creates the image-repertoire in which he (his self) traffics. It is possible to identify 
 
33 Ibid., Roland Barthes by Roland Barthes, 109. 
34 Ibid., 110. 
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the ideas that drove his writing, the movements of his career, and his obsessions, yet the book in 
its entirety also consists of what he does not know: “the unconscious and ideology, things which 
utter themselves only by the voices of others.”35 These things, the symbolic and the ideological, 
pass through the subject and are impossible to articulate directly, “since I am their blind spot.”36 
Some part of the writing then must court what is behind the curtain. The anamnesis does just 
this, it makes the space to observe the wires animating the subject. The writer proceeds partly in 
the fashion of Orpheus: without directly attaching a psychoanalysis or political criticism to every 
scrap of memory, he leads the past out into the open, without turning around.37 The anamnesis is 
the erratic recall that collapses time in an otherwise aged body. The unaffected reports of life 
help to determine a relationship with the past that is not bound to explanation or analysis, but 
(and this is the tantalizing part) might still lead to revelation. Once again, a finger points to 
something just over our shoulder. 
Of course, this is not an innocent term. Anamnesis, from the Greek ἀνά, “up” and μνήσις, 
“memory” is embedded in the relationship between the physical and the spiritual, the body and 
the soul. It has a long history and resonances that place it precisely in the vortex of the limits of 
memory, the acquisitions of knowledge, and a transformation, even a salvation of the self. In one 
tradition, the term recalls the epistemological trappings of the Platonic forms available to the 
immortal soul. Plato uses the term in both Meno and Phaedo to illustrate his theory of knowledge 
as a wisdom “remembered” out of the eternal. When Meno wonders how a person might search 
for knowledge when one does not know what to look for, Plato pushes the question up against 
the distinction between body and soul, insisting that since the soul is immortal, it “has been born 
 
35 Ibid., 152. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Ibid., 153. 
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often” and already knows all things, and may therefore recollect whatever it has known before.38 
“Nothing prevents a man, after recalling [ἀνάμνησίς] one thing only—a process men call 
learning—discovering everything else for himself” and illustrates this by prompting the young 
boy onward toward geometric truths.39 The point is driven further in Phaedo, where Plato insists 
that learning is a form of recollection of what the soul knew before its birth in the body.40 The 
Platonic anamnesis attempts to see what is true—not the representations of things, but things in 
themselves. It is a recollection of what is beyond one’s own life, beyond the physical and 
sensory. What is represented anamnetically is a picture of reality that suggests something else, a 
representation so stripped of artistic flourish that it denies the very thing it represents, expressing 
instead what is “tenuous,” a life, perhaps, other than the one that has been lived.  
The term also carries significant theological weight, for it is the word used in the Gospel 
of Luke during the last supper when Jesus breaks the bread, passes it to his disciples, and 
encourages them to take communion “in remembrance of me” (τοῦτο ποιεῖτε εἰς τὴν 
 
38 Plato, Meno, trans. G. M. A. Grube, in Readings in Ancient Greek Philosophy: From Thales to 
Aristotle, ed. S. Marc Cohen, Patricia Curd, and C. D. C. Reeve (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing 
Company, Inc., 2005), 80d. 
39 Ibid., 81d. 
40 Ibid., Phaedo, trans. G. M. A. Grube, in Readings in Ancient Greek Philosophy: From Thales to 
Aristotle, ed. S. Marc Cohen, Patricia Curd, and C. D. C. Reeve (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing 
Company, Inc., 2005), 75e. This mode of gaining wisdom through recollection also provides the 
groundwork for Plato’s reservations about the mimetic qualities of art. Plato characterizes the dichotomy 
between the body and soul as fundamentally limiting—that the body, with its illnesses, desires, illusions, 
and wants, distorts and impedes the pursuit of truth. “If we are ever to have pure knowledge, we must 
escape from the body and observe things in themselves with the soul by itself” (Phaedo, 66e). Insofar as 
death offers the ultimate release, Plato recommends that in the meantime we might “refrain as much as 
possible from association with the body” and employs the word catharsis (Phaedo, 67a). When Aristotle 
takes up this same word in his defense of the arts, the epistemological quandary of Plato is joined with an 
aesthetic concern. For just as war and base pleasure are a consequence of the body’s wants, so do the arts 
appeal to our pity and fear. Plato’s reservations about mimetic representations that arouse the passions 
falsely and overshadow the rational are here countered by Aristotle suggesting that tragic mimesis 
affecting the most intense emotions is what, in the end, achieves the catharsis necessary for the intellect to 
transcend the body. See Aristotle, Poetics, trans. Stephen Halliwell, Loeb Classical Library 199 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995), 47. 
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ἐμὴν ἀνάμνησιν) (22:19). The phrase is repeated again with the cup of wine, as well as in Paul’s 
first letter to the Corinthians, and becomes a cornerstone of Christian liturgy that emphasizes the 
transubstantiation of the bread and wine into the body and blood of Jesus, and by extension into 
his divinity. The believer who takes the Eucharist participates in the sacrament that symbolizes 
the physical reality of God and becomes a channel for His grace. Just as Christ’s body is 
sacrificed for the salvation of the Christian’s soul, so does the taking of communion at once 
affirm the divine and transport one beyond the physical. In the course of the entire ritual, it is the 
anamnesis that confers the commemoration of the Passion, Resurrection, and Ascension of 
Christ; a memorial of what is both known and not known. Above all, the anamnesis makes 
present and ratifies that which is otherwise invisible.  
Finally, and perhaps more practically though no less suggestively, an anamnesis denotes 
the medical history of a patient acquired by a physician in search of a diagnosis. In medical 
terms, a doctor can observe clinical signs—objective indications of disease or injury, like high 
temperature, a rash, bruises. On the other hand, there are symptoms—those subjective 
experiences like dizziness, headaches, tiredness. The signs are obtained by physical examination, 
while the symptoms are described in a medical history—an anamnesis. Only by weighing both 
can a doctor offer a diagnosis, and the anamnesis stands in service of both the body and the cure. 
 Barthes, surely, knows this etymology. As if searching for both a diagnosis and 
transcendence, he offers his erratic list as though it is evidence of something only the reader can 
decipher. Does it mean anything that these are the randomly recalled moments? Perhaps, but the 
significance of the anamnesis is not actually in what an image means, but a brief extrapolation of 
memory from the body wherein the subject actively transcends the self. While the body ages, 
these memories have somehow remained fixed, independent of the injustices of time and the 
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development of Barthes’s personal history. And by dredging them up (some “mixture of pleasure 
and effort”), Barthes extends beyond his body’s temporal position, not just by recalling the past, 
but by expanding the reach of his “unconscious” memory in the present. And these snippets, 
haikus as Barthes calls them, are more often than not directed by some object. The bowl, the 
chair, the fire tongs. 
It is interesting to juxtapose the anamnesis with an episode that is not so open-ended. The 
unknown is less in play, for instance, in Barthes’s recollection of the time he was trapped in a 
hole. All the other children climb out and stand at the rim, teasing him until his mother rescues 
him. “Lost! alone! spied on! excluded! (to be excluded is not to be outside, it is to be alone in the 
hole, imprisoned under the open sky: precluded)” until his mother comes and takes him away 
from the hole and the taunting children “—against them.”41 Here is the antithesis of the 
anamnesis—a memory full of color and sentiment, of nearly explicit psychological consequence 
and indulgence. The “loamy soil,” the exclamation marks, the final emphasis “against them” all 
smack of meaning. A memoir without this kind of intentional recollection would seem thin—in 
this anecdote there is an overt promise of something formative bubbling to the surface. Yet at the 
same time the meaning of this episode is obvious: the little boy stuck in a hole waiting to be 
rescued by maman. A book of only such instances would not only come off overly sentimental, 
but the subject would appear only as a performance of an image of itself. In other words, the 
fragments of memory give Barthes an edge on what is real—both what he knows and what he 
does not—and thereby render his monument, which can only ever be an artificial totem, 
authentically resonant.  
 
41 Barthes, Roland Barthes by Roland Barthes, 121-2. 
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 Consider the first of the anamneses, the afternoon snack: “cold milk with sugar in it. At 
the bottom of the old white bowl there was a defect in the glaze; he never could tell if the spoon, 
as it turned, was touching this defect or a patch of sugar that had not dissolved or had not been 
washed.”42 No meaning is particularly clear in this, yet there is also something familiar—the 
trick of perception, a lazy, childish fascination. This recollection tells us very little, if anything, 
about Barthes’s psychological formation or relationships, we learn nothing about his desire. And 
yet a certain value does arise, some language of perception that is tied to the world’s physicality. 
He notices and is uncertain, something is both sugar and an imperfect glaze. A young boy twirls 
his spoon.  
 Is it the case that behind this unsentimental (though is it truly?) recollection there lies 
some knowledge that Barthes accesses indirectly? Is the writing a remembrance of himself 
whereby Barthes converts the body, now aged and declining? Has he properly diagnosed 
himself? These questions seem to overstate the effect, yet the very fact that they can be leveraged 
on an episode in which a boy drinks cold milk is significant. In another recollection, Barthes tells 
of 1945 in Leysin when he had part of his rib removed, and that it was then returned to him 
wrapped in a piece of gauze. For a long time he kept this piece of bone in a drawer, alongside 
other “precious” objects like “old keys, a schoolboy report card, my grandmother B.’s mother-of-
pearl dance program and pink taffeta card case.” Then, one day “realizing that the function of 
any drawer is to ease, to acclimate the death of objects by causing them to pass through a sort of 
pious site, a dusty chapel where, in the guise of keeping them alive, we allow them a decent 
interval of dim agony,” he flings the rib chop from his balcony, “as if I were romantically 
scattering my own ashes.”43  
 
42 Ibid., 107. 
43 Ibid., 61. 
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Despite the etymological promise of the term, is the anamnesis nothing more than a bit of 
bone decaying in a drawer? Casting off these snippets might be just as liberating as it is 
revealing. Yet recalling the moment from the Mourning Diary in which Barthes marvels at how 
few things his mother left behind and that this scarcity makes it nearly impossible to get rid of 
anything she possessed, it is clear that there is some middle ground.44 The object does matter, it 
can transport and suggest just as well as it can gather dust. When Barthes throws his rib into the 
street for the dogs, he acknowledges the staying power of the thing. It is not important to keep a 
piece of one’s rib in a drawer—doing so achieves only a vague sense of idiocy. The mother-of-
pearl dance program, on the other hand, the pink taffeta card case—these objects remain. Even 
though the drawer might be conceived of as the place where an object goes to die, Barthes does 
not empty everything over his balcony. We do not know what happens to the other objects, but it 
somehow seems unlikely that he would toss that pink taffeta case. How could he? Such an object 
means something and perhaps the point to be understood in this episode is that Barthes is the 
kind of man who keeps it in his drawer, his dusty pious site. Perhaps we are only treated to the 
bit of bone so that we also catch a glimpse of the card case. The chair and fire tongs, the white 
porcelain bowl, the raspberry bonbon, the perfumed cones—these objects are both respite and 
invitation, nothing at all and yet quite telling, indeed eloquent.  
 




Rock, Paper, Scissors: Objects and Fate in the Novels of Elena Ferrante 
 
The novels of Elena Ferrante have received tremendous attention for their depiction of 
friendships, their mix of high- and low-brow style, and for the dynamics they trace between 
mothers and daughters.1 Her novels are capacious and lush, at once gossipy and complex. 
Ferrante draws on an array of literary traditions and techniques to achieve her wide-ranging 
effect, but a striking aspect of her novels is the constant appearance of simple, commonplace 
objects that seem to drive the story. Dolls, dresses, books, telephones, jewelry—these things and 
many others are threaded through all of Ferrante’s works with precision and no easy symbolic 
reading. At one time an exploding brass cooking pot seems like a negation of domestic prophecy 
in My Brilliant Friend, while at another it reappears, gleaming at a wedding. The more Ferrante 
insists on these items, the more they become essential to the relationships and identities of her 
characters.  
 Perhaps the most obvious example are the dolls that bookend the Neapolitan Quartet. 
Elena and Lila meet as girls, each playing with a doll outside their apartment building. They 
agree to trade and Lila enigmatically, almost maliciously, pushes Elena’s doll through the grate 
into the basement of the feared Don Achille. Defiantly, Elena does the same, insisting that what 
Lila does, she does. The two girls venture into the building to retrieve the dolls but cannot find 
them and conclude that Don Achille has already snatched them away. Lila decides that they must 
 
1 See Rachel Donadio, “Italy’s Great, Mysterious Storyteller,” New York Review of Books, December 18, 2014; 
Olivia Santovetti, “Melodrama or Metafiction? Elena Ferrante’s Neapolitan Novels,” Modern Language 
Review 113, no. 3 (2018): 527-45; and Lidija Haas, “Thinking Against: Elena Ferrante’s Radical Vision of 
Female Resistance,” Times Literary Supplement, September 11, 2015. 
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confront him directly, and screwing up their courage they ascend the stairs to the top apartment 
and knock on the door. Don Achille has no idea what they are talking about, but he gives them 
money to replace the dolls, which the girls spend on a copy of Little Women. This book, in turn, 
instigates the writing that eventually culminates in the book we are reading, and the missing 
dolls—along with the many emotional and psychological suggestions that surround this 
episode—become the foundational myth in the friendship of Lila and Elena.  
In the final pages of The Story of the Lost Child, the last volume in the series, Elena, who 
is now an elderly woman, discovers the dolls wrapped in newspaper on top of her mailbox in 
Turin. At this point Lila has disappeared while Elena has made a career as a novelist, believing 
all along that she is the one in control of the two friends’ narrative, especially the one we have 
been reading. But the two dolls suddenly suggest otherwise. “She had deceived me,” Elena 
thinks about Lila, “she had dragged me wherever she wanted, from the beginning of our 
friendship. All our lives she had told a story of redemption that was hers, using my living body 
and my existence.”2 But immediately, in a characteristic Ferrante turn, Elena denies this 
interpretation. “Or maybe not. Maybe those two dolls that had crossed more than half a century 
and had come all the way to Turin meant only that she was well and loved me.”3 These dolls 
could mean one thing, or they could mean another, but most of all Elena’s confrontations with 
and reactions to the objects—both as a girl and a grown woman—allow multiple things to be true 
about both girls and the terms of their relationship. Cowardice and manipulation, courage and 
 




affection, coincidence and design all swirl around these characters in the uneasy encounter with 
the thing.4  
In Ferrante’s hands, objects frequently become the instruments of destabilization and the 
means of interpretation. These mute physical objects at first appear irrefutable and easily 
defined, equally available to all characters. Yet in the space between the thing and the person, an 
array of significance arises that is at once subjectively specific and externally generated. In this 
distance between the physical and emotional, Ferrante places her dramatic movement. Objects 
never symbolize a concrete meaning in Ferrante’s works, but indicate intricate and often 
conflicting experiences, desires, and fears. And frequently the encounter with the object has 
some bearing on the capacity of a character to determine or influence an outcome, perception, or 
identity. Insofar as the object has a physical existence that extends beyond a single character’s 
perception, shrewdly manipulating or understanding the object confers on the character the 
power to control the narrative. With the dolls, Elena and Lila jockey for the upper hand, pushing 
each other’s doll through the grate, and this sets the tone for their entire relationship. In turn, 
when the dolls reappear sixty years later, they not only force Elena to reconsider her beliefs 
about her own self-determination and which one of these women has been pulling the strings, but 
insist on an uneasy finale in which definitive answers remain just out of view.  
This constant reinterpretation is central to Ferrante’s works, in which she very often 
subverts or adjusts the literary tradition in which she is operating. Combining the interests of the 
Milan Women’s Bookstore Collective with classical influences and contemporary realism, 
 
4 For a meticulous investigation of dolls across Ferrante’s works, see Elena Zagaglia, “All Literature is 
Childhood. About Elena Ferrante,” Encyclopaideia 23 (53):105-13, https://doi.org/10.6092/issn.1825-
8670/9358, as well as Nilay Kaya, “Lost Dolls, Lost Souls in Elena Ferrante’s La figlia oscura,” Annali di 
Ca’ Foscari: Rivista della Facoltà di lingue e letterature straniere dell’Università di Venezia 55, no. 1 
(2019), http://doi.org/10.30687/AnnOr/2385-3042/2019/01/022. 
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Ferrante is adamant, as she told The Paris Review, that “there is no work of literature that is not 
the fruit of tradition, of many skills, of a sort of collective intelligence.”5 And yet Ferrante’s 
novels push these traditions further, expanding them by pressing one against the other, and 
securing more various outcomes for her characters.6 To some degree, the objects in Ferrante’s 
novels and the expectations attached to them provide her with the means of exploiting generic 
anticipation and shifting narrative possibility. Just as objects can destabilize notions of control 
and meaning for Ferrante’s characters, so too do they provide one of the ways she maneuvers 
literary convention. To the same extent that the dolls transform into Little Women, their 
reappearance draws into question whether Elena has only imitated the example set by Alcott’s 
Josephine March while Lila has created the truly original story. Using dresses, dolls, cookware, 
telephones, and so many other common objects of domesticity, childhood, and marriage, 
Ferrante reconfigures expectations around the women in her novels and recasts the psychological 
landscape of their concern. In the space between the object and the subject, Ferrante shakes out 
certainty and articulates the conflicting interpretations of her characters. 
In the context of this study, Ferrante’s work offers an initial examination of the way that 
objects provide access to the expression of desires, values, and emotions that are difficult to state 
 
5 For a discussion of the influences of The Milan Women’s Bookstore Collective on Ferrante’s work, see 
Dayna Tortorici, “Those Like Us,” n+1, Issue 22, Spring 2015. For a reading on Ferrante’s engagement 
with and subversion of the expectations of contemporary realism, see Jon Baskin, “Out of Good 
Reasons,” The Point, Issue 10, June 16, 2015. Ferrante’s own thoughts on the matter were published as an 
interview with Sandro and Sandra Ferri as “The Art of Fiction, No. 228,” The Paris Review, Issue 212, 
Spring 2015. 
6 See Stefania Lucamante, “Undoing Feminism: The Neapolitan Novels of Elena Ferrante,” Italica 95, no. 
1 (2018): 31-49; Lidija Haas, “Thinking Against: Elena Ferrante’s Radical Vision of Female Resistance,” 
Times Literary Supplement, September 11, 2015; Mary Caputi, “‘The Known Footsteps of my Mother’: 
The Power of the Abyss in Elena Ferrante’s Neapolitan Novels,” Theory & Event 23, no. 3 (July 2020): 
641-663; Patrizia Sambuco, “Elena Ferrante’s L’amore Molesto: The Renegotiation of the Mother’s Body,” in 
Corporeal Bonds: The Daughter-Mother Relationship in Twentieth-Century Italian Women's Writing (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 2012), 129-51, http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.3138/9781442699496.9. 
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directly. The following chapter traces the appearance of objects in one of Ferrante’s earlier 
works, The Days of Abandonment, as a specific example of a technique she employs throughout 
her work. The analysis of the significance of objects here suggests a sense of meaning as an 
unstable interpretation that must be consistently reengaged, and that doing so capably or 
correctly is powerful. Ferrante’s characters understand themselves in part through their 
interactions with things, and both the extent and limitation of their comprehension is made 
legible to the reader in these same objects. It recalls Barthes’s description of the flowers that he 
refreshes on his mother’s bedside table. He cannot bear to abandon this chore, and thereby the 
flowers and the need to keep them fresh show us something about Barthes’s interiority—his 
unbearable sorrow—more eloquently than if he were to describe it outright. Ferrante operates in 
a similar fashion, and she uses this linguistic capacity of objects at once to revise received 
expectations and traditions and to enact her psychological drama.  
 
At the beginning of The Days of Abandonment, Olga’s husband abruptly leaves her and their two 
children. Olga does not know why he has left her. He tries to convince her that he is a poor 
choice as a husband and that she will be better off without him. But after a couple weeks his 
absence begins to register as more than a passing phase, and Olga resolves to learn the truth. She 
calmly decides to prepare his favorite meal—pasta with meatballs and potatoes—realizing that 
the only external sign of her agitation is an “inclination to disorder and a weakness in my fingers, 
and, the more anguish increased, the harder they found it to close solidly around things.”7 As she 
starts cooking, she cuts herself with a can opener, then a bottle of wine slips out of her hand and 
shatters. She reaches for a rag and knocks over the sugar bowl. All of this gives Olga such a 
 
7 Elena Ferrante, The Days of Abandonment, trans. Ann Goldstein (New York: Europa Editions, 2005), 
17. 
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sense of weariness that she goes to sleep, forgetting about her children and leaving a mess in the 
kitchen. When she wakes up, dazed, her situation returns to her but she refuses to believe she is 
helpless. She cleans the kitchen, gets the meal prepared, and when Mario arrives, she finally digs 
out the truth that yes, there is another woman. After making his admission, Mario shoves a 
forkful of pasta into his mouth, and chews vehemently until something cracks and he spits out a 
bloodied shard of glass. Reeling with fury, he jumps up, screams at Olga, and storms out, 
slamming the door behind him. 
At this point, Olga begins to spiral out of control. Mario’s affair overwhelms her, and The 
Days of Abandonment traces the unravelling of the life that Olga thought was secure. Ferrante 
accomplishes this through a variety of means, and the interactions she constructs between Olga 
and objects around her help reveal Olga’s psychological fall. At first, Olga turns to physical 
things to assert that she is not helpless. She reinforces the lock on her door, fetches a can of 
insecticide to keep the house free of ants, puts on the special earrings Mario had once given her. 
But much like her attempt to cook a meal for Mario, she proves incapable of manipulating 
objects to the ends she desires. As she fails to perform the daily tasks that once defined her 
domestic life, these objects lead her to realize how tenuous her relationship is with this world 
that was once so familiar to her, and how little she can admit about herself. At every turn and 
despite best intentions, Olga’s grappling with the physical only makes her situation worse. Her 
phone stops working, her earrings go missing, the front door refuses to open. 
The literary tradition of destroyed women is substantial, and part of Ferrante’s intention 
is to subvert the frequently tragic outcome.8 Bovary, Karenina, Effi Briest, and Medea all haunt 
 
8 This phrase, “destroyed women,” is derived from the English translation of Ferrante’s novel. The 
original, donna spezzate, might be more accurately translated as “broken woman,” as it is in 
Frantumaglia (see page 107). But the rendering in The Days of Abandonment appears to intentionally 
echo Simone de Beauvoir’s collection, The Woman Destroyed, one of the books from which Olga finds 
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these pages, but perhaps most salient is the connection to Dido, the doomed queen whose city 
burns when she is spurned by Aeneas. Dido’s Carthage is built on the values of matrimony and 
fidelity, and the stones of her temples and palaces are the objects that have been used to build 
that promise and hold it in place. When Aeneas abandons Dido and she throws herself on his 
sword atop a funeral pyre, Carthage also catches fire. Likewise, Olga has used commonplace 
things to construct her union with Mario, but when he leaves she is no longer able to control 
them. Olga’s kingdom collapses: her apartment falls into disarray, she rarely cooks any longer, 
she crashes the car, she forgets to pay the bills. 
Eventually her reckoning culminates in a single day in which Olga and her children 
become trapped in their apartment. At this point, even language has begun to deteriorate for Olga 
and she turns to physical things not only to prove she is a strong, capable woman, but to anchor 
herself in reality. And yet she remains unable to use objects the way they are supposed to be 
used. Instead, a hammer becomes an instrument for pounding on the floor, she tries turning the 
key to the locked door with her mouth, and she gives a paper cutter to her daughter with 
instructions to prick her if she becomes distracted. Suddenly Olga is using the tools at her 
disposal in bizarre, apparently psychotic ways. She has reasoned out why she must operate this 
way, and given her circumstances her logic makes a certain amount of sense. Yet on the other 
hand, because these commonplace things are not being handled according to their ostensible 
purpose—to hammer nails or cut paper—Olga also appears to have gone mad. 
 
passages copied into her own notebook that she does not remember transcribing (page 106). Early in the 
novel, when Olga attempts to rationalize her situation, she writes “La femme rompue, ah, rompue, the 
destroyed woman, destroyed, shit,” (a passage quoted at greater length below) and later, after she has 
recovered herself, she rereads passages in her notebook, “leafed through the ones about women destroyed. 
I read and felt that I was safe, I was no longer like those women” (59; 183-4). I have largely retained the 
word “destroyed” here so as to preserve the link with the intentional translation of the novel. 
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Between the first scene in which the wine bottle shatters into the meal for Mario, and the 
moment when Ilaria cuts a long gash down the side of Olga’s leg, objects both transfigure Olga 
and reveal aspects of her psyche that she cannot grasp directly and perhaps is not even aware of. 
Olga’s incompetent relationship with things first asserts how unprepared she is to contend with 
Mario’s departure. Then her illogical use of the objects reveals how close she is to unredeemable 
insanity, and threatens to condemn her to a literary tradition of destroyed women. Finally, Olga’s 
interaction with objects after she does escape her apartment and begins stitching her life back 
together accompany a return to logic and coherence. These things retain the history of Olga’s 
experience, and present her with a continuing interpretation of her self and the rest of the world. 
Throughout, they serve as an indicator of Olga’s psychological state, functioning as a kind of 
secondary vocabulary of her predicament and preparing the transformation from victim to 
survivor.  
 
After Mario finds the glass in his pasta and storms out, Olga slowly begins to clear the table. 
Then the dog needs to go out. “Everything pointed out to me the practical consequences of 
abandonment,” Olga thinks. “From now on it would be like this, responsibilities that had 
belonged to us both would now be mine alone.”9 This is the first apprehension of her new 
situation, and she warns herself not to neglect these household duties. Doing so, she fears, will 
transform her into the grief-stricken, doomed women she has read about in books or the 
abandoned poverella of her childhood who, after her husband had left her, was consumed by 
tears and eventually drowned herself. Immediately, the physical objects around Olga seem to 
promise a way through, if only she can keep them all in order. She hopes that if she can perform 
 
9 Ferrante, Days of Abandonment, 20. 
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the daily tasks with what is at hand, she will not only retain some degree of control and perhaps 
even convince Mario to return, but will avoid the fate that she was raised to believe was 
inevitable for the abandoned woman.  
 Yet already in the cooking incident, a direct link is established between Olga’s anguish 
and her ability to manipulate the physical. Olga knows this to be true, yet she does not want to 
take seriously what it signifies. In the weeks following Mario’s departure she denies what her 
bumbling incompetence suggests and, desperate to avert disaster, frantically focuses on the 
aspects of her life that she can control. She turns to language as the rational, ordered way to 
maintain and determine her identity. She becomes obsessed with the way she speaks, and writes 
long letters to Mario in the belief that if she could put everything down on the page, she might 
see where things went wrong. Most of all she implores herself to pay attention to the world 
around her: do not forget to turn off the stove, remember to take the dog out, be sure to pay the 
bills. She is terrified she will neglect her children in some irrevocable way, noting a growing 
sense of danger about the “physical requirements of their lives” and increasing anxiety that she 
might not only fail to meet their needs, but could even harm them.10 For years, Olga has built her 
identity on the successful execution of these daily tasks, and in her frantic attempt to parry 
Mario’s absence, she looks to the common household objects and errands of her middleclass life 
to sustain her, as if manipulating these things correctly and executing the duties of a responsible 
woman, mother, and wife will deliver her from coming undone.  
 Yet Olga’s new position is more complex than she can admit to herself. Mario has not 
left because Olga had failed to keep the house organized and the children fed; he has abandoned 
her because he has fallen in love with another woman. Or, more to the point, he has stopped 
 
10 Ibid., 27. 
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loving Olga. This truth is excruciating for Olga who has devoted herself to their union—to 
homebuilding and childrearing, but also to the honesty, loyalty, and affection of a partnership—
essentially wrapping her entire identity into the act of loving this man. Years ago she gave up her 
job and then her hope of writing novels, taking on her role as mother and wife at the exclusion of 
her professional ambitions. Olga’s entire self-worth is centered on the success of her 
relationship, and despite Mario’s infidelity she still wants him back; she still loves him. The 
psychological circumstances she must suddenly navigate revolve around the possibility that she 
herself—as a wife and mother, but most of all as a woman—is not worthwhile. As long as she 
persists in her love for Mario, she can never be free from the anguish that his rejection causes in 
its judgement of her as insufficient in all of these categories. Olga wants to live fully, yet the 
absence of Mario creates an instability in her life that she cannot reconcile. In the most damning 
and traditional sense, she does not know how to be a woman if she does not have a husband to 
love. Whereas Olga had spent the entirety of her marriage to Mario carefully circumscribing 
herself to fit the mold of their partnership (bearing and raising the children, fielding and 
encouraging Mario’s professional development), she now confronts a void in which these things 
no longer count, and perhaps were only ever false indicators of stability and happiness. 
“He’s gone, you’re still here,” she writes to herself. “You’ll no longer enjoy the gleam of 
his eyes, of his words, but so what? Organize your defenses, preserve your wholeness, don’t let 
yourself break like an ornament, you’re not a knickknack, no woman is a knickknack. La femme 
rompue, ah, rompue, the destroyed woman, destroyed, shit. My job, I thought, is to demonstrate 
that one can remain healthy. Demonstrate it to myself, no one else.”11 When Olga tries to save 
herself by performing the duties of a responsible wife, she is only engaged superficially with her 
 
11 Ibid., 57. 
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predicament. Olga mistakes household duties for the key to her deliverance, yet the only way 
that Olga can truly transcend the damning judgement of Mario’s departure is to stop loving him. 
This, of course, is the revelation at the end of the long day trapped in her apartment that suddenly 
allows Olga to free herself and move on with her life. But to arrive at this moment, Olga must 
contend with her misconceptions about her own missteps. Ferrante dramatizes this in Olga’s 
inability to force the physical world to yield to her control, and to confront the fact that even if 
she could manipulate the things as she intends, doing so does not deliver her from the pain of her 
separation. As Olga’s anguish increases in her attempts to understand her own inadequacy, so 
does her inability to handle daily affairs, despite her vigilance. There is a psychological 
shortcoming here exemplified in the mismanagement of common objects that in turn sets up the 
full extent of the change Olga must undergo to prevent her ruin. 
Four objects in particular—the phone, earrings, can of insecticides, and door—force Olga 
into the reckoning of Saturday, August 4th, and all of them gain their significance in Olga’s 
attempts to assert herself. After Mario leaves, Olga begins calling their mutual friends to find out 
as much as she can about Mario’s girlfriend. Hoping for reassurances, she uncovers only scraps 
of information and tortures herself filling in the details and entertaining further doubts about 
herself. A few weeks later Mario calls on Olga’s cellphone. There is something wrong with the 
landline he reports: all he can hear are hissing sounds and distant conversations of strangers. He 
wants to come collect a few things, a visit that provides Olga the perfect excuse to show him all 
that he has forsaken by leaving. She cleans the house for the first time in weeks, puts on makeup, 
and selects a pair of earrings that belonged to Mario’s grandmother and that he has only 
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permitted her to wear once before. The evening is a disaster—Olga cannot control herself—and 
just before Mario leaves he tells her not to wear those earrings anymore, “they don’t suit you.”12  
Olga’s mania increases and the following day she returns to the phone to call friends for 
more information, as if she has exhausted her own insight. But Mario was right, the phone does 
not work. Olga tries her cellphone but it runs out of batteries and she throws it against the wall, 
breaking it. The next day she discovers that ants have invaded her apartment. She retrieves a can 
of insecticides and sprays the poison everywhere. “I did it uneasily, feeling that the spray can 
might well be a living extension of my organism” but nonetheless assiduously, until every corner 
of the house is covered and the ants appear to be defeated.13 Then, after taking the dog for a 
walk, she discovers that the apartment door is open and the earrings are missing. Olga knows 
that, of course, it was Mario who snuck into the house and took back the earrings, but she 
chooses to believe instead that it was someone else, some anonymous thieves. She will have to 
have the door reinforced, she resolves, because that is what a strong, competent woman would 
do. 
At this point, Olga sees in her relationship with things both evidence of her self-worth 
and means of her defense. The phone, earrings, can of insecticides, and door are all approached 
as objects of security, but her focus on them in these narrow terms reveals a willful lack of 
insight. Rather than solve her problems, these objects only frustrate Olga’s situation further. 
When the door eventually becomes responsible for Olga’s confinement on Saturday the 4th, it is 
as though it is the culmination of her misguided and incomplete thinking. There is no real reason 
for Olga to have the door reinforced, and if she could allow herself to admit that it was Mario, 
not thieves, who stole the earrings, her predicament on Saturday might have been different. Here, 
 
12 Ibid., 43. 
13 Ibid., 49. 
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Olga confuses domestic responsibility (the need to protect her home) with the significance of 
Mario’s actions. She invents a threat so that she can perform competence, when in fact the more 
helpful but difficult course of action is an admission about who this man is that she insists on 
loving. Mario cannot bear to part with his grandmother’s earrings—he can abandon his dog, his 
children, his home, and his wife, but not the earrings. This is not the image of a man Olga has 
fallen in love with, but she cannot yet bring herself to see in Mario this childish shortcoming.  
 In the days leading up to Saturday the 4th, Olga cannot get the phone to work properly. 
Most of the time it is dead, or filled with hissing sounds. Olga wonders if perhaps she has 
forgotten to pay the bill (which she admits doing since Mario left). Olga tries calling the phone 
company from a pay phone, agrees to pay more money, but the situation does not improve and 
she resolves to visit the company headquarters in person to complain. At the office, a man 
indifferently informs her that there is no one to complain to because everything is digitalized. 
Exasperated, Olga retreats, nearly faint from all the exertion, and as she rounds the corner she 
sees Mario with his lover, and understands for the first time that the woman is the same young 
girl Mario tutored years ago, who had been at the center of their only preceding marital crisis. 
They are window shopping, and Carla is wearing the earrings.  
 It is a pivotal scene—Olga flies into a rage and attacks them, knocking Mario to the 
ground and kicking him. Then she turns toward Carla. Olga wants to pull the earrings from 
Carla’s ears along with her flesh, exposing her as nothing more than a receptacle for “the 
insupportable horror of our living nature.”14 Olga sees this girl as the embodiment of Mario’s 
crude desire and an affirmation of her own inadequacy. The realization comes out in garbled 
fragments of sentences, and Olga knows she appears incoherent, but internally she is beginning 
 
14 Ibid., 72. 
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to understand. Eventually Mario pushes her away and carries off Carla, leaving Olga drained in 
the middle of the street. “For what could I do, I had lost everything, all of myself, all, 
irremediably.”15 In this moment the earrings describe to Olga a sexual reality of Mario’s choice 
that she has not yet been able to admit. Later that evening, as she sits in front of a handful of 
sleeping pills and a full glass of cognac, Olga insists to herself that the love she had believed in 
was nothing more than an exaggeration of sexual chance. At one point Mario desired Olga, and 
she was foolish to believe that this signified more than base desire. It was not love, it was just the 
fulfillment of an animal function.  
This is, of course, a pessimistic reduction, but it is the first time Olga has entertained the 
notion that the reason for Mario’s departure could be anything other than her own fault. The 
phone and the earrings propel her into this new position, one both dangerous and violent. She is 
about to down the pills and cognac when she catches sight of Carrano, her downstairs neighbor, 
and recalls that she has his wallet, which she found in front of the building months ago but forgot 
to return. Almost as an experiment, Olga uses this object to gain entry into Carrano’s apartment 
and seduce him, as if a sexual conquest of her own would make her even with her husband and 
prove her desirability. But the episode turns sordid and unsatisfying, and Olga retreats to her 
apartment. On the stairwell she sees the poverella, the first appearance of this ghostly image 
from Olga’s past, who taunts her from the corner. Olga rushes into her apartment and is able to 
calm herself only by saying out loud: “I love my husband and so all this has meaning.”16 She 
falls asleep with this sentence in her head, and when she wakes up it is the morning of Saturday 
the 4th. 
 
15 Ibid., 73. 
16 Ibid., 88. 
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 Ferrante has positioned objects around Olga that eventually lead her to the day of her 
reckoning. Olga has attempted to use these things to assert herself over and against the 
condemnation of Mario’s rejection. They are all common objects that for years Olga has capably 
controlled to build her life with Mario and her identity as a woman. Yet now they do not yield. 
What Olga wants from these things, they are no longer able to deliver, and her refusal to accept 
the full significance of this shortcoming propels her into increasingly tormented positions and 
eventually to the edge of madness.  
 
The image of the “woman destroyed” has always haunted Olga. Since she was a girl she has seen 
the story repeat itself again and again, yet insisted to herself that such women were pathetic—too 
weak and foolish to avoid tragedy. The poverella and other abandoned women in novels and 
plays who descend into helpless pain and ignoble deaths when the men they love leave, strike 
Olga as cautionary tales, and she believed herself more careful, more capable. Olga both feared 
this fate more than any other, and convinced herself that she was beyond such a tragedy. But 
with Mario’s departure, Olga is forced to reconsider who she is and the fact that she may not be 
impervious to the same suffering she has loathed in others. She starts to waver between the past 
and present, among versions of herself and the stories of her childhood. The daily errands, caring 
for her children, preparing meals, keeping the house clean—all of it comes up against an 
unwillingness to believe she has become the very thing she most despised. 
As different iterations of Olga’s predicament appear to her throughout the Saturday in her 
apartment, the context in which she is struggling expands. In addition to Olga’s personal 
reckoning—confronting her affections for Mario and what she believed about the solidity of their 
life together—Ferrante establishes a literary precedent of tragedy that she then subverts when 
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Olga survives. The writing that Olga has been doing in her diary has been her attempt to 
understand what is happening to her and where she went wrong.17 As Saturday unfolds, Olga 
finds this notebook open in the living room with passages transcribed from de Beauvoir’s The 
Woman Destroyed and Tolstoy’s Anna Karenina that she does not remember copying out but are 
there on the page in her tiny handwriting and underlined in red. She sees three questions Anna 
asks herself in a sudden lucid flash, just as she falls to her hands and knees in front of the train, 
“Where am I? What am I doing? Why?” Olga knows the passage well but cannot answer the 
questions for herself. “I was lost in the where am I, in the what am I doing,” she realizes. “I was 
mute beside the why.”18 Despite recognizing herself in these passages, Olga’s intense focus on 
the practical demands of her domestic life has rendered her incapable of addressing the more 
fundamental question about why she is acting this way. 
Anna’s words also recall Dido’s at the moment when Aeneas sails from Carthage. In a fit 
of rage Dido orders her ships to pursue him then recalls herself. “What am I saying? Where am 
I? What madness / Takes me out of myself?”19 Both Dido and Anna have sudden moments of 
clarity just before they succumb when they can see the extent of their own role in their undoing, 
but it is too late for them to change course. Ferrante, on the other hand, threads bits of lucid self-
reflection throughout The Days of Abandonment in moments when Olga catches herself before 
making some mistake, or reflects on events after they have transpired. This is a kind of self-
surveillance that Ferrante has highlighted elsewhere, insisting that certain women “practice a 
 
17 In her interview for The Paris Review, Ferrante emphasizes that all her novels, though written in the 
first person, are imagined in the third as women who are leaving written testimony of their lives. She 
remarks that in moments of crisis, women often “try to calm themselves by writing” and she adapts this 
assumption in protagonists who write in order to understand themselves. Ferrante insists that by 
approaching her protagonists in this way, she herself can believe in her character. “It’s principally the 
truth of her writing that engages me,” she says (see Frantumaglia, 285). 
18 Ibid., 107. 
19 Virgil, The Aeneid, trans. Robert Fitzgerald (New York: Vintage Classics, 1990), 4.825-7. 
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conscious surveillance on themselves,” a self-criticism in which “the female body has learned the 
need to watch over itself, to take care of its own expansion, its own vigor.”20 Rather than being 
policed by her husband, society, or parents, Olga is her own supervisor, a modern woman who is 
only beholden to herself and therefore constantly exercising a self-criticism that is by turns 
helpful and damning.  
This type of self-surveillance has been one of the tools Olga has employed to fashion a 
life for herself with Mario and their children. By keeping any untoward urges or inclinations in 
check, and eliminating any hints of hysteria or vulgarity, Olga has been able to project and 
actualize the image of womanhood that she desires. This is part of the calculation that informs 
her focus on the household responsibilities in Mario’s absence, and it recalls not only Karenina 
and Dido, but Emma Bovary and Medea as well. Ferrante seems to want to deliver her 
protagonist from this literary precedent in which self-surveillance comes too late, or only serves 
to facilitate tragedy by making suicide the logical conclusion. Olga is close to this the night she 
sits with the pills and cognac, wallowing in disgust for the attraction she believed was love and 
her own inadequacy on these terms. Likewise, Dido’s grief at the departure of Aeneas ravages 
her mind to the point where she sees no recourse except to die as she “deserves.”21  
Virgil’s martyr is, of course, not only a wife and a queen, but also in the process of 
building a city. When Aeneas first arrives in Carthage, he is amazed by the construction—
workers laying courses for walls, rolling stones for citadels, dredging harbors, quarrying pillars 
for a theatre. “How fortunate these are / Whose city walls are rising here and now!” he cries 
out.22 He enters a temple planned for Juno, the god of marriage and childbirth, and after 
 
20 Elena Ferrante, Frantumaglia: A Writer’s Journey, trans. Ann Goldstein (New York: Europa Editions, 
2016), 103-4. 
21 Virgil, Aeneid 4.758. 
22 Ibid., 1.595-6. 
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marveling at the craftsmanship and the reliefs depicting the Trojan War, sees Dido for the first 
time, striding among her people, encouraging them in their work. Ferrante notes that in Virgil’s 
use, the city of Carthage is not just a background but a potential: “material that is being worked, 
stone exploded at times by the internal moments of the two characters.”23 As the passion 
compounds between Dido and Aeneas, the city reacts, construction pauses, waiting to see what 
kind of city it will become—one ruled by a joyful marriage or mired in the rage of abandonment. 
Ferrante suggests that the stones themselves feel, and will respond to the actions of the humans, 
as though both are characters. Indeed, as Dido falls upon the sword, fires erupt: “As though all 
Carthage or old Tyre fell / To storming enemies, and, out of hand, / Flames billowed on the roofs 
of men and gods.”24 With her final breath, Dido curses Aeneas, and his future Rome, calling for 
eternal enmity between the two cities. “No love, / No pact must be between our peoples.”25 The 
city constructed on the premise of marriage and childbirth, founded by a woman who secured the 
land through her facility with needle and thread, and built as a living repudiation to the 
murderous city of Dido’s past, is cursed and burns. 
 Olga too has attempted to build a city dedicated to marriage and childrearing that 
repudiates a past of violence. This is her home, the small apartment she shares with Mario, where 
she believed they were joined in a common vision. When Mario leaves, when some god whispers 
in his dreams that he is made for other shores, Olga’s construction pauses. The house becomes 
chaotic, Olga forgets the children at school, the phone stops working, jewelry goes missing, and 
ants invade. She installs a reinforced door, suspicious of everyone. In both cases—Dido’s and 
Olga’s—the feminine city does not entirely know how to proceed. The creation made from 
 
23 Ferrante, Frantumaglia, 149. 
24 Virgil, Aeneid 4.927-9. 
25 Ibid., l. 867-8. 
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objects of domesticity erodes with the introduction of hostility, betrayal, abandonment—those 
things antithetical to stereotypical female instinct. Yet Ferrante insists that Olga is not 
necessarily condemned to Dido’s fate and could transcend both the trappings of the idealized 
home and the constricting animosity, anxiety, and doubt she encounters in its destabilization. As 
the phone, door, and can of insecticides morph from innocuous, useful objects of domesticity 
into agents of overwhelming psychological uncertainty, Olga’s literary and cultural precedents 
are laid bare and Ferrante maneuvers her into a scenario in which she will either change and 
prevail or hold fast and be destroyed. 
As in many of her works, Ferrante appears to be searching in The Days of Abandonment 
for a new kind of language, one that both engages the intensity of desertion and offers a literary 
alternative to the tradition of tragedy. To understand the severity of Olga’s situation, Ferrante 
seems to say, we do not necessarily have to watch her annihilate herself. To get to this point, 
Ferrante unhinges Olga’s language to break her out of the literary trajectory yawning before her. 
At first Olga is unable to control the way that she speaks (she spews vulgarities), then she stops 
recognizing the words that appear in her own notebook. As the events of Saturday the 4th 
unravel, her language becomes less and less reliable as the means of understanding and decisive 
action. It is as though Ferrante wants to establish, or even quote the language that typically 
surrounds a character in Olga’s position, and then shake Olga away from its logical conclusion. 
In a 2003 essay, Ferrante writes about “frantumaglia,” a jumbled state of mind in which the logic 
of language breaks down.26 Many of Ferrante’s protagonists contend with this lapse in one way 
 
26 In a written letter to Sandra Ozzola in 2003, Ferrante reports that she picked this term up from her 
mother who used it to indicate a certain state of mind in which emotion and intellect appear to conspire 
against language. Ferrante admits to suffering a similar loss of stability herself, and describes it vividly 
(see Frantumaglia, 99-100). In her Paris Review interview, Ferrante maintains that for her writing is an 
act of conveying this state of mind into language, and thereby funneling all the relevant tradition and 
experience into a “concretely narratable object” (see Frantumaglia, 288). 
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or another, and here Olga’s ability to express herself to herself, and to comprehend the world 
through language, deteriorates. She finds that she is talking to herself and carrying on 
conversations with the poverella. Desperate, she turns to objects to keep herself planted in the 
realm of logic. “I had to anchor myself to things,” she insists, “accept their solidity, believe in 
their permanence.”27  
Here is some articulation of the motivations behind Olga’s actions throughout the novel. 
If she proves incapable, careless, irresponsible with physical things in the absence of Mario, 
Olga will not be able to exonerate herself from her own suspicion that she is indeed a failed 
woman and does not deserve Mario or the life she thought they were building together. While 
Olga’s self-denigration stands to dissolve her into confusion in which she cannot understand 
what has happened, the physical objects that substantiate the domestic tasks appear to offer her 
an alternative by which she can remain attached. Insofar as a key, a hammer, and a thermometer 
are simple objects with straightforward, unambiguous uses, they provide Olga a potential 
substitute for the slippery language she has not been able to corral into an adequate explanation 
of her situation. And yet she cannot read the thermometer and does not know how to get the 
phone to work to call the doctor for her sick son. Olga has always feared that she would “grow 
up and become like the poverella,” and believes that as long as she can say to herself that she is 
adequately resisting the humiliation of her abandonment, and believe it, she will not succumb to 
this fate. Before the pivotal Saturday, objects had offered her concrete evidence of this 
competence, and as her words slip away from her and she becomes increasingly distracted, she 
turns to them again. “I was reacting well,” she insists just before she tries to turn the key in the 
 
27 Ferrante, Days of Abandonment, 114. For an extended discussion of how frantumaglia determines the 
plot of The Days of Abandonment, see Victor Xavier Zarour Zarzar, “The Grammar of Abandonment in I 
giorni dell'abbandono,” MLN 135, no. 1 (2020): 327-344. doi:10.1353/mln.2020.0004. 
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door, “very well, I was holding tight around me the parts of my life, compliments, Olga, in spite 
of everything I wasn’t leaving myself.”28  
Yet notwithstanding her best efforts, the key will not turn in the lock. Desperate, Olga 
goes to the storage closet and fetches the hammer to pound out the door. Again she fails, and 
starts inventing new uses for these things. She hands the hammer to Ilaria and tells her to pound 
on the floor, without stopping, until Carrano comes to check on them. She attaches a paperclip to 
her arm so that the pain will recall her to herself. She ties a crowbar to a piece of string and 
swings it around outside below her balcony until it smashes through Carrano’s window. When 
the paper clip stops working, she hands a paper cutter to Ilaria with instructions to prick her 
whenever she seems too distracted, too detached. Eventually all she can think to do with the 
stubborn key at the door is to put it in her mouth, to attempt turning it with her entire body. In the 
context of Olga’s situation—both physical and mental—her reasoning for this behavior makes 
some sense: if she can attract Carrano’s attention, he might be able to help; if she keeps floating 
away from her immediate surroundings, pain in her body might keep her present; if turning the 
key with her hand will not work, maybe her mouth will be better. However, these are not how 
these objects are intended to be used, and when Olga can do nothing besides frantically distort 
their function, we understand that her belief in the physical control of the house has failed to 
protect her from the detachment she has so feared. It is the failure of objects in Olga’s hands to 
mean what they have meant before—the hammer no longer means nail-driver, the paper cutter 
no longer cuts paper, and the reinforced door no longer protects Olga from thieves but endangers 
her entire family––that reveals the precarious teetering of Olga’s mind.  
 
28 Ibid., 116. 
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At this point, the physical objects of the novel have shifted the interpretation of Olga’s 
psychological state. Initially the outlet by which Ferrante expresses Olga’s tenuous reaction to 
the guilt and turbulence surrounding Mario’s departure, objects have now become the means of 
destabilizing her conception of how domestic precedent might serve her, and draw into question 
her grasp on what is real and what is not. Furthermore, Olga’s frustrated, ineffective, and perhaps 
even detrimental relationship with things begins to evoke suspicion about herself. Along with the 
hissing phone and the stubborn lock, the dented insecticide can calls her actions into question. 
Did she spray so much insecticide that she poisoned her whole household? “What was I? A 
woman worn out by four months of tension and grief; not, surely, a witch who, out of 
desperation, secretes a poison that can give a fever to her male child, kill a domestic animal, put 
a telephone out of order, ruin the mechanism of a reinforced door lock.”29 These things 
undermine Olga’s sense of purpose and her certainty about how to avert the disaster she feels is 
close at hand. But they also raise a troubling question that she cannot quite bare to look at 
directly: Is all her bumbling incompetence evidence of her unworthiness, or has it been, to some 
subconscious extent, deliberate? Did she actually intend to ruin the phone? Has she intentionally 
failed to use her key correctly? Did she mean to feed her husband glass and seal herself and her 
children into their poison-coated apartment?  
When Olga asks this question, it is still framed in terms of some fundamental 
shortcoming—is she simply exhausted or a witch who unintentionally secretes toxin? Yet the 
interactions Olga has with objects that consistently morph into dangerous scenarios pushes the 
question beyond accident and toward intent. Olga has, after all, been an extraordinarily 
competent woman her whole life, fashioning a functional identity from the raw materials of 
 
29 Ibid., 118. 
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domesticity. She knows how to use things, and that is where the danger lies. Through Olga’s 
dealings with objects, Ferrante can suggest malicious possibilities about Olga that might 
otherwise seem overblown. Stating directly that Olga contemplates suicide or would like to kill 
Mario would flatten this character, and is not actually in keeping with the person Olga seems to 
be. Olga does not think these things—she is the kind of person who avoids such admissions and 
convinces herself otherwise. By explicitly rolling such intentions into Olga’s internal discourse, 
Ferrante would surrender this character to aesthetically trite formulations, and a literature of 
hysterical women that she wants to avoid. Yet such possibilities are a part of Olga’s situation, 
and through objects Ferrante secures a manner of obliquely incorporating them. Ferrante leaves 
intention ambiguous, which in turn expands the scope of what Olga may hope to accomplish and 
makes her simultaneously guilty and innocent.  
To some degree, Ferrante’s depiction of Olga’s bewildered encounters with objects and 
the unconscious desire these things suggest achieves with objects a similar effect as the 
frantumaglia does with language. The physical world becomes both jumbled and threatening, 
something Olga may or may not use correctly according to reasons she may or may not 
understand.30 As such, Ferrante succeeds in troubling the precedent of a women destroyed 
linguistically, physically, and psychologically to the point where the path toward ruin and 
salvation seem equally possible. As the Saturday wears on, the responsibility for delivering the 
family, a responsibility that should be Olga’s, falls to her daughter, Ilaria. Again, Ferrante inverts 
 
30 A similar moment transpires in My Brilliant Friend when the boundaries of the world begin to dissolve 
around Lila. “It seemed to her that everyone was shouting too loudly and moving too quickly. This 
sensation was accompanied by nausea, and she had had the impression that something absolutely 
material, which had been present around her and around everyone and everything forever, but 
imperceptible, was breaking down the outlines of persons and things and revealing itself” (89-90). 
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the tradition in which Karenina and Bovary abandon their children, and enacts a kind of 
restructuring through the relationship between mother and daughter.  
Ilaria pricks her mother three times with the papercutter. The first instance occurs while 
Olga is lost in contempt for Carrano who does not answer her cries for help but did accept the 
chance for sex the previous evening; the second while she is recalling her inability to use a key in 
the door of a cabin where she and Mario spent a weekend with Carla who, at the time, criticized 
Olga for being too involved with the children and not prioritizing her own intellectual work; and 
finally as Olga is fumbling with the key at her own door, believing that perhaps Mario’s 
departure has robbed her of the physical ability to correctly use such an object. Each of these are 
precise iterations of the confinement that Olga is desperately trying to escape. Male sexual 
demands, domestic interference with intellectual and professional ambition, and the lack of 
practical acumen that would allow Olga to escape her own house and properly care for her 
children—Ilaria’s prick pulls Olga out of each and anchors her in her own specificity. In doing 
so, Ferrante secures for Olga the salvation that was not available to Karenina and Bovary, not at 
the hands of the man who has abandoned her or even through herself, but by the insistence of her 
daughter. Olga seeks to arrest the pattern of destroyed women that is passed from generation to 
generation, that haunted her own childhood and determined the great works of literature. Ilaria’s 
handling of the object, though violent and contrary to the intended use of a papercutter, is at last 
effective: it keeps Olga attached.  
 
As a result, Olga does eventually find her way out of her apartment and establishes an 
independent life. Only after Ilaria has returned her mother forcefully to the present can Olga 
admit to herself that she no longer loves Mario, inverting the sentence that calmed her down after 
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her embarrassing sexual encounter with Carrano and the arrival of the poverella. After Ilaria 
makes the cut above Olga’s knee, Olga locks the children in their room and goes to the study 
where Otto, the family dog, is dying. At the moment when Otto expires, the confusion that has 
plagued Olga’s language and actions also evaporates. She realizes “that Mario had become again 
the good man he had perhaps always been, I no longer loved him.”31 This is the fundamental 
move that she has been unable to make for months: to forgive Mario and resolve within herself a 
new truth. Only then does Gianni revive, Carrano ring the bell, and the key turn in the door’s 
lock. Once again things function as they should.  
What is it about Otto’s passing that allows Olga to finally utter these words? Or rather, 
why is it that the dog is the object around which Olga’s realizations cohere? To some extent the 
connection is obvious: Otto was, essentially, Mario’s dog, a gift to the children that Mario cared 
for and that viewed Mario as his master. In a sense, Otto is Mario’s property, the embodiment of 
this man’s lapsed interest in his family. When the dog dies, so does Mario’s claim on the family. 
But perhaps there is something more. First, there is always a question of poison surrounding 
Otto—there is a rumor that someone, perhaps even Carrano, leaves strychnine-soaked biscuits in 
the park. That someone might kill Otto is a looming threat and after Olga has regained some 
control, she cannot shake a tormenting sense of guilt that she was responsible for the animal’s 
death. Perhaps she was too careless with the insecticides, spraying them all over the house. She 
does, after all, find the can dented by Otto’s teeth and the little spray cap missing. In this way the 
dog’s existence becomes entwined with the can of insecticides. Then later, Olga comes home one 
day to find the children playing “dog”—Ilaria has the collar around her neck and Gianni is 
pulling her on the leash, threatening her and demanding obedience. Olga confiscates the collar 
 
31 Ferrante, Days of Abandonment, 146. 
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and locks herself in the bathroom where, before she can stop herself, she slips it around her own 
neck. “When I realized what I was doing I began to cry and threw it all in the garbage.”32  
On the one hand we could read this as further commentary on the lingering idea of 
domestic stability that Mario afforded. But the association between the dog and the can of 
insecticides is perhaps useful for complicating the merely symbolic. Realizing her responsibility 
for Otto’s wellbeing was the very first moment Olga faced Mario’s departure as a new fact of her 
life. It marked the beginning of her campaign to perform the domestic duties capably in order to 
survive her ordeal and perhaps even entice Mario to return. On the morning of her tortured 
Saturday, the last time Olga leaves her apartment before being locked inside, she takes Otto to 
the park. A few hours later, she finds the dog ill in Mario’s study, filling the room with a terrible 
stench. Immediately Olga is disgusted that all of Mario’s things are still here, and humiliated, 
“even more humiliated than I had felt in all these months” that after taking care of Otto all this 
time, the dog would, in his sickness, still retreat to the room that most fully retained the traces of 
Mario.33  
Hours later, Olga discovers the can of insecticides next to the bookcase, dented by Otto’s 
teeth. At this point she has become significantly disoriented. As she picks up the can, she hears a 
voice saying, “At times the solidity of things is entrusted to irritating elements that appear to 
disrupt their cohesion.”34 Olga looks up from the can to see the poverella sitting at her desk, a 
gruesome image of herself who, after uttering these words, goes back to writing in Olga’s 
notebook. This is a baffling sentence that could mean in multiple directions. Olga has just 
considered that the ants, which have returned and are crawling along the base of the bookshelf, 
 
32 Ibid., 156. 
33 Ibid., 109. 
34 Ibid., 126. 
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are in fact not enemies, but a force holding the house together—an irritating but important 
element. Perhaps this peculiar formulation suggests the first counter to Olga’s presumption that 
her salvation lies in her ability to perform her domestic responsibilities, like keeping the 
apartment free of ants and taking out the dog. Maybe the very thing that appears to disrupt, or 
that Olga believes to be unwanted, is what will offer her cohesion. Olga has never considered 
getting rid of the dog; she unquestioningly took up its care in Mario’s absence. Likewise, she 
always presumed that her affection for Mario was warranted, and in fact that their union was the 
only thing between her and disgrace. This belief has been embodied in her domestic fealty and to 
abandon this notion, Olga is sure, is to resign herself to the life of the poverella. And yet the 
poverella’s warning seems to suggest otherwise: if Olga could accept the irritating elements of 
her separation—namely, that she has been wrong to believe she needed Mario and is thereby 
largely mistaken about her identity and the tremendous effort she has made to maintain it—she 
might find real solidity. 
Olga peers over the poverella’s shoulder, and recognizes the handwriting as her own. She 
feels the weight of the can in her hand and wonders if maybe she had been spraying the 
insecticide all night, and perhaps that was why Gianni and the dog were ill. “Or maybe not. My 
opaque sides were inventing culpability that Olga did not have. Painting me careless, 
irresponsible, incompetent, leading me to a self-denigration that would later confuse the real 
situation and keep me from marking its margins, establish what was, what was not.”35 This is the 
first time Olga catches a glimpse of what she is doing to herself. Over and again, Olga blames 
herself and invents fault that she can only answer with domestic competence. Yet at this 
moment, she sees past herself, almost as if she’s been let in on a secret. Otto and the insecticides 
 
35 Ibid., 127. 
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frame her encounter with such a moment. In the dog’s last moment, Olga’s proximity to “real 
death . . . unexpectedly made me ashamed of my grief of the previous months, of that day with 
its overtones of unreality. . . . How could I have let myself go like that?”36 There is a sense of 
calm returning here alongside the perspective that has been thus far eluding Olga.  
As Otto dies, Olga clears herself of any claim to or involvement in male desire and 
romantic entanglement. These aspects continue to swirl around Olga as she puts her life back 
together and reclaims her sense of womanhood. The object of the dog becomes inseparable from 
notions of poison, culpability, and obligation, and it continues to mediate Olga’s interaction with 
men and her past. Unable to shake her sense of guilt about Otto’s death, Olga visits a 
veterinarian who assures her that it was likely strychnine, not insecticide, that caused such a 
death. “You have no responsibility other than that of being a very sensitive woman,” the vet tells 
her, to which Olga responds, “Excess of sensitivity can also be a fault.”37 Still harsh with herself 
though also more realistically wary, Olga tries to push past this man who uses a patronizing tone 
to flatter Olga, and she is compelled to eventually rebuff him at a dinner party. Again the 
dynamic between responsibility and desire is linked to the things Olga has been handling, and the 
man’s advances come with an unabashed sexual condescension that Olga now recognizes as 
noxious.  
But the image of the dog keeps recurring. That evening Carrano knocks on Olga’s door. 
It is the first time she’s seen him since he took Otto’s dead body away from her house and buried 
it. Olga is hesitant but welcomes him inside. In the living room he picks up the dented can of 
insecticides and asks why she has not thrown it away. Olga tells him the vet’s diagnosis of 
strychnine, suggesting that it was Carrano who killed Otto. He becomes flustered, insists that he 
 
36 Ibid., 145. 
37 Ibid., 158. 
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was only trying to warn them about the poisoned dog biscuits, and calls Mario arrogant. Olga 
brushes him off, saying that Mario “has the flaws of us all . . . a man like so many others,” and 
admits that she did hardly anything more noble when she came to Carrano’s apartment that 
Friday evening.38 Their sexual encounter meant nothing to her, she says bluntly. Carrano is 
stricken. He admits that their evening together was very important to him, and when Olga 
unsympathetically cuts him off, he murmurs, “You are no different from your husband.”39 Then 
he makes to leave and hands the insecticide can back to Olga before walking out, closing the 
door gently behind him (unlike Mario who was always slamming it). For days the conversation 
irritates Olga, not only Carrano’s accusation that she is like Mario but the ways these men—
Carrano and the vet—have described her husband. Was he really an aggressive opportunist? 
Meanwhile she keeps hearing the sounds of the dog licking water from his bowl as she tries to 
sort through the answers.  
It is not until Olga’s friend invites her to a musical performance that she sees her 
neighbor in a different light—he is the cellist and delivers a remarkable performance, full of 
harmonies and exalted feeling. Olga is taken aback and at the end feels as though “the shade of 
Otto had joyously crossed the scene like a dark vein through bright, living flesh.”40 On the way 
home Olga’s friend tells her the vet has been asking after her, using the dog as an excuse. Olga 
does not go back to the vet, in part because the notion of a rash sexual encounter repels her, but 
also because “I no longer wanted to know if it was strychnine or something else that had killed 
Otto. The dog had fallen through a hole in the net of events. We leave so many of them, 
 
38 Ibid., 161. 
39 Ibid. 
40 Ibid., 176. 
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lacerations of negligence, when we put together cause and effect. The essential thing was that the 
string, the weave that now supported me, should hold.”41  
During this time Olga takes a job at a travel agency and one day Mario and Carla walk in. 
Olga confronts them, coldly but with precise control (unlike their previous encounter over the 
earrings). She tells Mario that Otto died, that he was poisoned, and when a startled Mario asks 
who was responsible, she calmly tells him that he was. “I discovered that you’re a rude man. 
People respond to rudeness with spite. . . . Or maybe there was only the need for a scapegoat. 
And since I wasn’t going to be, it was up to Otto.”42 A few days later Mario comes to the house 
to get a few things, and negotiate the children’s care. Another icy exchange transpires in which 
Olga again suggests that Mario is not as innocent as he would like to believe. Now Ferrante puts 
the words of Karenina and Dido into his mouth: “What I am, what I’m not, how do I know” and 
then he wearily points at Otto’s bowl. “‘I’d like to get the children another dog.’ I shook my 
head, Otto moved through the house, I heard the light clicking sound of his nails on the floor. I 
joined my hands and rubbed them slowly against one another, to eradicate the dampness of bad 
feeling from the palms. ‘I’m not capable of replacements.’”43  
Through the family dog, Ferrante has achieved a transformation of the language and the 
fate available to Olga. Initially the embodiment of domestic responsibility that Olga believed 
would be the measure of her salvation, Otto becomes suffused with the aura of decay. The things 
that Olga thought must be attended to and maintained proved an insufficient bulwark against the 
psychological void she was facing, becoming instead detrimental. Olga’s domestic eagerness to 
prove her desirability and apologize for her own shortcomings was the equivalent of spraying her 
 
41 Ibid., 177. 
42 Ibid., 181. 
43 Ibid., 183. 
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entire house with poison. She goes after the ants only to realize that the solidity of things is often 
entrusted to irritations that only appear to threaten cohesion. That Mario has acted out an 
essentially base sexual urge is an irritating idea, in part because it undermines Olga’s fantasy of 
an impervious marriage. When Olga acknowledges this dynamic rather than trying to bury it 
beneath the assumption of all responsibility, she discovers that she is not, in fact, at fault. For 
months, Olga attempts to eradicate the disruption of Mario’s absence, but in doing so mistakes 
the true aspects of her own wellbeing.  
Otto becomes the scapegoat, and Olga is left to disentangle what is poisonous and what is 
not. Whether he died from strychnine or insecticide is an open question. If there were poisoned 
dog biscuits in the park, it seems that this was a consequence of Mario’s abrasiveness, and the 
dog’s death is therefore his fault. Alternatively, if it was the insecticide, then the death is on 
Olga’s hands, though perhaps this is an achievement rather than a failing—the dog’s passing 
does, after all, make it possible for Olga to admit she no longer loves her husband. In any case, 
both the dented can of insecticides and the image of the dog continue to determine the events of 
the novel: the vet’s solicitations, Carrano’s accusations and musical performance, Mario’s 
reckoning, and Olga’s triumphant control. In each of these scenes the ghost of Otto evokes guilt 
and wariness, danger and clarity. Ferrante essentially trades the specter of the poverella for the 
clicking nails of the dog, the inevitable destruction of a woman for the sacrifice of an idealized 
marriage. Both Olga and Mario are to blame, but only Olga can see the full extent of this joint 
culpability, leaving Mario unwittingly muttering the words of the destroyed women.  
The novel ends on a scene with Carrano. Olga comes home to discover the small white 
nozzle of the insecticide can on her doorstep. Carrano has been leaving her small objects she 
misplaces—a button, hairclip—and she understands that this is the final gift. For the first time 
 53 
since that Friday evening, she goes to his apartment and asks him kindly about the nozzle. He is 
evasive, indicating that he found it in the trunk of his car and it must have been in Otto’s fur or 
mouth. Once again Olga sees things a little more clearly: 
 
I thought with gratitude that in those months, discreetly he had worked to sew up 
around me a world that could be trusted. He had now arrived at his kindest act. He 
wanted me to understand that I no longer had to be frightened, that every moment 
could be narrated with all its reasons good and bad, that, in short, it was time to 
return to the solidity of the links that bind together spaces and times. With that 
gift he was trying to exonerate himself, he was exonerating me, he was attributing 
the death of Otto to the chance of the games of a dog at night.44 
 
In this moment Olga decides to go along with him. She doubts the nozzle is really the one from 
her can, she is not about to be fooled so easily, but admires the intention behind Carrano’s act. 
“He was trying to communicate silently that, through his mysterious gift, he knew how to make 
meaning stronger, to invent a feeling of fullness and joy.”45 These of course are the feelings that 
Olga desired in her union with Mario, the very opposite of the despair that detaches and ruins 
abandoned women. She interprets Carrano’s offering through the object that has itself shifted and 
travelled along in the novel. Once the means of spraying insecticides, the white nozzle is the last 
remnant of Otto and the uneasy truth of responsibility in the dissolution of Olga’s marriage. It 
suggests Olga’s disillusionment as well as her desire for stability. Through the object, Ferrante 
 
44 Ibid., 187. 
45 Ibid., 188. 
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articulates these varied and even contradictory ideas at once, ultimately providing Olga a path 




Bare Bones: The Object and Identity in Karl Ove Knausgaard’s “Seasons Quartet” 
 
In the final volume of Karl Ove Knausgaard’s My Struggle, he confronts the social consequences 
of his writing. Over the course of the six-volume novel, Knausgaard details everything he can 
about himself, from his teenage shame and family discomfort to the kinds of cigarettes he 
smokes. “I imagined I was going to write exactly what I thought and believed and felt,” he 
confesses toward the end of Book Six, “in other words to be honest.”1 In every sentence he “tried 
to transcend the social world by conveying the innermost thoughts and innermost feelings of my 
most private self, my own internal life, but also by describing the private sphere of my family as 
it exists behind the façade all families set up against the social world.”2 And yet as he comes to 
the end of this project, he realizes that the forces of the social realm are “absolutely impossible to 
break away from” and that the “truth of the I [has] turned out to be so incompatible with the truth 
of the we, or this is how it is meant to be, that it foundered after only a few short sentences.”3  
 In other words, Knausgaard arrives at the end of his monumental and widely celebrated 
book only to admit that everything around him and even his own self are linguistically bound, 
and therefore fundamentally social. Not only is it impossible to escape the social realm in this 
writing, but the attempt to do so has been both a failure and destructive. In the course of Book 
Six, the reader learns that many people in Knausgaard’s life have become furious with him for 
publishing these books, accusing him of immorality and causing reckless pain. His uncle tries to 
sue him, and Knausgaard’s wife, Linda, has a breakdown and lands in the hospital, presumably 
 
1 Karl Ove Knausgaard, My Struggle: Book Six, trans. Don Bartlett and Martin Aitken (New York: 
Archipelago Press, 2018), 825. 
2 Ibid., 824. 
3 Ibid., 825. 
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because of the pressure these books have put on her. “This novel has hurt everyone around me,” 
Knausgaard writes, “it has hurt me, and in a few years, when they are old enough to read it, it 
will hurt my children.”4 He deems the novel a failed experiment because he has “never even 
been close to saying what I really mean and describing what I have actually seen” and insists that 
if it has any value, it is in the demonstration of how “the force of the social dimension is visible 
and also the way it regulates and controls individuals.”5 Knausgaard has achieved the opposite of 
what he set out to do, and that the “experiment” faltered seems to some extent inevitable, insofar 
as writing is always a social act. Apparently accepting both the limitations of the form and the 
responsibility for the pain he has caused with this book, Knausgaard concludes My Struggle with 
the words, “I am no longer a writer.”6  
And yet a few years later a new series appeared, written again in Knausgaard’s signature 
confessional tone, but this time addressed to his unborn daughter, diluting the binary of the “I” 
positioned against the “we” in My Struggle with the intimacy of “you.” The “Seasons Quartet,” 
as the four books have come to be known, recount about two years in Knausgaard’s life after the 
success of My Struggle when his fourth child, Anne, was born. At times diary, epistolary, 
confession, autobiography, essay, and fiction, they follow no set pattern and defy easy 
categorization. The first two books, Autumn and Winter, are structured as three letters addressed 
to Anne (unborn until halfway through Winter) interspersed with a series of short essays charting 
each month of the season. Spring is a memoir-like telling of a single day shortly after Anne was 
born that ranges back to the previous summer when she was conceived and Linda was once again 
 
4 Ibid., 1007. 
5 Ibid. 
6 Ibid., 1152. 
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hospitalized. Summer combines short essays with diary entries made during the summer two 
years after Anne’s birth.  
But at the heart of these four books are meditations on commonplace objects. Brief 
essays on rubber boots, bottles, daguerreotypes, tin cans, telephones, Thermoses, chairs, pipes, 
Q-tips, and many other everyday objects substantiate the series, tying together the otherwise 
disparate modes of writing. Knausgaard’s concern is still himself, and his focus on these objects 
appears to be a new approach to the same problem of My Struggle. Rather than meticulously 
cataloging every thought, belief, and feeling, here Knausgaard describes the small objects of the 
world in elemental detail, ostensibly explaining them to a child who has no knowledge of their 
material or cultural significance. The result is another attempt to understand his life outside the 
pre-established linguistic apparatus of memoir.  
As Knausgaard details objects in the plainest terms, he essentially denudes them of any 
lyrical connotation, as though doing so might reveal something that he has not yet been able to 
articulate or explain. Objects allow him to exercise his powers of observation and record his 
subjective experience of the world without depositing subjectivity in anecdote, confession, or 
character description, all of which, he has found, hurt or offend. Knausgaard insists that his 
private self is always in some conflict with his socially-determined self, and he turns to objects 
as a way to sound completely neutral about his interior investigations, even if total neutrality is 
only an ideal (as he discovered in My Struggle). He therefore frames his relations with, or his 
observations of objects (insentient, non-social) as his most authentic self-expression. Rather than 
define himself in relation to the people around him, sacrificing their privacy to the project of his 
self-revelation, in these four books Knausgaard reveals his personality via his contact with the 
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less vulnerable (and less litigious) inanimate realm: he uses the generic quality of objects to 
emphasize what is particular about his gaze. 
While Elena Ferrante draws on a wide literary tradition to make objects important to her 
characters, Knausgaard finds objects most useful when they are stripped down. In Ferrante’s 
novels, she wields the associations that amass around objects to depict Olga’s control over her 
own identity. In The Days of Abandonment objects serve as both an anchor in reality and a 
destabilizing force: they compel Olga to confront her preconceptions about her situation and to 
overcome her own sense of groundlessness. Through Olga’s encounters with things and her 
attempts to manipulate them, Ferrante expresses emotion and revises claims to power within 
relationships. Knausgaard, on the other hand, takes nearly the opposite approach. Devoid of 
implication or sentimentality, Knausgaard’s objects serve as a kind of armor against the more 
volatile social world, and he uses them to build a fort of neutrality, so to speak, one in which his 
daughter, the only one who has not been injured by the inconsiderate confessions of My Struggle, 
can hear his voice without being wounded or exposed by it. By providing the unadorned details 
of objects, Knausgaard attempts to pass some true part of himself along to his daughter not 
through association, but in a kind of savage rawness. In studying simple things and imagining 
how his daughter may come to know them, Knausgaard creates a venue of intimacy. He attempts 
to exit the solipsism of My Struggle and use his observations to field a more inclusive work that 
explores the demands of fatherhood without betraying what he believes is essential to himself.7 
 
 
7 In an essay for The New York Review of Books titled “I, Knausgaard,” Daniel Mendelsohn suggests that 
this is ultimately the failure of My Struggle: that “Knausgaard’s creation, for all its vastness and despite 
its serious intellectual aims and attainments, reduces the entire world to the size of the author.” In the 
“Seasons Quartet,” Knausgaard attempts to expand his minute representations to include a shared reality. 
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Not until the third book in the series, Spring, do we learn the details of Linda’s struggle with 
depression. She and Knausgaard have been together for more than a decade, and have three 
children, each two years apart. They live a comfortable suburban life in a small town in the south 
of Sweden. The book takes place on a spring day in 2014, a few months after Anne is born. It is 
the day of the Walpurgis festival, and that night there will be a large bonfire the whole family 
will attend. Except for Linda, who is in the hospital. During the day Knausgaard takes Anne to 
visit her mother, and in the course of the journey tells us (and, in a way, his daughter) about the 
previous summer. We learn how Anne was conceived at a high mark in an otherwise grim time 
when Linda’s depression had become overwhelming. To some extent, she and Knausgaard 
believed having another child would help. But about a month into the pregnancy, Linda sinks so 
far into despair that she can hardly leave her bed. Knausgaard does the chores and manages the 
children, doing what he can to protect them from the difficult truth. One day Linda asks, begs, 
for her husband’s help, but Knausgaard insists that the darkness is something she must confront 
herself. He can support her, he says, but he cannot do things for her because this only encourages 
the disease. The next morning he goes into their bedroom and cannot wake her. He knows she 
uses sleeping pills and tells himself she is only sleeping deeply. But the hours slip by and still he 
cannot rouse her. He calls for an ambulance and finds in the bathroom she has taken all her pills. 
This occurs at the end of the summer, just before Knausgaard begins writing the first two 
books in the series. Yet in those works, he never discusses any of this turmoil, and hardly 
mentions Linda. We only really see her in relief—a natural, necessary extension of the daughter 
who is the addressee of the writing. There is no overt consideration of depression or suicide, and 
Knausgaard never remarks on the dynamic between himself and his wife. Nor does he express 
any real concern for his daughter’s existence, or suggest that it had ever been jeopardized. 
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Instead he writes short essays on blood, twilight, the migration of birds, fingers, teeth, and 
picture frames. Typically, he starts with an elemental description, which then unspools some 
memory, admission, or observation. The pieces seem to have no real point, and Knausgaard 
hardly offers an opinion about the litany of domestic responsibilities that shape his days. The 
closest he comes to discussing the anxieties that surround his family are broad, nonspecific 
meditations on loneliness, forgiveness, pain, silence, and ambulances. Never does he connect 
these things explicitly to himself or to Linda, but simply prods them along as though merely 
pondering that they exist.  
Yet there is a sense that something is lurking underneath. In the first “Letter to an Unborn 
Child” in Autumn, Knausgaard writes that he wants to show the world as it is to Anne, “Only by 
doing so will I myself be able to glimpse it.”8 This still partakes of the solipsistic register of My 
Struggle, yet here Knausgaard is building into his quest for individuality a concern for another 
person, accepting, to some extent, the social character of his writing, as if he has learned his 
lesson.9 Putting the world in direct relation to himself renders it somehow inchoate or false; only 
by arranging his observations for someone else can he see what he sees. “I want to show you the 
world as it is now,” Knausgaard writes: “the door, the floor, the water tap and the sink, the 
garden chair close to the wall beneath the kitchen window, the sun, the water, the trees. You will 
come to see it in your own way, you will experience things for yourself and live a life of your 
own, so of course it is primarily for my own sake that I am doing this: showing you the world, 
little one, makes my life worth living.”10  
 
8 Karl Ove Knausgaard, Autumn, trans. Ingvild Burkey (New York: Penguin Press, 2017), 5. 
9 In her review of these books for The Atlantic, Ruth Franklin suggests that Knausgaard had been 
“spooked” by the response to My Struggle. She offers an insightful reading of the social demands 
Knausgaard attempts to juggle, and the self-diagnosed failure of his memoir. 
10 Knausgaard, Autumn, 6. 
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For readers acquainted with Knausgaard’s work, this is familiar terrain. Shame, despair, 
and death are all thickly woven through the six volumes of My Struggle: a meticulous account of 
Linda’s breakdown and Knausgaard’s own guilt about his complicity in this fall substantiate the 
last two hundred pages of Book Six. But rather than describe his own anguish or painstakingly 
recount each conversation he has with Linda or his other children, Knausgaard turns immediately 
to the objects around him. One of the first essays in Autumn is titled “Plastic Bags” and 
Knausgaard muses on this item of consumer culture that, because it takes so long to decompose, 
is often found in the most unexpected places. On the day he is writing, he notices one flapping 
from the roof of their house, and a few days earlier he had come across a layer of shopping bags 
while digging in their garden. “The plastic bag has something inviolable about it,” he writes, “it 
seems to exist in a place beyond everything else, including time and its inexorable modality.”11 
He recalls that one of the most beautiful things he has ever seen was a plastic bag floating in a 
limpid, green sea about ten feet below the surface, absolutely motionless. He recalls that “it 
resembled nothing other than itself” and wonders why, when he saw the bag, he could not look 
away.12 The plastic bag did not fill him with joy or contentment, but “it felt good to look at it, the 
way it feels good to read a poem that ends in an image of something concrete and seems to fasten 
on it, so that the inexhaustible within it can unfold calmly.”13  
In this preliminary example, Knausgaard uses the object to motion toward something 
essential yet inexplicable about himself. In describing the elemental simplicity of the plastic bag, 
which repels soil as well as water and ends up on rooftops, in the earth, and floating at sea, 
Knausgaard evokes his own eccentric relationship to the object. Somehow his rudimentary 
 
11 Ibid., 18. 
12 Ibid. 
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knowledge moves him, he cannot look away. By describing what is apparent in the thing, he 
indicates something that arises within himself, something also inviolable yet less specific. There 
is still a focus on the self in this writing, but Knausgaard is using the commonplace object to 
mediate the interiority he would like to express.  
In a following essay he turns to teeth, marveling first at how these “little enamelled [sic] 
stones” form in the soft mouths of his children and then fall out.14 At first, losing a tooth is an 
event for a child, but then it becomes routine, a piece of the body discarded. One of 
Knausgaard’s children loses a tooth while eating an apple and hands it to her father. “It feels 
wrong to throw it away,” he writes. “The tooth is a part of her.”15 But what is the alternative? 
Save it in a box as some token evidence of who she was? “In this tooth she will stay ten years old 
forever,” he sighs. The moment recalls Barthes’s decision to throw his old rib out his window to 
the dogs on the street. But whereas Barthes is keen to allow the lyrical potential of this disposal 
its full range (“as if I were romantically scattering my own ashes”), Knausgaard keeps emotion at 
arm’s length.16 After noticing his daughter’s tooth will always indicate a little girl even as she 
grows into a woman, he opens the cupboard under the sink and drops it in the trash on top of a 
used coffee filter. The essay ends as Knausgaard places a crumpled muesli bag on top, “so that 
the tooth is no longer visible.”17  
Here, Knausgaard refrains from sentimentalizing the object, as if to claim that emotion 
remains most intact when unarticulated. He shows a relationship between a person and the world 
around her, establishing a physical exchange in which what is a part of someone can be 
 
14 Ibid., 24. 
15 Ibid. 
16 Roland Barthes, Roland Barthes by Roland Barthes, trans. Richard Howard (New York: Hill and Wang, 
1977), 61. 
17 Knausgaard, Autumn, 24. 
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transformed into a foreign object. Rather than pursue the associations of this conversion from 
animate to inanimate, he merely drops the tooth into the trash and covers it up. In stripping away 
the lyrical imagery of this moment, Knausgaard seems to be soliciting the object itself, rather 
than the writing he could surround it with, as though the raw materialism of a tooth might 
indicate childhood’s ineffable poignancy more accurately than any outright phrasing.  
This focus on physicality helps to elucidate a distinction between the interior and the 
exterior that Knausgaard wants to explore. Throughout these books, he is constantly grappling 
with the exchange that occurs between his own private experience and his activity in the world. 
In Knausgaard’s understanding, the self is arranged to navigate society and family, and this 
necessarily splits a person’s identity in two: a private self that is authentic but inconsiderate, and 
a social self that is accommodating but slightly false. Knausgaard seeks to bring these two halves 
as close together as possible, and here uses objects as emblems of the interior/exterior 
compromise that he feels defines life. Plastic bags and teeth point toward this exchange, and by 
proceeding to focus on these and other objects rather than on the people around him, Knausgaard 
attempts to express the private without compromising privacy.  
Early in Autumn, Knausgaard includes a short essay on picture frames. He describes the 
object that marks the edge of a picture but is not a part of the picture itself, and observes that a 
frame without a picture is empty. But frame can also be used figuratively to describe a boundary. 
“The frame limits a phenomenon, sharply demarcates an inside and an outside, and by isolating 
it, the phenomenon becomes clearly defined, that is it becomes something in itself. It gains an 
identity.”18 Quickly Knausgaard has moved from describing something simple to the 
fundamental concerns of the book while keeping what is personal at a remove. He goes on in a 
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dry fashion: in nature there are no frames, and so the activity of framing is likely a distinctly 
human endeavor. Not only are we framed physically via houses and clothing, but also within 
ourselves through certain opinions, thoughts, experiences. These frames, both visible and 
invisible, make the world comprehensible to us, and determine behavior as well as desire. Since 
life is always changing, sometimes desire aligns with the frame, and sometimes it pushes beyond 
it. “Common to all these,” Knausgaard writes, “is the longing for authenticity, for the real, which 
is simply the place where one’s notions about reality and reality itself are one and the same thing. 
Or in other words, a life, an existence, a world unframed.”19  
The frame, described in generalized language, edges toward a kind of allegory for the 
role that all these objects assume in Knausgaard’s series. The object appears in juxtaposition to 
experience and thereby emphasizes the distance between the interior and exterior. Knausgaard is 
attempting to signal that the navigation of this space is common to everyone, and an effort that 
his daughter will have to make herself. In refusing an entry of the “I” into the objects around 
him, Knausgaard at once leaves them associatively blank (his daughter can invest them with her 
own experiences, memories, and longings) while simultaneously marking them with his gaze. 
Whether he means to or not, Knausgaard coyly stamps these objects as his own property, while 
denying that he has done any such thing. 
  
As he describes the objects around him and vaguely acknowledges his experience of them, 
Knausgaard finds that his reaction to objects like plastic bags and teeth indicate his own 
personality. He ponders how his grasp on the significance of objects has changed since he was a 
child, and by extension, how Anne’s own personality will be formed by the material around her 
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as she grows older. At one point, while considering the sight of other people’s fingers, 
Knausgaard suggests that the whole variety of entities that we encounter including “trees, tables, 
bicycles, houses, plains, lakes, cats, cups, telephones and electric torches . . . are also parts of our 
personality.”20 Yet a child’s fascination with her own tooth fades as the object becomes familiar. 
There is an exchange here as well, not only in the way that an experience of the physical world 
governs a child’s development, but also in the evolving conceptions and relationships that a 
person assumes as she ages.  
Weighing his own personality as well as those of his children, Knausgaard constantly 
thinks through his role as a father. He marvels that his children’s realities—their concerns, fears, 
desires, passions—are so different from his own, and he describes objects almost as props to 
illustrate the disparity and to recall his own childhood when he too had a relationship to the 
world that is utterly distinct from the one he has forty years later. He is interested in how the 
transition takes place, how conceptions of reality develop as people grow and their relationship 
to the exterior world changes. The objects of his home might mean one thing to Knausgaard and 
something else entirely to his children, and so he describes an object in its most basic simplicity 
to trace the discrepancy. In doing so, he seems to suggest that he might illuminate the unspoken 
dynamics that exist within the family. “The whole array of objects in a house,” he writes in 
Spring, “all meaning deriving from the relations within a family, the significance that every 
person dwells within, all this is invisible, hidden not by the darkness but by the light of the 
undifferentiated.”21 When Knausgaard does differentiate, he aspires to articulate something about 
himself without overexposing its significance. 
 
20 Ibid., 106. 
21 Ibid., Spring, 1-2. 
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This kind of impersonal writing in which objects are stripped of their lyrical association 
is epitomized in the essay on rubber boots about halfway through Autumn. Knausgaard catches 
sight of the boots in the hallway that, along with the other jackets and shirts hanging in the foyer 
so closely “resemble the bodies they sheathe” that at times he enters the hall and has the 
impression that “the entire family’s bodies are hanging on pegs and standing on the floor in the 
dark, like their negatives as it were. Then the thought may come to me of what life would be like 
had they died in an accident and all that was left were the spaces they once occupied.”22 To some 
extent, this is the kind of clear-eyed confrontation with death that was so distinctive about My 
Struggle and brought Knausgaard unreserved critical acclaim.23 But here he swerves away from 
himself; he does not entertain what his life would be like without his family, or how their deaths 
would emotionally affect him. Instead he recalls that his boots were his father’s, who is dead (as 
readers of My Struggle know well), and are one of only two items of his that Knausgaard has 
kept, the other being a pair of binoculars. Knausgaard suspects that of all the objects his father 
left behind, he kept just these two because they were neutral. He could never have retained his 
father’s lambskin jacket, he admits, whereas the rubber boots “are not in any comparable way an 
expression of individuality, but are more or less the same for everyone.”24 He goes on to describe 
how useful these rubber boots are, their “thick, rather stiff rubber is shiny and smooth, so that 
water cannot cling to it,” and that they fit so snugly around the calf with a sealed interior; “that 
the boot is absolute proof against the weather can occasion great pleasure,” he chirps. “To be 
invulnerable, to be protected, to be a separate entity in the world. . . . Yes, oh yes, that is 
precisely wherein joy over the properties of the boots lies.”25  
 
22 Ibid., Autumn, 91. 
23 See James Wood, “Total Recall: Karl Ove Knausgaard’s ‘My Struggle’,” New Yorker, August 6, 2012. 
24 Knausgaard, Autumn, 92. 
25 Ibid. 
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This is a distinctly different register than My Struggle that almost viciously prioritizes the 
impersonal dullness of an object’s usefulness over the personal associations, life stories, and 
sufferings that they potentially indicate. The final chapter of this study considers how W. G. 
Sebald uses objects throughout Austerlitz to do just the opposite, essentially courting the lyrical 
and mysterious properties of objects to draw out a complex and even impossible desire. But here, 
Knausgaard essentially refuses the psychology of his character (himself) by insisting on the 
material practicality of the boots. Sebald does not deny this aspect of objects, in fact using the 
extraordinarily practical rucksack as an identifier for Austerlitz, yet he also turns this object in 
multiple directions, revealing almost an entire psychological trajectory through it. Knausgaard, 
on the other hand, while writing a book ostensibly for his daughter, chooses to forgo his most 
intimate emotions that might be tied to the objects he confronts in the hallway and essentially 
denies association by insisting on functionality. What does he achieve by doing this? What 
image of himself does he preserve for his daughter, and how does this more accurately represent 
this man than a lyrical investigation? The essay is not without its tenderness, but Knausgaard 
offers the most unsentimental version of himself, a person absolved of worldly affectations. The 
absence of individuality here effectively goes past subjectivity and positions Knausgaard on an 
equal plane with all human beings, one in which there is no difference, no personal history, no 
judgment. In a sense, he has gone from one extreme to another: from indiscriminate personal 
reportage to the objective levelling of difference. What appears before us on the page is at once 
universally human and entirely anonymous. 
 Certainly, this approach hardly risks offense. And yet, is this the only advantage to such 
writing? If Knausgaard wants to express and preserve some piece of himself for his daughter, 
how does his emphasis of the raw materiality serve his purpose? In Summer he writes, “it struck 
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me that my inner being, the person I am to myself, has changed in recent years, and how often I 
get the feeling that I am no one, that I am merely a place which thoughts and feelings pass 
through.”26 He compares himself with objects that “are just there, side by side, and the identity of 
the place they thereby constitute is as distinct and unique as it is accidental.”27 Knausgaard’s 
experience of things appears to compel him to acknowledge how the self’s identity is at once a 
verified entity and a fiction. Because it has no physical reality, the self takes its cues, so to speak, 
from the objects around it and models itself in relation to these objects. Therefore, Knausgaard 
seems to ask, is it possible that by removing all the personal associations that make rubber boots 
more than a functional “sheathe” and aligning one’s own identity with the “thingness” of objects, 
does he represent his most authentic self? 
And yet this appears to be something of a two-way street, for just as Knausgaard attempts 
to remove himself from the objects he describes, his personality nonetheless seeps in. “My 
identity, the person I am to myself,” he writes in Spring, “is woven into the world of things in 
such a way that it is impossible to say where one ends and the other begins.”28 This becomes 
even more apparent as images of his father reappear in Knausgaard’s attempts to posit his own 
role as a parent. While he turns away from his relationship to his father in the description of the 
rubber boots, he returns to this man again and again as he describes objects in their elemental 
form. Knausgaard thoroughly analyzed his relationship with his father in My Struggle and makes 
no explicit indication that his interest in the “Seasons Quartet” lies in rehashing this dynamic, yet 
as he tries to catch a glimpse of the experience of his children and their relationship to objects, 
Knausgaard seems to necessarily evoke his own father and the image he had of him as a child. 
 
26 Ibid., Summer, 81. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Ibid., Spring, 63. 
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Knausgaard still sees his father through the eyes of himself as a child, yet also understands him 
from an adult perspective. Through objects, Knausgaard attempts to show how these two images 
might coexist, and anticipates the same experience for his own children. Despite his reluctance to 
admit the lyrical quality of objects, Knausgaard finds that he cannot entirely escape the 
resonances that they retain.  
 For instance, Summer opens with a short essay on lawn sprinklers. Knausgaard describes 
his work with this unassuming tool and seems almost caught by surprise that he even owns a 
sprinkler, admitting that “of all the things I remember from summers when I was growing up, the 
lawn sprinkler is the most emblematic, it is the single object around which the greatest number of 
moods and events cluster in my memory and which evokes the most associations.”29 He goes on 
to describe the summertime sight of the sprinklers in his childhood neighborhood, the sounds of 
the water falling, and how his father was in charge of his family’s sprinkler, running the hose up 
through the basement window, and the faint ache Knausgaard felt that the window couldn’t be 
properly shut while his father was watering.  
 
That I myself am now master of a sprinkler and both turn it on and move it around 
unaided, in my own garden, ought therefore to mean something to me, if not a lot, 
at least a little, since the life which back then I only observed—the life of grown 
men and women—has now become mine, something I no longer regard from the 
outside but fill from within. It doesn’t, I take no particular joy in turning on the 
sprinkler, no more than I find pleasure in buttering a slice of bread or taking off 
my shoes as I enter the house. Now it is the world of the child that I observe from 
 
29 Ibid., Summer, 3. 
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the outside, and what more fitting image for this asymmetry in life could there be 
than the basement window, which is at once high up beneath the ceiling and low 
down near the ground?30 
 
Knausgaard does not attempt to deny the sprinkler its associations here, nor does he overly exalt 
his experience with this object. In fact, what the associations are do not seem to matter as much 
as the way in which Knausgaard’s encounter with the object reveals to him a shift from exterior 
to interior, from being a child imagining the life of adults to being an adult imaging the 
experience of a child. This change has occurred slowly, imperceptibly, yet the object reveals to 
Knausgaard how absolutely he has transformed. When his daughter is old enough to read this 
book, she too will have undergone some shift from the child who watched her father water the 
garden to an adult on her own terms.  
 A similar episode occurs later in the same book when Knausgaard recalls a small boat 
that his father owned. He begins with a dry consideration of how the form of an object is dictated 
by its use and that boats, like spectacles and bicycles, have been perfected in their form over 
time. Gradually Knausgaard recalls the boat of his childhood, “a traditional clinker-built double-
ender” with a special engine that a crane would lower into the water in the spring and that 
Knausgaard and his brother would scrape and repaint in the winter.31 He recalls gliding out into 
the ocean with his father, who sat at the tiller smoking a pipe. And he remembers thinking back 
then that the boat was too slow for his father, that the object and the man were a mismatch. 
“Now I think of it as a child’s way of understanding a fundamental thing about him. That the 
speed he had inside him was greater than the life he was living, and that it was only a matter of 
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time before the force of this asymmetry would fling him out of the trajectory which included the 
wooden launch, the pipe, the house and the children, and into another one, faster and wilder.”32 
Once again what begins as an elemental description of an object transforms into a personal 
account that distinguishes between the gaze of the child and the experience of the adult, and 
suggests a shift from one into the other. 
Perhaps this manner in which the personal seeps into objects, especially in childhood, is 
exactly what Knausgaard relies upon to corroborate a book on fatherhood that proceeds through 
elemental descriptions. In contradistinction to Knausgaard’s own effort to remove any 
sentimental identification with sprinklers and rubber boots, in Winter, he shows how thoroughly 
his children do just the opposite. Knausgaard reflects on all the stuffed animals his children have 
and notes that these toys “act as agents for their feelings, an extension of their inner world. . . . 
The stuffed animals represent them.”33 The plush toys are blank receptacles in which his children 
invest their conceptions about reality and how it should be, Knausgaard writes, which eventually 
come up against the world as it really is and changes as they adjust what they perceive to be true 
and what they desire. Objects, in this iteration, are intermediaries between the self and the rest of 
the world, and consequently take on some aspect of the person they frame. 
He recounts taking one of his daughters to the hospital for an operation on her ear. The 
girl brings her toy rabbit and presses it to her chest as they wait, declaring that she wants to be a 
nurse when she grows up. In the operating room, the child double-checks that the rabbit can be 
there and repeats her career ambition to the nurse preparing the anesthesia. During the operation, 
Knausgaard waits with the rabbit in his lap and when his daughter wakes up in the recovery bed, 
he puts it in front of her as she grasps for it eagerly. Knausgaard has promised her a toy of her 
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choosing after the procedure, and on their way home they buy a house with a family of plastic 
rabbits inside. Just as Knausgaard is paying for the item, his daughter runs outside and is sick on 
the street, vomiting blood she had swallowed during the operation.  
As he describes the episode, Knausgaard offers no commentary on the events and 
imagery he recounts. But he consistently notices the toy rabbit—where it is and how his daughter 
holds it. Without being explicit, here Knausgaard depicts the relationship between objects and 
personality that he describes in the chapter on stuffed animals. Insofar as the stuffed animal 
represents something about this girl to herself, she can take comfort in its presence. The rabbit 
reassures her by somehow preserving her: she seems to believe that finding it in her hands when 
she wakes up is part of what makes the operation a success, as though an essential piece of 
herself has not been lost. Knausgaard pairs this identification with the reality of life and a 
pending future: the seriousness of the operation, the desire to become a nurse, the blood in her 
vomit. In this episode, various aspects of identity are caught up in the object, and Knausgaard 
uses this dynamic to display the distance between childhood and adulthood, and how personality 
shifts over time. The daughter wants to become a nurse, but who knows if she will actually do 
so. She also wants more rabbits, and the toy describes both aspects of this girl at once—her sense 
of growing up and the naïve yet “real” consolation she takes in a stuffed animal. This is a 
different formulation than the one the Knausgaard uses for the rubber boots and the lost tooth. 
There, emotion was removed from the object in a reserved, almost jaded tone that Knausgaard 
appears to equate with being an adult, whereas the identification with an object at the hospital 
registers as something particular to being a child.  
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In addressing these books to his daughter, it appears to some extent that Knausgaard is offering 
them to her as a kind of reference as she aligns her interior self with the exterior world. 
Knausgaard presents objects not entirely devoid of his own associations but largely denuded of 
definite meaning, and invites a conversion of what belongs to the “I” into something experienced 
by the “you.” Towards the end of Autumn, he includes an essay on the metal Thermos, those 
ubiquitous bullet-like silver flasks. Again Knausgaard describes the object in numbing detail, 
observing that it is an ordinary item that will go unnoticed in some situations, yet seem 
inappropriate in others. No one thinks twice about a Thermos in the office, but it would be odd to 
bring one to a dinner party. The Thermos is a kind of extension of one’s own home into the 
outside world, and thereby is something of an anomaly among domestic objects, for it only 
comes into its own when it is outside the house. The Thermos “weaves around itself a web of 
associations and memories, for it was always there on car journeys, boat trips, hikes in the 
mountains and in the forest, connecting everything that was out there with everything back home 
without us ever thinking about it. Only later, when we look at all the photos from that time, does 
it become obvious that the Thermos is at the center of all of them, like a kind of family totem.”34 
Just as the essay on frames evoked the boundaries that distinguish the individual from the 
collective, here the Thermos registers the family unit within the larger customs of society. 
Knausgaard is not explicit about what memories and associations their family Thermos evokes, 
only remarking that it does weave these memories around itself. The essay conjures blurred 
movement around a fixed point, as if one were watching a sped-up film: Knausgaard and his 
family scurrying around, hiking and camping, driving to school and taking vacations, each 
person a swath of motion, hardly distinct from one another, while at the center of the image the 
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silver Thermos remains an unassuming focal point. By calling attention to this object, it is as 
though Knausgaard is planting a clue for his daughter: someday she might read this book, and 
thereafter will always pick out the Thermos in those family snapshots. She’ll notice it in the 
photos of her childhood, and it will both fix her attention on a time that has passed, recalling her 
father and her youth, and reveal what is no longer there. “It discreetly embodies all that bound us 
together back then,” Knausgaard writes in his final sentence.35  
 Once again, Knausgaard leaves the lyrical potential of an object largely unformed, as 
though he were positioning the Thermos in the future for his daughter’s own associations and 
remembrances. He makes no real attempt to disclose a meaning, or to even assert that one exists 
beyond the general laws of physics (that it keeps drinks warm) and social custom (that it does not 
belong at dinner parties). On the one hand, perhaps this is a kind of gift to his daughter, a 
talisman of their family as distinct from the rest of the world. On the other, perhaps the Thermos 
invokes those aspects of himself that Knausgaard may not be able to see or state directly, but that 
his daughter might know as she recalls her sense of him in her own childhood. The object here 
operates within a similar framework as the studium and punctum that Barthes describes. The 
description of the Thermos is matte: it retains no specificity about the family outings or personal 
anecdotes. Yet the reader might still be stirred by the image; there remains an invitation in the 
address to Knausgaard’s daughter for her to either invent or remember a punctum. Knausgaard 
generates this solicitation by not asserting himself too forcefully in the studium, as though he 
does not want to taint what his daughter might bring to the image in the future. 
Perhaps this helps to explain the sensation Knausgaard comes to in Summer, the final 
book of the series, of continually giving pieces of himself away and being merely a site where 
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memories and thoughts pass through. Here he seems to be courting some nuance to the position 
that objects might be stripped of their associations, as though by considering how his children 
invest themselves in their toys and the resonance of a sprinkler, he recognizes the need to 
reposition himself. He still does not identify with the objects around him in the same way as 
might his daughter, yet in Summer he adjusts the description of what he has been doing in these 
books, speculating that what he attempts to put on the page, “isn’t part of my identity, merely a 
product of it.”36 This is a curious admission, given how personal his entire project seems to be. 
Knausgaard appears to presume a distinction between what he writes and what he is, as though 
the social self that he represents in language must necessarily misrepresent some part of what is 
authentically his own. Whether this is true or not, the notion of writing as a product of identity is 
indeed very different from writing that records identity. Whereas a memoir seeks to be a record 
of one’s life, Knausgaard’s stripe of autofiction looks to recast it entirely. “Although everything I 
write these days is autobiographical and in one sense deals with my life,” he writes, “life itself is 
still something entirely different.”37  
However reductive this formulation may be, what Knausgaard seems to be grappling with 
is that as a social product the “I” of literature might not represent the self as it really is, but as it 
might otherwise be. Whatever un-socialized identity exists privately, it must conform to the 
social demands of the image-repertoire (to use Barthes’s term) as soon as it is put on the page. 
The only way to be both honest and considerate, in Knausgaard’s model, is to remain silent. 
Refusing that in the “Season Quartet,” he has attempted some product of his identity constructed 
through a relationship with objects. Rather than insist on ruthless reporting, Knausgaard notices 
the Thermos and rubber boots, but refuses to endow them with himself (unlike his daughter with 
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her rabbit), thereby denying any socially determined iteration of his individuality. To some 
extent, the stripping away that Knausgaard performs on most of the objects in these books might 
be viewed as an attempt to leave them bare and available to his daughter. By pointing them out 
in their most elemental form and refraining from investing himself in them, Knausgaard presents 
objects to his daughter that are not exclusively claimed by the inconsiderate private “I,” but 
ready to be handled and reinvested with her own associations. 
 Yet if Knausgaard’s attempt in these books is to strip objects to their bare components so 
that they might be available to his daughter, how successful is he? Furthermore, what bearing 
does this attempt have on an understanding of literature that focuses on the inanimate as a way to 
access character? In Summer, it appears that Knausgaard reassesses the mode in which he started. 
What began as a meticulous attempt to remove himself from the objects around him has evolved 
into a demonstration of how objects “discreetly embody” both him and the rest of his family. He 
contends that “the task of art is to see something as it really is, as if for the first time. And if we 
are serious about seeing, then the person who sees is also a part of it, for there is no such thing as 
a neutral gaze, a neutral landscape, it is always charged with an underlying meaning.”38 Without 
necessarily accepting this definition of art, it is perhaps useful to consider it in relation to these 
books. By the end of this series, Knausgaard seems to accept that his identity still seeps into the 
objects he mentions—he marks the rubber boots and the plastic bag by writing about them—
even as he insists on their universal generality. In a sense, he appears to admit a necessary 
compromise in the fourth book, forgoing objectivity so that a resonance of his self might be 
available to his daughter as she reads this text. Rather than obviating identity, perhaps 
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Knausgaard realizes that the boots, sprinkler, and Thermos more accurately press what is 
personal into the margins, postponing meaning for the intended reader’s gaze.  
This corresponds to some degree to Knausgaard’s interest in the exchange between the 
interior and exterior forms of personality, the movement from private to public. He finds this 
distinction between the inner and outer troubling because neither state feels to him wholly 
authentic. Therefore he endeavors to communicate through a distant relationship with objects the 
navigation of the personal and the social, this constant and fluid activity of living as if naming it 
for what it really is. In Linda’s depression and collapse Knausgaard interprets the urgency of his 
concern: “Between this external world and the inner reality that your mother lived in,” he writes 
in Spring, “there was almost no connection any more. That’s what happened, the connection was 
broken. . . . In themselves objects and events don’t mean anything. They become meaningful 
through the resonance they evoke. . . . and that is what happened to your mother, the world no 
longer resonated within her.”39 
 In a way, this recalls the import that Ferrante assigns to objects in The Days of 
Abandonment. There the objects around Olga are crucial aspects of her reckoning with her 
failing marriage and understanding of herself. She turns to objects to anchor herself in reality, 
but she fails to handle them properly and slips dangerously close to the edge of an abyss that is 
perhaps not so different from the one Knausgaard here describes. In both cases, objects offer 
characters a way to remain attached to the world. Both Knausgaard and Olga attempt to 
understand themselves partly through the objects that surround them—they have distinct ideas 
about how their identities are reflected in these objects and accordingly how each thing can and 
should be used. Knausgaard’s identity is not contingent on this relationship in the same way that 
 
39 Ibid., Spring, 101-2. 
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Olga’s is, in fact he makes a distinct effort to displace himself from the objects he observes. 
Doing so, he suggests, allows a nonabrasive participation in the delicate social and personal 
dynamics of his own family. In particular, objects provide an entry-point into the lives of his 
children that is not an act of exposure or betrayal, and not compromised by the confessional 
mode Knausgaard has assigned to the private “I.” Instead, describing the elemental forms of 
objects allows Knausgaard to orient his writing as an address to a “you,” one in which what is 
considerate of his family is not subjugated to what is truthful about his own experience. In a 
sense, the objects in these books grant Knausgaard access to personality, both his own and his 
children’s. 
 Knausgaard’s exercise is especially useful in relation to the following chapter that takes 
up Valeria Luiselli’s novel, Lost Children Archive. There Luiselli gradually shifts the novel’s 
narrative voice from a character who closely resembles Luiselli herself to a ten-year-old boy. 
Objects are instrumental to this move, as they first reveal to the adult character the limitations of 
her own perspective and then become an actual hinge from one narrative voice to another. In the 
ten-year-old boy’s hands, the same objects that the adult narrator viewed only as functional tools 
become the instruments of play. As the boy’s imagination takes over the narrative, objects are 
released from their intended purposes and begin to inspire connections and associations that 
become essential to the story Luiselli wants to tell but were unavailable to a rigid, politically 
determined adult narration. Just as they do for Knausgaard, objects allow for language in 
Luiselli’s novel that is not confined to the private concerns of the “I” but invoke a more 
inclusive, considerate address to “you.” In a sense, Luiselli’s novel radically expands the attempt 
Knausgaard has made by situating the childhood relationship to objects within a complete 
narrative. The capacity of objects to discreetly embody the dynamics of a family is employed by 
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Luiselli to not only indicate a distinct yet subjective perspective, but to determine the entire 
shape of her novel.  
Knausgaard’s turn to objects is an attempt to retreat from the uncharitable force of My 
Struggle while retaining his authenticity. Rather than focusing on the lyrical sentiments that 
govern his own personal experience of objects, he presents objects in their elemental form and 
thereby gives the power of interpretation to his daughter. This solves, he suggests, the ethical 
dilemma he faced at the end of My Struggle, and provides insight into the exchange that occurs 
between childhood and adulthood and the extent to which reality can be subjectively molded by 
personality. Luiselli pushes this even further to solve for concerns about appropriation and 
generate plot. Moving from objects that are stripped down to those that are augmented by the 
imaginative play of children, the following chapter suggests that the object can be an active 
rather than a discreet embodiment of social dynamics, and, when explicitly employed, can 





The Archive and The Game: Valeria Luiselli’s Objects in Play 
 
So far this study has observed the use of objects in two very different works. In Ferrante’s novel, 
the objects that surround Olga reveal conceptions she has about herself and offer her the means 
potentially to control the outcome of her story. Ferrante’s objects are fundamentally 
associative—they welcome and make use of a shifting array of symbolic, literary, and emotional 
readings. By contrast, Knausgaard seeks to absolve objects of their emotional connotations, 
reducing each thing to its most literal and elemental presence. He hopes to uncover the central 
nature of his own identity by interacting with such stripped-down, universal icons.  
Valeria Luiselli’s novel Lost Children Archive combines these two methods. The novel is 
in part a story of children who leave their homes in South America and travel thousands of 
treacherous miles to cross the southern American border illegally. But it is also about a woman 
searching for a way to understand and responsibly tell the story of these immigrant children. 
Luiselli has worked as a translator for such children in American courts, an experience she 
chronicled in a nonfiction book, Tell Me How It Ends: An Essay in Forty Questions. Her novel is 
an attempt to recast those encounters into a fictional narrative that more broadly dramatizes the 
political and social circumstances of these children.1  
 
1 Many of the events recounted in Tell Me How It Ends (2017) are folded into Lost Children Archive 
(2019), and read together the books function like two sides of one coin—fictional and nonfictional 
treatments of the same story. The cross-country road trip, immigration interrogations of children, 
deportations by airplane, Apache Indian sound projects, and many other aspects are all part of both books. 
As Luiselli writes in Tell Me How It Ends, “perhaps the only way to grant any justice—were that even 
possible—is by hearing and recording those stories over and over again so that they come back, always, 
to haunt and shame us” (30). 
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Yet Luiselli recognizes that there is a gulf of privilege and security between herself and 
her subject, even though she is a Mexican-born writer with American citizenship. Luiselli is the 
daughter of a diplomat, and attended private schools around the world. She is sensitive about 
appropriating stories that are not her own and her writing toes the line between social justice and 
art. How does a novel help children find asylum? Why bother even dramatizing these children’s 
story? “So that others can listen to them and feel—pity? Feel—rage? And then do what? No one 
decides to not go to work and start a hunger strike after listening to the radio in the morning.”2 
Furthermore, she asks, can engaging with this issue in any shape other than a social justice 
documentary be defensible? And does a work of art have to be “for” anything? “But then again, 
isn’t art for art’s sake so often an absolutely ridiculous display of intellectual arrogance? Ethical 
concern: And why would I even think that I can or should make art within someone else’s 
suffering?”3 Can socially mindful art only be authored by those who belong to the persecuted 
party?  
To some degree, Luiselli’s novel is an experiment in the negative: by admitting these 
concerns and shortcomings, she fashions a work that might satisfy each category—aesthetic, 
moral, social. The experiment hinges on Luiselli’s representation of other people’s voices, and 
whether she can create a language that is not her own but to which she retains credible access.4 
The formal struggle here is not only with the authoritative language used to describe the plight of 
 
2 Valeria Luiselli, Lost Children Archive (New York: Knopf, 2019), 96. 
3 Ibid., 79. 
4 There is a resonance here with the notion of heteroglossia advanced by Mikhail Bakhtin in “Discourse in 
the Novel” in which a novel combines multiple languages at once. Per Bakhtin’s argument, the author is 
restrained by the lexical discourse in which she has lived and must therefore invent credible languages of 
disparate experiences. This can happen in a number of ways—point of view, character’s speech, 
employing “genres” such as diaries, letters, newspaper clippings, and so on—but the fundamental effect is 
to expand the credible “zone” of narrative experience into an “authentic stylization” of a multi-layered 
image of language. Luiselli does this in various ways, not least of all by employing “archive” as a credible 
genre. 
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these children (the journalistic voice of record), but with the artistic access to the experience 
itself.5 Part of her solution is to use objects to direct a narrative voice and frame a point of view 
that are foreign to her. 
Initially the novel is narrated by an unnamed woman who closely resembles Luiselli 
herself. She is on a road trip with her husband and their two children from New York to Arizona, 
and the car is packed with objects for the journey. The two adults have items that they believe 
will help them understand and document stories of persecution in the American Southwest: 
books, recording equipment, maps. The children have toys and survival kits that they play with 
in the backseat, inventing stories and games that freely intersect and diverge from the issues their 
parents talk about in the front of the car. Halfway through the book, as the woman watches her 
son use a pair of binoculars he was gifted for his birthday, she realizes that the language he and 
his sister have been inventing more accurately represents the story of the children at the border 
than her own politically determined attempts to understand the crisis. She cedes the narration to 
him and the rest of the book is told from his perspective as an address to his younger sister.  
As the narration shifts, it becomes clear that the woman is incapable of using the objects 
she has brought with her (books, maps, photographs, a tape recorder), objects she thought would 
equip her to tell this story. These items do not yield to her, just as Olga is unable to manipulate 
the objects around herself in The Days of Abandonment. In Ferrante’s novel, Olga’s conception 
of the world is mistaken, and she attempts to use the objects of her household to reestablish a 
reality that no longer exists. Olga has an established idea of how the external world is and should 
 
5 The critical response to Luiselli’s work as a novelist advancing social justice causes has, in general, 
praised this ambition (see especially Parul Sehgal, “Valeria Luiselli’s Latest Novel is a Mold-Breaking 
Classic,” The New York Times, February 11, 2019 and Claire Messud, “At the Border of the Novel,” The 
New York Review of Books, March 21, 2019, among others) though is also wary of such an effort’s 
shortcomings for realist fiction (James Wood, “Writing About Writing About the Border Crisis,” The 
New Yorker, January 28, 2019).  
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be, and when she is nonetheless unable to mold the world to fit these expectations, she is forced 
to reconsider what she believed to be certain. Likewise, the woman in Luiselli’s novel has an 
understanding of the situation at the border that has been over-determined by a politicized 
discourse and she is forced to come to terms with this when all the books, maps, and photographs 
that she has assembled to make sense of what is happening leave her more frustrated and 
confused than ever. 
Instead, she realizes, the way that the boy encounters these objects and articulates his 
experience of them—the pictures he takes with his camera, the observations he makes using his 
binoculars—proves the more insightful course. And once the narrative has changed perspectives 
from the woman to the boy, the children’s possessions become even more central to the 
development of the plot. Eventually the boy and his five-year-old sister set out into the desert on 
their own to find the lost immigrant children without telling their parents. They do not quite 
realize the danger involved in this undertaking; it all has the flavor of one of their backseat 
games even though they have snuck out and have hardly any provisions. The boy uses the 
objects in his backpack to navigate their route, but he does so in the manner of childish play. 
Meanwhile his story is interspersed with another that tells of a group of immigrant children 
slowly making their way to the American border. These children also have backpacks, and the 
objects they carry with them are all that remain for them of their families and where they are 
from. Just like the boy and his sister, these other children relate to the world through the games 
they invent, using the objects in their possession to translate their experience. As the boy and his 
sister wander through the desert, the narrative shifts back and forth between the two groups of 
children until they finally meet and exchange the contents of their bags.  
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The suggestive power of objects throughout the novel—the multiple perspectives they 
field and the imaginative language they inspire—helps Luiselli challenge notions of a fixed, 
official record of history. The organizing principle of Luiselli’s novel is, of course, the archive. 
As a collection of documents, images, maps, and sounds, the book is presented as its own 
assemblage of archival content. By using the term, Luiselli invokes notions of cultural and 
political claims to power and interpretation, as well as something incomplete. There is a range of 
ideas about what “archive” means. On the one hand, an archive is a depository for documents, 
books, and papers that may prove of historical interest. But what gets selected and why are not 
easy questions to answer, for how is one to know what will prove of historical interest? And 
likewise, once placed in the archive, the material takes on an outsized import, as though by its 
very selection it becomes broadly representative and especially significant. Furthermore, it is 
impossible to know what has been left out of the archive, for as much as an archive reveals about 
the past, it also withholds information about what it lacks. Thus the archive is a site of power as 
well as one of preservation; an array of exclusion as much as inclusion. An archive can only 
indicate the events that took place via the selections it contains, it cannot present a 
comprehensive history, and this imbues the items in an archive with a suggestive allure. The 
objects in Lost Children Archive not only determine the activity of the protagonists, but offer a 
criticism of the archive as a supposedly all-encompassing and reliable record. 
   
Lost Children Archive begins as the unnamed family of four prepares to leave New York. The 
father is a sound documentarist eager to record the ambient sounds of the American landscape as 
a way of documenting the violence wrought on Native Americans, particularly the Apaches 
(recording what sounds are in the landscape now, he contends, captures the echoes of an 
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otherwise lost people). The mother, the first narrator, is a sound documentarian who is invested 
in the plight of children trying to cross the border. (Apparently there is a fine distinction—she is 
the “sound librarian” while her husband is the “sound chemist.”) The boy is the man’s son whose 
biological mother died when he was born, while the girl is the woman’s daughter from a 
previous relationship. The woman and her husband met while making a sound documentary of 
all the languages in New York City, and now that this project is over, they are growing apart—he 
wants to relocate to the Southwest, she needs to remain in the city. With the dissolution of the 
family in sight, the summer trip stands as the final chapter together, and as a contrast to the 
forced separation of the children on the border from their families back home. 
From the beginning, language and sound are paramount. Not only are the man and 
woman steeped in sound recording, but the narrator consistently notices how the family shares an 
intimate language. She wonders which parts of this story the children will remember and how the 
pronouns the family uses will shift alongside its geographic relocation—whether the family will 
be a we, they, us, he, I (curiously, she does not consider “you,” the pronoun that comes to 
dominate the text). Language has been failing the marriage, the woman and the man struggle to 
communicate as they once did, and no one seems to entirely understand the change transpiring. 
The day before the family leaves the city, ants invade the house and the girl offers a jumbled 
prophecy-explanation that they all accept as good as any: “The ants, they come marching in, eat 
my upperworldpanties, they take us where there’s no catastrophes, just good trophies and 
tooshiefreedom.”6 It is the bizarre formulation of children, yet this unexpected and playful 
language will come to be essential to the novel. “From that day on, I think,” remarks the woman, 
“we started allowing our children’s voices to take over our silence.”7  
 
6 Luiselli, Lost Children Archive, 28. 
7 Ibid., 28-9. 
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As the family leaves the city, their language expands as well, transforming into a parlance 
filled with the myths of the American west, song lyrics, children’s misappropriations, directions, 
complaints, and quotations from the various books they have brought along. This sonic intensity 
is compounded by the stories that the man tells about the Apaches and those of the lost children 
that the mother listens to on the radio. In the second half of the book, it becomes clear that all of 
this language is internalized by the children without any distinction between what is real and 
contemporary on the one hand and imagined or historical on the other. With childish naïveté that 
verges on prescience, all the words, lyrics, myths, reports, instructions, and names constitute the 
entire plane of reality for the boy and girl—there is no separation between, say, the lyrics of a 
David Bowie song, sacred Apache landscapes, and their mother’s ambition to find the lost 
children. Eventually this new, idiosyncratic language becomes something the family relies on 
while everything else remains uncertain. They even take on new names, inspired by the stories of 
the Apaches: Papa Conchise, Lucky Arrow, Swift Feather, and Memphis respectively replace 
father, mother, boy, and girl. 
The ephemeral nature of sound and language in Lost Children Archive provokes 
questions about what is permanent and official. If the sounds of a place and the things people say 
disappear almost immediately, how might history be reclaimed, listened to, understood? What 
sort of trace is left behind? Something intelligible or only silence and junk? The narrator thinks 
of the recordings her husband makes, the books that the family reads, the photographs the boy 
takes, and the maps that they follow as the material of their passage. These physical objects will 
be the enduring evidence of their trip, the “archive” of this novel, and they are all packed into 
seven boxes in the back of the car. Boxes I-IV are the husband’s, filled with notes, books, tapes, 
pictures, index cards, maps, folders—all relating to the Apache project, recording, and ghosts. 
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Box V is the woman’s, likewise loaded with books, maps, and lists of objects left behind in the 
desert, all pertaining to the missing children and archiving. Box VI is the girl’s and Box VII the 
boy’s, both of which they decide to leave empty to fill up along the way—the collections that 
will document the trip itself. If the parents’ boxes are essentially the sources from which 
Luiselli’s novel derives, the children’s boxes will be the record of what the novel ultimately 
becomes. 
 
The family leaves New York the day after the boy’s tenth birthday. For presents, he has 
specifically asked for no toys, only “real” things. He receives a polaroid camera from his mother 
and a small survival kit from his father that includes binoculars, matches, a compass, and a Swiss 
Army knife. He puts them all in his backpack, and they become the essential objects of the novel.  
Initially, the camera consumes his attention. The boy is excited to start documenting the 
trip, but the first few pictures he takes come out milky white. “Perhaps,” the woman suggests, 
half serious, half teasing, “they’re coming out white not because the camera is broken or just a 
toy camera but because what you’re photographing is not actually there. If there’s no thing, 
there’s no echo that can bounce off it.”8 Later the woman decides that she would like to take a 
picture of the children and their father as they play an Apache-inspired game. She goes to her 
son’s backpack for the camera and alongside the compass and Swiss Army knife, she notices 
little cars and rubber bands; the random objects of a child. And she recalls once looking through 
her sister’s desk drawer for a forgotten ID, “suddenly wiping away tears with my sleeve as I 
went through her well-ordered pencils, colored clips, and random Post-it notes addressed to 
herself—visit Mama this week, talk more slowly, buy flowers and long earrings, walk more 
 
8 Ibid., 55. 
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often.”9 She wonders how it could be that these unremarkable objects, the detritus of a life, have 
such power. “Impossible to know why items like these can reveal such important things about a 
person,” Luiselli writes, “and difficult to understand the sudden melancholy they produce in that 
person’s absence. Perhaps it is just that belongings often outlive their owners, so our minds can 
easily place those belongings in a future in which their owner is no longer present. We anticipate 
our loved ones’ future absence through the material presence of all their random stuff.”10 
This kind of treatment of objects of the past will be explored more fully in the following 
chapter on W. G. Sebald, but here it is enough to notice how these objects provoke in the woman 
a predictable feeling of nostalgia. She finds the camera instructions and learns that the polaroid 
has to be stored in a dark place while it develops. She teaches the boy, and allows him to place 
his developing images in a little red book she has brought along. Once the narrative switches to 
his perspective, the boy describes how it was his job during the trip to keep the back of the car 
organized, especially the boxes. And though he is not allowed to go looking through them, 
sometimes his mother would permit him to get the little red book so that he could put the pictures 
from his camera between its pages. Using that permission as an excuse, he pokes around the box, 
just a little, a looking that stirs in him the same sensation he felt in the park once when he and his 
sister played a game of burying clay figures for future scientists to discover. “Except with Ma’s 
box, I was not the one who made the clay figures but the scientist who had found them centuries 
later.”11  
Here Luiselli echoes what the woman felt looking in her son’s backpack and sister’s 
drawer, but in the attitude of a child. And this changes the tone of the experience entirely. 
 
9 Ibid., 67. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Ibid., 207. 
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Whereas the woman encounters an overwhelming sorrow looking through her sister’s things, a 
pain associated with absence, the boy’s mode is one of discovery and wonder. The accidental 
glimpse these objects afford does not result in emotional poignancy or nostalgia for him, perhaps 
because as a child he does not entirely grasp the finitude of life. Instead, the encounter with his 
mother’s objects is an opportunity to understand something about her. Very often objects are 
used in a fiction to evoke a person’s absence, but here Luiselli pushes this resonance further by 
suggesting that the object may also posit something new, it may provide us with clues to 
something we did not previously apprehend.  
The little red book proves to be a crucial part of this creative encounter with the physical. 
It is an object that initially belongs to the woman, but eventually comes into the possession of the 
boy. It is titled Elegies for Lost Children, and is the only invented document in the novel. Luiselli 
provides a description of the fictional author, Ella Camposanto, and a summary of the book: it is 
based loosely on the Children’s Crusade of 1212 though could also have been written with the 
not-so-distant future in mind of Europe or North Africa or Central America. Chiefly, the little red 
book is at once historically informed and loose enough to describe all migrant children. As the 
family makes its way across the country, the woman reads these elegies out loud to her children 
while the boy slips his photographs between its pages. In this way Luiselli introduces a third-
person narration of the lost children into the text, one that is far enough removed to potentially 
avoid criticisms of appropriation. By the end, the little red book stuffed with photographs is the 
very image of the book Luiselli would like to write. 
These elegies tell the story of a group of seven children making their way to the 
American border. When the woman reads these elegies out loud to her own children, she (much 
like the reader) instinctively assumes a separation between that story and her own. But for the 
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boy, no such distinction exists. Just as the song lyrics and myths he hears in the car are valid 
constituents of reality for him, so are these elegies. When his narration usurps the woman’s, it 
becomes clear that these seven children are the ones he believes he and his sister will find in the 
desert. He continues to read the elegies out loud to his sister, and slowly Luiselli erodes the 
distinction between the immigrants’ story and that of the boy and his sister, entwining the two 
narratives as contemporaneous. As the siblings make their way into the desert, the group of 
immigrant children arrive at the border. Eventually the separation between the elegies and the 
boy evaporates entirely, as the two groups of children take refuge from a storm together in an 
abandoned boxcar, the culminating scene of the novel.  
Whereas the first half of the novel, narrated by the woman, remains rigidly confined to a 
single perspective, the second half, narrated by the boy, is porous. Furthermore, the little red 
book comes to have more of a bearing on these characters than the boy and his mother initially 
expect. What this object reveals to the woman and to the boy is different, and it compels them to 
react in distinctive ways: the woman simply becomes angry at the unjust hardship these children 
endure, while the boy innocently goes looking for them. In part, what makes the object so 
important here is not its physical, universal aspect (as is the case for Knausgaard), but the quality 
of the looking and the kind of understanding it inspires. This is first depicted as a feeling when 
the woman sorts through the boy’s backpack and the boy pokes around her box, and then 
becomes more consequential when the story of the lost children sends the boy and his sister off 
into the wilderness. Objects broker the comprehension of these characters, and more importantly 
they reveal distinctions between one perspective and another. And finally, the story contained 
within the object—the tale of the seven migrant children—moves beyond the physical bounds of 
paper and print, and becomes a living part of the journey the boy and his sister undertake.  
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After the boy becomes proficient with the camera, his attention turns to his binoculars. 
Throughout Lost Children Archive the objects of looking—photographs, cameras, binoculars—
are always close at hand, and the glances, observations, and vision of all the members of the 
family are carefully portrayed. Just like the camera, the binoculars offer a means of specialized 
sight, they are a tool of interpretation. Eventually it is through this object that the woman realizes 
the boy is best equipped to observe the lost children. The shift in narration occurs just after the 
family has arrived at a small airstrip outside El Paso, Texas where a group of refugee children 
will be deported by plane. The woman has been adamant that the family witness the extradition, 
as though by doing so they might somehow right the wrong. As they rush to the scene, only the 
children speak, “their thoughts filling our world . . . blurring all its outlines,” the woman thinks.12 
For the first time she wonders how she and her husband’s concerns have occupied the minds of 
her children, and how much the children’s games and stories have affected the adults. In the 
backseat, the boy and the girl are imagining some war-like scenario with Border Patrol and 
American bluecoats, and suddenly the woman realizes that her children “are the ones who are 
telling the story of the lost children. They’ve been telling it all along, over and over again in the 
back of the car.”13 In this regard, Luiselli goes further than Knausgaard, who merely marvels at 
his children’s capacity to meld and adjust disparate realities, and fully dramatizes the children’s 
imaginative synthesis of the world.  
The family arrives at the airfield just before the children are boarded onto the plane. It is 
a dry, hot scene with steam coming off the tarmac and dust in the air. The woman and her son are 
standing at a chain-link fence, scanning the airstrip with the boy’s binoculars. The woman uses 
them first while the boy pesters her to give them back. Reluctantly (much like a child herself) she 
 
12 Ibid., 179. 
13 Ibid., 180. 
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hands them to him, and asks him to describe what he sees. He begins in terms that he knows his 
mother will recognize—the brown hills, the plane—a staid, simple description. Then uniformed 
men appear, escorting about fifteen small children. The woman snatches the binoculars back, but 
becomes so overwhelmed by what she sees that she throws a fit, kicking at the fence until her 
husband must restrain her. The boy takes the binoculars back. When the woman is calm again, 
she seems to accept that the boy is now her interlocutor, but realizes that as long as she asks him 
to speak in her language, she will not receive an accurate representation. So she switches modes: 
“Tell me what you see, Ground Control.”14 With this, she enters into the world of the games the 
boy and girl have been playing in the car, mixing their favorite David Bowie song with stories of 
Apaches and the immigrant children. The boy picks it up immediately: “The spaceship is moving 
toward the runway,” he replies. The woman keeps prodding, and as he describes the scene in 
bizarre images, the boy secures for the woman—and for the reader—a new narrative access. 
After the plane disappears into the sky, she finally understands:  
 
It’s his version of the story that will outlive us; his version that will remain and be 
passed down. Not only his version of our story, of who we were as a family, but 
also his version of others’ stories, like those of the lost children. He’d understood 
everything much better than I had, than the rest of us had. He’d listened to things, 
looked at them—really looked, focused, pondered—and little by little, his mind 
had arranged all the chaos around us into a world.15 
 
 
14 Ibid., 184. 
15 Ibid., 185. 
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The spaceship imagery emphasizes the figurative, unfathomable distance between America and 
the country to which these children are returning—they might as well be going to the moon. 
Unencumbered by the need for accuracy here, the language that the binoculars allow goes to the 
very core of the issue. This is the first time in the novel where the imaginative language of the 
children stands in for the recognizable image-repertoire of adults.  
To some degree, the imagination’s relation here to the unexpected and revealing has a 
long history, and recalls some aspect of the romantic appeal to imagery that lies beyond daily 
perception. Coleridge’s distinction in particular between primary and secondary imagination has 
some resonance here. Coleridge establishes the primary imagination as “a repetition in the finite 
mind of the eternal act of creation,” that is, a kind of human-scaled yet divine genesis.16 The 
secondary imagination is the action taken by that finite mind “to idealize and to unify” what has 
been generated. “It is essentially vital,” Coleridge concludes, “even as all objects (as objects) are 
essentially fixed and dead.”17 Luiselli creates a not entirely dissimilar distinction, as though the 
primary imagination of children retains what Coleridge terms an “esemplastic power” to produce 
an unfettered poetic ideal, while the secondary imagination of adults struggles to order what it 
beholds while observing a political sensitivity. Objects here serve as a kind of conduit, from the 
limited imagery of the woman to the expansive transformations of the boy, and once the 
narrative shifts to the child’s perspective, they become even more central to inventive 
descriptions.18 Luiselli essentially establishes the imagination over ideology here, moving from 
that which is sanctioned toward the untethered. 
 
16 Samuel Taylor Coleridge, Biographia Literaria, in Samuel Taylor Coleridge: The Major Works, ed. H. 
J. Jackson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 313. 
17 Ibid. 
18 After all, in his notes on the composition of “Kubla Khan” Coleridge described the images that rose up 
before him as “things.” See Harold Bloom and Lionel Trilling, The Oxford Anthology of English 
Literature: Romantic Poetry and Prose (New York: Oxford University Press, 1973), 255.  
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Immediately following the scene at the airstrip, the boy takes over the narration in an 
address to his sister. The conceit is that he is making a sound recording for her, telling her their 
story so she never forgets. Curiously, this also introduces the “you” into the story, a pronoun that 
stands in contrast to the “I” and the “we” that frames the first half of the narrative, recalling 
Knausgaard’s claim in My Struggle that the second person retains an empathic consideration that 
the first and third person neglect. Whether Luiselli has something similar in mind is unclear, 
though she does seem to be interested in undermining the authority of any one perspective. From 
here on the narrative becomes much more fluid, shifting voices and perspectives, and guided 
largely by the children’s games as well as by objects in the sky.  
A few days after the family watches the children deported by plane, they are staying at a 
rented cabin on the edge of a wilderness area, close to the Apache land that has been their 
destination. One night the boy wants to read more of the elegies from the little red book. Rather 
than try to find the book among his mother’s things in the car, he brings her box inside to his 
room while the rest of his family sleeps. He knows he is not supposed to intrude, but after he 
takes out the little red book he cannot help himself. “I was about to close the box again and get 
ready to read when something came over me, which I cannot explain. I felt like I needed to see 
what else was in that box, look at all the things that I knew were always under the little red book, 
things I wasn’t allowed to look at so never did.”19 Once again, the boy encounters the same 
sensation that Luiselli tracked for the woman looking through her sister’s drawer. He is not 
supposed to be looking through his mother’s box, yet the intrusive nature of transgression, the 
possibility that these objects could reveal something more, pushes him further. Circumscribed by 
social conventions of privacy, rarely do we catch such intimate glimpses of another person. “But 
 
19 Luiselli, Lost Children Archive, 235. 
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no one was watching me now,” the boy thinks to himself.20 Here these objects inspire more than 
just a sentimental reflection, and the intrusion has consequences. 
The boy inventories everything from his mother’s box, and decides that he and his sister 
must set off into the desert to find the lost children on their own. The archive of private things 
propels the narrative forward, directing the children out from the safety of their parents’ 
supervision. It is not just that the boy has caught sight of something fleeting about his mother or 
the political situation that concerns her; he has interpreted the objects and resolved to act. “It was 
silly of me to have broken a promise and looked inside Ma’s box. But also I finally understood 
some important things after looking at all that stuff, understood them with my heart and not only 
with my head.”21 Just as the image of the airplane granted to the boy by the binoculars is 
somehow more revealing than the news reports on the radio, so does the little red book and the 
maps in this box reorient the boy’s relationship with the lost children. Carefully he packs his 
backpack with maps, the red book, his binoculars, knife, compass, flashlight, matches, and 
camera, and his sister’s backpack with a little food and a children’s book the family has been 
reading and rereading, The Book with No Pictures. The next morning, before their parents are 
awake, the two children set off, using the Apache names have assumed, Swift Feather and 
Memphis. 
 
As they make their way through Apacheria, Memphis asks Swift Feather to tell her about the lost 
children. He does his best to imagine them, and eventually takes his binoculars out of his 
backpack. “They’re coming to meet us and we’ll meet them over there, look,” he tells her, and 
they peer through the glasses at large thunderclouds amassing over the valley, with birds circling 
 
20 Ibid. 
21 Ibid., 238. 
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above.22 Memphis asks if they are eagles and Swift Feather tells her “yes of course they are, 
those are the eagles, the same eagles the lost children now see as they walk north into the desert 
plain” and with that the narrative makes its first shift in the book’s penultimate section, from 
first- to third-person, from Swift Feather to the group of immigrant children.23 Once again, it is 
an object, the binoculars, that becomes the narrative’s fulcrum, providing the right vision of 
another object in the sky, the eagle. In the desert, the children’s possessions serve them in a 
variety of ways, though persistently the tools for looking—binoculars and camera—prove most 
useful. Adapting a technique she attributes to Virginia Woolf, Luiselli changes perspective via 
airborne objects. Just as the narrative shifts from the woman to the boy when the plane takes off 
from the El Paso airstrip, in the desert the narrative moves from the boy to the group of 
immigrant children via eagles.24 
 These lost children also have backpacks with toothbrushes, sweaters, underwear, a bible, 
photographs. These are the only possessions these children have, packed with care by parents 
and grandparents. In the elegies, these children do not even have names—the moment they are 
handed over to their guide, he simply numbers them, youngest to oldest, and these numbers 
become the whole of their identity. Their backpacks—their archives—are the only record of who 
they once were and what they hope to become. Some of the things they carry are obviously 
useful, but some are not. One of the children has a bag of marbles. Another has a broken cell 
phone. He found this phone by the railroad tracks, and holds on to it, along with a black hat. One 
 
22 Ibid., 321. 
23 Ibid. 
24 The technique is also used in the film Wanda by Barbara Loden when a toy airplane directs the 
camera’s gaze from one party to another in a languid, senseless, desert-like scene with a storm 
approaching. Though Luiselli does not mention this film, she does include a book by Nathalie Léger 
called Suite for Barbara Loden in the mother’s box. An odd homage to Loden in itself, Léger’s book also 
culls meaning and perspective from archival material and found objects.  
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night, while the man in charge is sleeping, this boy, the sixth, pulls out the phone and shows it to 
the other children. He invents a game: “Here,” he says, offering it to one of the girls, “call 
someone, call anyone.”25 She takes the phone and pretends to call her grandmother to tell her that 
everything is okay. The phone is passed around the group, some of the children making earnest 
“calls” while others make jokes, until it is handed to the youngest boy, the one who sucks his 
thumb. This boy makes the longest call to his grandmother, telling her about the other children 
and that he carries with him a stone in his pocket, one of the stones that his grandmother used to 
throw into the green lake. When he is finished and all the children have spoken, the sixth boy 
tells them that the broken phone is also a camera, and they all huddle together for a portrait. The 
boy pretends to focus a lens and says that on the count of three, when he takes the picture, they 
all have to say their names. He adjusts his black hat, counts, and they all shout out into the night 
who they are.26 
 Again, what is possible to see and say is mediated by an object. This is not the earnest, 
stripped-down description of Knausgaard, but the inventive imagination of children taking 
creative liberty with a thing. It hardly matters that the cell phone is broken or that it is not a 
camera. All these children need is an object that can suggest or invite an alternative reality. Just 
as the playful language of the boy in front of the airplane conveys the scene of deportation to his 
mother, so do the theatrics of these children make their identities real. In his Charles Eliot Norton 
Lectures, Italo Calvino discusses the “magic objects” of romance, around which “there forms a 
kind of force field that is in fact the territory of the story itself.”27 A similar ambiance is 
established here: meaning is negotiated by the thing, and while Luiselli often uses the object to 
 
25 Ibid., 306. 
26 Ibid., 308. 
27 Italo Calvino, “Quickness,” in Six Memos for the Next Millennium (New York: Vintage International, 
1993), 32. 
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prompt a childish game that in turn reveals more than “adult language,” she persistently allows 
the object to retain unexpected properties, as though suggesting that all things we encounter 
might have more of a bearing on our lives than we expect.  
For example, when the immigrant children are waiting in the train yard for their first 
train, an old witch approaches them, prophesies doom, and for a fee offers to interfere with the 
fates on their behalf. When the children decline, she shuffles away, then turns and lobs a ripe 
orange at them, which hits the oldest boy, number seven, on the shoulder. The children and 
everyone around them are hungry, but no one touches the fruit, which dropped to the ground 
without rolling and then slowly rots away. Days later, boy number seven becomes the first 
casualty among the children when their coyote punishes him for compulsively reading out the 
words on the side of the train while running to catch it. Meanwhile, at one of the first towns the 
train passes, a crowd of people gather to throw food and fresh fruit up to the children on top of 
the boxcars, including oranges which most people peel and eat quickly but one girl saves under 
her shirt. At the next town, another crowd of people are waiting by the tracks and the children 
eagerly get ready to catch the food, but instead these people pelt them with stones. Later on, 
when Swift Feather and Memphis arrive at the boxcar in the valley, Swift Feather throws a stone 
inside to see if anything is there. An enormous eagle emerges and flaps up into the sky, after 
nearly twenty pages of narrative flipping back and forth via eagles, “until it was a smaller object 
up there” along with the other eagles.28 As brother and sister stare up at the birds one last time, a 
stone hits Swift Feather in the shoulder. He turns and there in the boxcar are the other lost 
children, the real children, not just stories about them. Together they make a fire and find three 
 
28 Luiselli, Lost Children Archive, 330. 
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eagle eggs in a nest, which they cook and share, consummating the joining of the two narratives 
in a single meal.  
It’s a strange progression and impossible to say that stones, oranges, and eggs 
“symbolize” something particular. Rather Luiselli constructs a sequence in which the things that 
accompany the action seem to possess latent potential; sometimes it comes to bear on the 
children, sometimes it does not. Nothing “happens” because the girl tucks the orange under her 
shirt or because the youngest boy has kept a stone in his pocket all this time, and there is no 
direct correlation between the orange striking the boy’s shoulder and his death. And yet much in 
the same way that Ferrante endows the objects around her protagonists with an actualizing 
potential, and Calvino suggests some attenuating magical power, so does Luiselli embrace the 
covert consequences and articulations of the objects that accompany a journey. Furthermore, if 
these things could be preserved in some kind of archive, she seems to be asking, would they tell 
the story of what happened? Probably not, even though the stone is the object that the young boy 
is sure to “tell” his grandmother he still has. 
This distinction between what is meaningful and what is not comes into sharp relief in an 
episode just before the lost children reach the border. The train on which they are riding makes a 
stop at a military checkpoint and soldiers climb up onto the roof. They walk among the children 
and adults, taking their bags and throwing everything over the side. The children can sense the 
threat and the youngest boy, tempted to suck his thumb instead “bends over his crossed legs and 
bites the strap of his backpack.”29 The soldier approaches, takes the backpacks from the children, 
and pulls out each item from inside, one by one, naming it before tossing it over his shoulder and 
off the train, as though questioning the intelligence of the child who would bring such an object 
 
29 Ibid., 310. 
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all this way. “Toothbrush? Marbles? Sweater? Toothpaste? Bible? Underwear? A broken 
telephone?”30 The children make no resistance, the soldier leaves, and the train pulls away amid 
“the heaps, the broken, the beautiful rubbish, all colors of stuff beaming now under the sun.”31 
Not only does this leave the children with nothing, but it underscores the oddity of the things 
they have been holding. Without a personal connection, objects are just stuff. The scraps in the 
sister’s drawer, or the rubber bands in the boy’s backpack, when detached from the context of 
their owners, appear as junk. Yet a broken phone is at once trash and the means of uttering a 
name; one person sees a small prop plane through the binoculars, another sees a spaceship. In the 
essay “The Dehumanization of Art,” José Ortega y Gasset suggests that modern art might divest 
objects of their “lived” reality so as to “compel us to improvise other forms of intercourse 
completely distinct from our ordinary way with things.”32 Luiselli does just this, making a case 
for augmentation whereas Knausgaard favors reduction. In alternating between depictions of 
objects as meaningless and meaningful, Luiselli suggests that to dismiss them as merely material 
is to forfeit the scope of their power. 
 Without their backpacks, the children have nothing yet the boy retains the black hat that 
appeared to confer some authority on his game with the broken phone, as though it were some 
strange sorcerer’s hat. Days later, after the children have scrambled over the wall and run from 
the bullets of Border Patrol, this boy falls and cannot get up. One of the girls implores him, pulls 
him by the sleeve, but he cannot go any further and gives her his black hat in a silent gesture that 
means “carry on.”33 As they wander through the desert, the four children who remain arrive at a 
 
30 Ibid., 311. 
31 Ibid. 
32 José Ortega y Gasset, “The Dehumanization of Art,” in The Dehumanization of Art and Other Essays 
on Art, Culture, and Literature, trans. Helene Weyl (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972), 21-2. 
33 Luiselli, Lost Children Archive, 322. 
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ghost town full of old houses with broken windows and scattered furniture, and some random 
things lying in the dirt—a fork, the sole of a shoe—more junk that no one is left to redeem. The 
youngest boy picks up a pink cowboy hat and wears it as they keep walking. Then, the morning 
after the two groups of children have spent the night together in the boxcar, Swift Feather wakes 
to find that everyone is gone and Memphis is making mud pies for breakfast. She has traded 
nearly everything in Swift Feather’s backpack for a plastic bow and arrow. He is initially irate, 
concerned that they will not be able to find their way without his things. But Memphis is calm, 
she knows the journey is almost over because she lost her tooth. She has also given away her 
book without pictures, and secured for herself and her brother the two hats. “The pink one is 
yours,” she tells him, “and the black one is mine.”34 The boy calms down, they pretend to eat 
mud pies for breakfast, and then set out for the mountains and Echo Canyon.  
Where did this bow and arrow come from? How could the lost children have been 
carrying this toy with them over the wall and past Border Patrol? It is the first we have heard of 
it, almost as though Memphis has conjured it from thin air. Yet this toy and their two new hats 
prove to be the children’s salvation. When they arrive in the mountains, they cannot be entirely 
sure where they are. They set out to explore and “because we had the hats and we also had the 
bow and arrow, we decided to play the Apache game we used to play with Pa.”35 It is a hide-and-
seek game and when Memphis finds her brother she shouts “Geronimo!” At that moment, her 
voice echoes back to them, “bouncing back even stronger and longer” and they know that they 
have found Echo Canyon.36 They shout their Apache names together and then they hear a 
 
34 Ibid., 336. 
35 Ibid., 337. 
36 Ibid., 338. 
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different echo, that of their parents calling out. This is the end of the journey, the lost children 
are found.  
 Once again, the objects facilitate a childish game that in turn determines the narrative arc. 
Despite Swift Feather’s initial insistence to his parents that he wanted “no toys” for his birthday, 
the practical tools he receives can only take him and his sister so far. Only once the tools have 
been exchanged for toys do the things the children possess deliver them into safety. Meanwhile, 
we learn a few pages later that the two girls that the woman has been looking for, two sisters who 
may or may not have been with Memphis and Swift Feather that night in the boxcar and would 
have carried on in their journey with the “survival” tools from Swift Feather’s backpack, have 
been found dead in the Sonoran Desert.  
Ultimately the toys that make possible the game, once again allow the declaration of 
names. Immediately following this scene, Luiselli includes an inventory of Box VI, which 
belongs to Memphis and is full of the “echoes” she has “collected” throughout the trip. The 
novel then concludes with all the photos Swift Feather has taken as the exclusive contents of Box 
VII. Together, these two collections underscore how incomplete an archive really is when 
presumed to accurately account for what has happened. Neither box tells the story, though they 
are not entirely indecipherable either. The spaces and connections these echoes and photographs 
open up—that is, the deceptive objectivity of objects—arrange many possible narratives, and 
Luiselli’s novel becomes situated between what is real and what is not. After all, where did these 
photographs come from if not from the story we have just read?  
 
Luiselli’s novel is in many ways an experiment in form. She begins from a place of personal 
experience and ends in a radically fictionalized narrative. Luiselli herself witnessed the injustices 
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of the American immigration system through her work as a legal translator, and is compelled by 
the history of repression and murder that those in power have systematically and routinely 
perpetrated on those without. Her aim with this book is in part political; she wants to comment 
on and engage with this history and ongoing policy while presenting a version of the story that 
otherwise remains invisible. Furthermore, she is concerned with how the past is remembered and 
documented, and what vanishes irretrievably. Lost Children Archive contends with the artistic 
difficulties the socially mindful author faces in dramatizing a political subject and telling a story 
that is not her own. 
As we have seen, objects are a crucial aspect of this effort, functioning toward two major 
ends. The suggestive language that arises from objects in the hands of children releases Luiselli 
from the constraints of her own experience and the staid images of political nonfiction. This 
technique is propulsive but it also relates more broadly to Luiselli’s overall adoption of the term 
“archive” to describe the work. The second function of objects is ultimately to complicate 
notions of truth by showing how what is documented, preserved, and official is only a sliver of 
the story. Luiselli’s obvious concern in collecting objects into a so-called archive––made explicit 
by her novel’s title and her inclusion of books on archive theory as central props––suggests that 
the reader consider the archive as a form, and determine where that form and the literary claims 
of the novel intersect. The success of both, Luiselli seems to argue, depends on the legibility and 
resonances of the objects inside. In this sense, the experience of exploring an archive is not so 
different than looking through a sibling’s drawer or child’s backpack. Both encounters produce a 
sense of further meaning, an extrapolation of something latent in the original action that reveals 
itself only in retrospect.   
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Given the difficulty of arranging an official yet unbiased record, archive has been taken 
up in the past forty years as a metaphor for theories on power, exclusion, and discourse. Perhaps 
the most far-reaching exploitation of the term has been Foucault’s use of Archeology of 
Knowledge to describe the domain of statements where systems establish language as events and 
things. This overarching view of the archive acknowledges the archive’s ties to the structures 
that determine experience. “The analysis of the archive, then,” writes Foucault, “involves a 
privileged region: at once close to us, and different from our present existence, it is the border of 
time that surrounds our presence, which overhangs it, and which indicates it in its otherness; it is 
that which, outside ourselves, delimits us.”37 Such delimiting is taken up by Derrida in Archive 
Fever, one of the books Luiselli includes in the husband’s boxes, in which Derrida prods the 
term etymologically to endow it as both a place of beginnings and law, as well as the house of 
authority. Between these two theoretical appropriations of the archive—Foucault’s systemic 
considerations and Derrida’s etymological rendering—the term has taken shape as a 
metaphorical tool used to describe all kind of scenarios in which history and authority, origin and 
observation intersect. 
Perhaps the most influential text about archives for Luiselli is Arlette Farge’s The Allure 
of the Archives, published by Editions du Seuil in 1989. A short book, it is part defense of 
archival work, part instruction for the novice archivist, and part theoretical examination of what 
occurs when the archivist extracts historical meaning from the contents of an archive. Farge’s 
argument is fundamentally about the interpretation that the archive demands, and the way in 
which it allows a reconstruction of the past to serve the concerns of the present. Referencing 
Foucault, she asserts that archives do not tell truth, but of truth, and that they demonstrate and 
 
37 Michel Foucault, The Archeology of Knowledge & The Discourse on Language, trans. A. M. Sheridan 
Smith (New York: Pantheon Books, 1972), 130. 
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embody individual positions between systems of power and a self-identity. The archive 
“preserves an infinite number of relations to reality” and “into this complex game . . . slip fable 
and fabulation, and perhaps even the ability for someone to transform everything into fantasy, to 
write one’s story or to turn one’s own life into fiction.”38 Essentially the archive invites a 
grappling with the harshness of reality and collusion with multiple, even conflicting experiences. 
To access this realm of truth, the archivist (or novelist) must allow the scattered details of life to 
surface without constraining them to logical or predetermined narrative. “You develop your 
reading of the archives through ruptures and dispersion,” Farge writes, “and must mold questions 
out of stutters and silences.”39 These become the very directives of Luiselli’s novel. Not only 
does she imagine the stories of the lost children in the Elegies for Lost Children, but employs the 
fables of children to elicit the possibilities of different realities. 
 At the beginning of Lost Children Archive, Luiselli establishes the “archive” in a 
traditional sense, which she then uses to create fictions that tell of truth. The archive that she 
creates among the boxes in the backseat of the car is not only a collection of documents and 
books that the adults believe will help them tell the stories they seek, but an open repository for a 
new kind of story, one that cannot be told in familiar terms. This type of archive is both 
subversive and unconventional, for the children’s camera, binoculars, and storybook prove more 
consequential than the diaries of Susan Sontag, the Cantos of Pound, and the other objects in the 
adults’ boxes. Here, Luiselli shows us that parallel to the official archive there may exist many 
other, equally revealing and consequential collections requiring interpretation that is not 
 
38 Arlette Farge, The Allure of the Archives, trans. Thomas Scott-Railton (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 2013), 30-1. 
39 Ibid., 94. 
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hamstrung by what Foucault might term the prevailing discourse. Luiselli dramatizes this 
through the objects that become the means of play for the children. 
Despite the fundamental conceit that the term archive appears to secure for Luiselli, her 
attention seems to be most readily drawn not to the archive itself but to the distance between the 
record and the events as they transpired. Sound is one useful way to orient this investigation, for 
it is at once a physical, potentially linguistic event that also ricochets off the objects it 
encounters. It is this kind of echo that Luiselli is seeking. Rather than attempt to strip away the 
excesses of language in order to uncover the official record and an “accurate” dramatization of 
immigrant experience, she arranges her novel as a lyrical array of events and sounds echoing off 
each other. Luiselli wants to trace the resonance of people in a landscape—a family, refugees, 
Apaches—and she understands “echoes” as not only made of sound, but also of experience. 
While Knausgaard uses objects to chisel away the suggestive lyricism of language so as to 
preserve identity in its raw form, Luiselli turns to things to allow her language to become 
expansive. The object’s capacity to evoke multiple descriptions of the same event is essential to 
Luiselli’s project.  
To some extent, Luiselli amends the experience of looking through someone else’s 
drawer—an encounter with the latent meanings of objects—in the context of sounds. “The 
inventory of echoes was not a collection of sounds that have been lost,” she writes, “but rather 
one of sounds that were present in the time of recording and that, when we listen to them, remind 
us of the ones that are lost.”40 This sort of accidental glimpse is precisely what is useful about 
objects in Luiselli’s novel. So often the things that remain are revealing because they have been 
taken out of their original context. As Farge writes, “the spoken word, the found object, the trace 
 
40 Luiselli, Lost Children Archive, 141. 
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left behind become faces of the real” but the overwhelming feeling of having discovered Truth 
never lasts.41 The object “reveals nothing more than its physical presence . . . [but] its importance 
lies in the interpretation of its presence, in the search for its complex meaning, in framing its 
‘reality’ within system of symbols—systems for which history attempts to be the grammar.”42 In 
a sense, by arranging an archive, perhaps even by simply invoking the idea of an archive, 
Luiselli allows this system to speak, to invent, to determine, as though she were animating the 
historical pieces that someone in the future will find tucked away in a drawer. Luiselli relishes 
the way that things can take on multiple meanings, especially once they have been removed from 
their common, everyday context. The objects in this novel—much as they constitute an 
archive—are the starting point, and the book becomes a collection, both substantive and limited, 
that inspires and solicits interpretation.  
The woman’s discovery at the airstrip that her son’s game offers the most truthful 
description of the deportation is the discovery of Luiselli’s novel. It is not archives that tell us a 
story, but how well we imagine the circumstances of archival material. As Farge writes, archival 
work is an act of interpretation: “a new object is created, a new form of knowledge takes shape, 
and a new ‘archive’ emerges. As you work you are taking the preexisting forms and readjusting 
them in different ways to make possible a different narration of reality.”43 Luiselli uses 
binoculars, a camera, a cell phone, hats, and eagles to initiate and sustain this imaginative work, 
creating not only the narrative’s propulsion, but a novel that makes its own case for credibility 
even when its culminating scene is the dream-like desert meeting of fictional and real people in 
an abandoned boxcar for a meal of eagle eggs. By the end, what is left in the archive is not the 
 
41 Farge, Allure of the Archive, 11. 
42 Ibid., 11-2. 
43 Ibid., 62-3. 
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ratifying element—these are only fading echoes and amateur photographs with no captions. 
Instead, the novel turns on the children’s inventions and their consequential play, the activities 
that tell of truth. By arranging the children’s games through objects, Luiselli draws out the 
experiences that exceed her own and allows interpretation to remain multiple. The archive speaks 
through the objects in the hands of children, a shout that bounces off the canyon walls and 




Secondhand Shop: The Objects of Unlived Lives in W. G. Sebald’s Austerlitz 
 
About two thirds of the way through Austerlitz, the titular character travels to Terezín, the 
fortified town that served as the Theresienstadt Ghetto from 1941-45. Austerlitz has learned that 
his mother was sent here in late 1941 or early ‘42. Vera, an old family friend, tells him that for 
many years now Terezín has been an “ordinary” town, yet Austerlitz sees no residents except a 
ghostly figure who disappears in the park and a deranged man ranting wildly to himself who 
suddenly vanishes. Austerlitz takes photographs of closed doors and finally comes upon the 
Antikos Bazar, apparently the only shop apart from a small grocery. The large depot is closed, 
but in four picture windows Austerlitz sees a grand assortment of objects, surely only “a small 
part of the junk heaped up inside.”1 These things at first mean nothing to him, yet they are the 
only traces of real human life in the entire town. For reasons he does not understand, Austerlitz 
stands for a long time with his forehead pressed against the glass, staring at the objects, “as if one 
of them or their relationship with each other must provide an unequivocal answer to the many 
questions I found it impossible to ask in my mind.”2  
Austerlitz never specifies what these questions could be, or why the objects in this shop 
window might provide answers. Yet this impression, that these physical things offer some crucial 
clue, drives the novel. It recalls what Walter Benjamin depicts as an object’s “aura” in “The 
Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction:” a “phenomenon of distance” between the 
observer and the observed.3 “The person we look at,” writes Benjamin in his essay on 
 
1 W. G. Sebald, Austerlitz, trans. Anthea Bell (New York: Modern Library, 2001), 195. 
2 Ibid. 
3 Walter Benjamin, “The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction,” in Illuminations, ed. 
Hannah Arendt, trans. Harry Zohn (New York: Schocken Books, 1968), 222. 
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Baudelaire, “or who feels he is being looked at, looks at us in turn. To perceive the aura of an 
object we look at means to invest it with the ability to look at us in return. This experience 
corresponds to the data of the mémoire involontaire.”4 A relationship of mutual sight, the kind 
that occurs between people, here arises between human and object. The feeling Austerlitz 
entertains in front of the Antikos Bazar derives from such transposition. At this point he has 
finally turned toward his own past after a lifetime of almost willful amnesia and travelled to 
Terezín where he hopes to recover some aspect of his mother. Instead Austerlitz finds a lace 
tablecloth, brass mortars, cut-glass bowls, ceramic vases, a little box of seashells, a hunter’s bag, 
a Japanese fan, a landscape painting of a river. Despite what he knows—that these are worthless 
trinkets and moth-eaten clothes—the gaze of these things, which stand in place of his mother, 
draws Austerlitz into a reverie. “They were all . . . timeless . . . perpetuated but forever just 
occurring, the ornaments, utensils, and mementos stranded in the Terezín bazar, objects that for 
reasons one could never know had outlived their former owners and survived the process of 
destruction, so that I could now see my own faint shadow image barely perceptible among 
them.”5  
Sebald here endows these objects with the same aura that Benjamin identifies; the 
floating reflection in the window is the image of Austerlitz that appears in the space between the 
 
4 Walter Benjamin, “On Some Motifs in Baudelaire,” in Illuminations, ed. Hannah Arendt, trans. Harry 
Zohn (New York: Schocken Books, 1968), 188. The phrase “mémoire involontaire” is Proust’s, coined in 
contrast to “mémoire volontaire.” Benjamin is in part interested in the way that Proust restored the figure 
of the storyteller who does not convey information but embeds what happens in himself “in order to pass 
it on as experience to those listening” (Benjamin, 159). To this end, mémoire involontaire is critical, for 
the past, as Proust says, lies “somewhere beyond the reach of the intellect, and unmistakable present in 
some material object (or in the sensation which such an object arouses in us), though we have no idea 
which one it is” (quoted by Benjamin, 158). Sebald is also trafficking in these ideas, using objects to 
gesture toward what is beyond the intellect, and embedding this experience in his narrator as well as the 
reader. 
5 Sebald, Austerlitz, 197. 
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object and the character himself. James Wood has suggested that part of Sebald’s intent is to 
equate Austerlitz with the inanimate things around him, as though this man himself is one of the 
objects that has been left behind, forgotten, a piece of rubble in the movement of history.6 
Likewise, Jens Brockmeier has argued that this scene at the Antikos Bazar ultimately secures for 
Austerlitz a definitive “autobiographical glance,” whereby the objects become “mementos of his 
own lost memory.”7 Yet throughout the novel, Sebald does something more than merely draw 
parallels between objects and Austerlitz or position objects as symbols of Austerlitz’s own 
displacement. Though Austerlitz does feel some relation to these trinkets, Sebald also invests 
them with the capacity to meet the gaze of characters, and this in turn drives an interpretation of 
what the objects “see.” Time and again, Sebald frames scenes with pensive descriptions of 
commonplace objects, or threads the same object through multiple events. An aura becomes 
attached to these things, and an opportunity arises not only to trace their unique context and 
history (or to use Benjamin’s term, their “authenticity”) or to understand them as a foil for 
Austerlitz’s own plight, but to interpret the image of the self that the object extends.  
Whereas Ferrante’s characters turn to objects to regain and assert self-possession, 
Sebald’s objects provoke his characters’ self-questioning. An essential aspect of this is an 
object’s associative potential, which Sebald allows to manifest in the circling, often incomplete 
language he uses to describe them. This stands in stark contrast to Knausgaard’s reductive 
cataloging––Sebald relies upon an object to be broadly evocative, while Knausgaard seeks to 
distill objects into one clearly defined essence. The objects in Luiselli’s novel inspire a shift from 
the rhetoric of political journalism into the playful vocabulary of children, and while objects do 
 
6 James Wood, “Sent East,” London Review of Books, October 6, 2011, https://www.lrb.co.uk/the-
paper/v33/n19/james-wood/sent-east. 
7 Jens Brockmeier, “Austerlitz’s Memory,” Partial Answers: Journal of Literature and the History of 
Ideas 6, no. 2 (2008): 362. https://doi.org/10.1353/pan.0.0016. 
 112 
not directly change the language that is available to Austerlitz, they do provide an alternative to 
the received, generic images of the persecution of the twentieth century, thereby encouraging 
discursive thought about these tragedies.  
Throughout Austerlitz, Sebald establishes and appeals to the aura of objects to depict the 
past that is not otherwise accessible through the avenues of voluntary memory. Alongside the 
latent meanings of these trinkets, there is a suggestion here about Austerlitz’s own attempt to 
locate himself. This is a central question for Sebald: How do the ones who excavate their past 
position themselves within the findings? Austerlitz does not unearth many definitive answers, 
and the effort that begins as one of recovery and slowly morphs into an attempt at salvation, 
eventually resolves into a process of acceptance. This search is not for lost time (after all, 
Austerlitz does not own a watch) as much as it is for a part of the self that exists somewhere 
between what happened and what did not. Here, objects are invested with the ability to return the 
gaze of characters. This image of the person reflected is an amalgamation of desire and history, 
and Sebald uses this composite to suggest the full scope of his character’s psyche. Objects 
provide a proof and picture of identity, establish a relationship with time, and most of all guide 
the experience of reliving the past. Using the specific physicality and simultaneously mysterious 
origins of objects, Sebald reflects the image of a character who is likewise both in time and 
outside of it, both known to himself and a stranger. Such a character only truly exists at the 
moment when he can articulate a desire, but before the attempt to fulfill it has tarnished the 
anticipation of its fulfillment. Objects provide the means by which Austerlitz comes into this 
position, allowing him to imagine, and thereby recapture, the life he cannot live. 
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Apart from the moment in front of the Antikos Bazar, the only other time in the novel that 
Austerlitz confronts his own image is when Vera presents him with the photo of a boy dressed as 
the Rose Queen’s page. This should be the image that unlocks Austerlitz’s childhood, but it only 
leaves him perplexed, failing to evoke even a memory of this moment. “I was not moved or 
distressed,” Austerlitz reports, “. . . only speechless and uncomprehending, incapable of any 
lucid thought.”8 Austerlitz’s own identification with the image fails and this creates a curious 
dynamic in the novel, for if the objects that supposedly represent the subject accurately across 
time do not in fact preserve what is essential about a person, then what does? Austerlitz 
examines this photograph with a magnifying glass, as though the thing he is looking for might 
just be really small, or maybe hiding somewhere. Certainly, this is a ridiculous way to look at 
such an image, yet it suggests that Austerlitz’s concern is not only about what he can recognize 
in himself by looking at a photograph, but about where in an object recognition resides.  
 The identity of Austerlitz is a central preoccupation of the novel, and the answers, such as 
they are, rarely come from the expected sources. Instead Sebald arranges commonplace objects 
around Austerlitz that draw out reflections and interpretations of who this man might be. When 
the narrator first encounters Austerlitz, he is sitting in the Salle des pas perdus in Antwerp’s 
Centraal Station.9 The narrator describes him in some detail—wavy hair, heavy walking boots, 
 
8 Sebald, Austerlitz, 184. 
9 Establishing Sebald’s “lost steps” over and against Proust’s “lost time,” and conjuring the notion of a 
“lost cause.” And while a common moniker of waiting rooms at trains stations and in courthouses, one of 
the better-known Salles des pas perdus is at the Palace of Justice of Brussels where Austerlitz meets the 
narrator by accident very early in their acquaintance. Austerlitz reports that this building is “the largest 
accumulation of stone blocks anywhere in Europe,” and though he does not mention the coincidence that 
there exists in this building a room of the same name as that in which he and the narrator first met, he 
does remark that the enormous building was so hastily built that it contains “corridors and stairways 
leading nowhere, and doorless rooms and halls where no one would ever step foot, empty spaces 
surrounded by walls and representing the innermost secret of all sanctioned authority” (29). Lost steps 
confined by a mountain of stone.  
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workman’s trousers—and notes that he removes a camera from a rucksack to take a few pictures 
of the mirrors in the hall. The following day, after resuming the conversation and walking 
through the city with the narrator, Austerlitz makes his concluding remarks at the Antwerp Glove 
Market just as he slings his rucksack over his shoulder. The two men meet a few more times in 
Brussels and London, but then twenty years pass before their next encounter. The narrator has 
just had eye surgery but he recognizes Austerlitz on the edge of a rowdy drinking crowd by his 
rucksack, which sends him into a reverie on the likeness between Austerlitz and Ludwig 
Wittgenstein.10 The philosopher also carried a rucksack with him everywhere, to the point where 
his sister once wrote to him that this object was almost as dear to her as Wittgenstein himself. In 
fact, the narrator comes to think of Austerlitz every time he sees a photograph of the great 
thinker, one of which appears on the third page of the book. Both men, Austerlitz and 
Wittgenstein, the narrator tells us, share a supreme aptitude for logical thought inextricably 
linked to confused emotions, as well as a “wish to manage with as few possessions as 
possible.”11  
Quickly this initially unremarkable object that Austerlitz carries with him has become not 
only the means of recognizing him after two decades, but solicits an association that provides the 
first insight into Austerlitz’s character. The comparison with Wittgenstein is both favorable (the 
famous philosopher who also spent his career relentlessly investigating the relationship between 
objects, language, and identity), and circumscribed: both men’s logical thought dogged by their 
confused emotions. This rucksack, Austerlitz proceeds to tell the narrator, has been “the only 
 
10 For more on the comparison between Wittgenstein and Austerlitz see Nina Pelikan Straus, “Sebald, 
Wittgenstein, and the Ethics of Memory,” Comparative Literature 61, no. 1 (2009): 43-53. Straus suggests a 
correlation between ethics and aesthetics centered on the photographs that appear in Sebald’s text, taking cues 
from the philosopher. 
11 Sebald, Austerlitz, 41. 
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truly reliable thing” in his life.12 What kind of man says this about his backpack? If he endeavors 
to live with as few possessions as possible, are they all inside? Sebald even includes a picture of 
a frumpy rucksack hanging from a coatrack. But this initially innocuous object slowly begins to 
accumulate significance and, much like the objects in the Terezín bazar window, comes to be 
one of the things that not only reveals Austerlitz to the narrator, but to Austerlitz himself. 
Nearly a hundred pages later, Austerlitz is in the throes of despair. He has buried all his 
writing in his backyard and is roaming around London at night, tortured by a feeling that he has 
no idea, cannot even express in words, who he is. Again and again he inexplicably returns to 
Liverpool Street Station which is under construction, and one day notices a white-turbaned porter 
sweeping up trash. Without thinking, Austerlitz follows this man through a doorway to a massive 
waiting room (another salle des pas perdus). The cavernous room has been sectioned off for 
renovation but as Austerlitz steps behind the plastic sheets he sees, quite suddenly, the figures of 
a woman and a man dressed in the style of the thirties, as well as the boy they have come to 
meet, a child of about four years in white knee-high socks alone on a bench, a boy Austerlitz 
recognizes by the rucksack in his lap as himself. “I felt something rending within me, and a sense 
of shame and sorrow, or perhaps something quite different, something inexpressible because we 
have no words for it, just as I had no words all those years ago when the two strangers came over 
to me speaking a language I did not understand.”13 The recognition of a self via an object is like 
being addressed in a foreign language: a meaning indecipherable, but a meaning all the same. 
Indeed, in the days following young Austerlitz’s meeting of the pastor and his wife, his little 
 
12 Ibid., 40. 
13 Ibid., 137. 
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green rucksack inexplicably disappears, an absence he associates with “the dying away of my 
native tongue,” as if this thing were the physical manifestation of speaking and comprehension.14 
The memory of arriving to England that Sunday morning at the Liverpool Street Station 
prompts Austerlitz to confront his willful ignorance of his own past and the twentieth century 
history of Europe. This decision propels him to Prague, where he reconnects with Vera who 
stood with four-year-old Austerlitz on the day he departed from Czechoslovakia all those years 
ago. She recalls to him the boy at Wilsonova Station with a rucksack—“un petit sac à dos avec 
quelques viatiques . . . those had been Vera’s exact words, summing up, as he now thought, the 
whole of his later life.”15 Not only is the rucksack something that Austerlitz has come to rely 
upon, but it is here presented as the ultimate emblem of his life. A little sack with the small 
things for travelling seem to be all that Austerlitz has ever had, as if his life were nothing more 
than a brief journey. A viaticum is an allowance for travelling expenses or a supply of small 
provisions for a trip, from the Latin via. But it is also the term used for the last rites given to a 
person on the verge of death. The things Austerlitz carries with him in his rucksack—his camera, 
his notebook, maybe a few pencils—are both his only necessary provisions, as well as his ticket 
to another life.  
When Vera later reminds Austerlitz of his family’s trips to Marienbad, he recalls the 
journey he took there years before with Marie de Verneuil, perhaps the one true love of his life. 
It was to be a lighthearted trip, one of healing and companionship, but while he is there 
Austerlitz cannot shake an overwhelming sense of foreboding and becomes withdrawn, unable to 
describe to Marie what he feels. Eventually she confronts him, taking offense that he hasn’t 
 
14 Ibid., 138. 
15 Ibid., 173. 
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unpacked, “always preferring to live out of a rucksack.”16 He tries to explain but falls short and 
remains isolated from Marie, forcing her to turn away. Only later, when Vera tells him of his past 
in this resort town, does the reason for Austerlitz’s despondency become clear, though by then it 
is too late, Marie is gone. Austerlitz departs Prague, taking the same train route through Germany 
that he travelled as a boy all those years ago, and steps off in Nuremburg where an old woman 
presses a one-mark coin into his hand, “probably taking me for one of the homeless because of 
my old rucksack.”17  
Objects in Sebald’s hands are not simply emblematic or restrained in their significance. 
The rucksack that was initially portrayed as the only reliable thing in Austerlitz’s life is also the 
spur to investigate his own past and “un petit sac à dos avec quelques viatique,” words that sum 
up his essence. It would make sense if Sebald left the rucksack alone at this point, for it has 
served its narrative purpose by elucidating these corners of Austerlitz’s psychology. Yet the final 
two mentions of the object complicate its significance. Marie criticizes Austerlitz by way of his 
rucksack, as though he were some child or half-formed person whose presence in the world is 
fundamentally stunted. And in Nuremburg, the city where Austerlitz’s father first witnessed the 
horrific nationalistic furor of the Third Reich, the rucksack represents Austerlitz as homeless. 
Not only has the rucksack shown Austerlitz to himself, but it presents him to the reader through 
the eyes of other characters who find in Austerlitz the same qualities that he happens to entertain 
himself—a stunted life and homelessness. 
At once the source of meaning and an indication of a tenuous place in reality, the 
rucksack does not become an exalted object that can only mean in one direction. The object 
confers on Austerlitz varied recollections and identities, evoking and revealing some of the 
 
16 Ibid., 216. 
17 Ibid., 224. 
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conditions of his displacement as well as affirming through the eyes of others what he feels to be 
true about himself. Nonetheless, the rucksack might very well end up in an Army surplus story as 
nothing but a piece of junk. In fact, it often seems that it is because of an object’s insignificance 
that it can potentially signify. Just as Barthes refuses to analyze the white porcelain saucer with 
the imperfect glaze, offering it as a “matte” anamnesis, so does the unassuming aspect of the 
rucksack make it a suitable vehicle for various affiliations in Austerlitz. What is plain and 
commonplace about the rucksack helps it retain an unqualified presence in the novel, and 
prevents it from being reduced to a reliable symbol. The multiple associations Austerlitz has with 
his rucksack suggest the kinds of connections he is looking for in the trinkets at the Terezín 
bazar. It essentially validates Austerlitz’s feeling that an old piece of clothing or lost figurine 
might reveal unequivocal answers to yet unformed questions.  
The invisible significance of physical objects not only links meaning with the 
inconspicuous, it also arranges an experience of time.18 A critical aspect of objects in Austerlitz 
is their capacity to outlast their owners and persist through the years; to be at once immersed in 
time while also outside of it. Of all Austerlitz’s possessions, one of his most treasured is a gold-
framed card with willow leaves from a tree on St. Helena and a piece of lichen taken from 
Marshal Ney’s tombstone on July 31, 1830. It was a gift from André Hilary, and reminds 
Austerlitz daily of his adored teacher and friend who was also the first person to whom Austerlitz 
ever revealed his true name. This occurred after Hilary delivered a long lecture on the 1805 
Battle of Austerlitz and Napoleon’s most dramatic and arguably important victory. While Hilary 
 
18 In scholarship on Sebald, the claim is frequently made that photographs in particular are the object that 
collapses distinctions between different time periods (cf. Carolin Duttlinger, Stefanie Harris, J. J. Long). 
Mary Griffin Wilson offers a particularly lucid argument of this kind in “Sheets of Past: Reading the 
Image in W. G. Sebald’s ‘Austerlitz’,” Contemporary Literature 54, no 1. (2013): 49-76. This section 
seeks to extend the understanding of Sebald’s manipulation of time beyond the photograph to include the 
material properties of objects.  
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is speaking, Austerlitz not only feels an increasing connection to the people of France but “the 
more Hilary mentioned the word Austerlitz in front of the class, the more it really did become my 
own name.”19 Hilary essentially baptizes Austerlitz in his true name, and sets him on a path of an 
academic career that will deliver him from the stifling manse of a country preacher. After high 
school, Hilary helps Austerlitz obtain his British citizenship, and the two men remain close, often 
visiting the dilapidated country houses and estates all around Oxford. 
On one of these excursions, they come to Iver Grove, a stately property belonging to 
James Mallord Ashman, whose ancestors built the house and who now farms the land himself. 
Ashman shows the two friends around and tells them about his grandfather, the last man to live 
in the building and a reclusive insomniac who devoted himself to studying the trajectory of the 
moon. However, Ashman continues, leading them into the billiards room, on cloudy nights or 
during a new moon, his grandfather would play pool against himself until dawn. Since his 
grandfather’s death on New Year’s Eve in 1813 (on the eve of the year of Napoleon’s first 
abdication and the beginning of the Bourbon Restoration), not even a cue has been touched in the 
game room. Everything—the ivory balls, chalks, brushes—lies as it was left one hundred and 
fifty years ago. Even the ledger where the man entered his wins and losses against himself with 
scientific precision under the rubric Ashman v. Ashman remains open on a tall desk. “It was as if 
time, which usually runs so irrevocably away, had stood still here, as if the years behind us were 
still to come.”20 
In the middle of this scene is a full-spread image of two billiard balls, one black and one 
white, about six inches apart on pock-marked felt. They look celestial, like the moon and its 
opposite in orbit. Ashman describes how during the house’s requisition in 1941, he hid the doors 
 
19 Sebald, Austerlitz, 72. 
20 Ibid., 108. 
 120 
to the billiards room and nursery with false walls and wardrobes, as if the fact that these spaces 
remained untouched (still redolent, in some way, of Napoleon himself) was the most valuable 
part of the property. Then in the early 1950s when he returned to the house, Ashman looked back 
into the nursery and was overwhelmed by the objects preserved inside—the model train, Noah’s 
Ark with toy animals, the notches on the side of the table he carved in a fury when he was eight 
years old the day before he was sent off to preparatory school—“as if a chasm of time were 
opening up before him,” and the next thing he knew he was outside firing his rifle at the clock on 
top of the coach house, leaving on its face a new set of marks.21 
How to measure a life held in abeyance? The precise pattern tracked by the clock 
misrepresents the dimensions of existence for these characters. And yet how is one to get beyond 
a framework so fundamental to human conceptions of self? Here, Sebald turns to objects to 
articulate an acute instability in the present. The game of billiards, its white cue scattering and 
pursuing the other balls, is here juxtaposed with selenography, the delineation of the moon. Yet 
what is there to delineate? The moon tracks the same path night after night, month after month, 
year in and year out. It is perhaps the most well-understood celestial body. Delineating its 
progress is about as revealing as describing the hands of a clock circling twelve numbers—after 
the facts have been established, there is not much more to say and certainly no surprises. 
Billiards, on the other hand, combines mathematical geometry and physical certainty with the 
unpredictability of human skill. While there is an exact numerical description of how a shot 
should ricochet off the rails and the direction it will knock the other balls, there are so many 
miniscule factors that determine the trajectory—how the player holds their cue, the exact place 
the cue strikes the ball, the angle of the arm—that controlling them all perfectly is just beyond 
 
21 Ibid., 108. 
 121 
the humanly possible. Anyone who has played billiards knows how often these universal laws of 
geometry and physics can evaporate in the middle of a game. Sometimes one cannot help feel 
that it might even be a game of luck, for so often there are inexplicable runs, flashes of skill that 
the next day disappear when the balls refuse to land in the pockets. The game starts to seem like 
the intersection of chance and will that, of course, because it is a game with no time limit, occurs 
outside the constraints of the clock. On these terms, Ashman v. Ashman suddenly begins to seem 
not so ridiculous after all, as if a record of all the games won and lost against one’s self might 
very well be an accurate description of this man’s existence.  
“In what way do objects immersed in time differ from those left untouched by it?”22 This 
is a perennial question for Austerlitz who is himself seemingly outside of time. The situation he 
faces is part of what André Aciman has termed “irrealis time” in which time, to the extent that it 
exists at all, “operates on several planes simultaneously, where foresight and hindsight, 
prospection and retrospection, are continuously coincident.”23 Austerlitz’s feeling that he has 
been living the wrong life is in part confirmed when he begins to track down his origins. It is not 
quite that Austerlitz made a conscious mistake, but that time has left him behind, transpiring in 
such a way that his life both does and does not seem to have occurred. Not only was he displaced 
at a young age, cut off from his parents and compelled to adopt a new language and citizenship, 
Austerlitz has spent his entire career immersed in a truncated history. His meticulous 
architectural studies have always stopped just at the turn of the twentieth century, and for much 
of his life he actively avoided all knowledge of contemporary Europe, especially Germany and 
the entire period of the Second World War. To the extent that his work was an attempt to 
 
22 Ibid., 100. 
23 André Aciman, “Sebald, Misspent Lives” in Homo Irrealis: Essays (New York: Farrar, Straus and 
Giroux, 2021), 75-88. 
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understand his society, he might as well have been studying the moon. This does not appear to 
have been a conscious decision, but once Austerlitz realizes how absolutely he has eschewed this 
most relevant time period, it seems impossible to think of it as anything other than a peculiar, 
unconscious mistake.  
 The image that Vera hands over to Austerlitz in Prague of himself as the Rose Queen’s 
page is an absolute fact, but a mute one; the years have wiped it clean. Instead, Austerlitz begins 
to assign it his own, invented meaning: “I always felt a piercing, inquiring gaze of the page boy 
who had come to demand his dues,” he says, “who was waiting in the gray light of dawn on the 
empty field for me to accept the challenge and aver the misfortune to come.”24 In other words, 
the photo prompts him to reimagine the way his life might have unfolded. Suddenly Austerlitz 
feels responsibility for the past, as though he must find some way to turn back the clock and 
rearrange a crucial event.25 Objects like this photograph that compel Austerlitz’s gaze yet 
withdraw just before they confer a definite revelation are essential to Sebald’s project because 
 
24 Sebald, Austerlitz, 184. 
25 There has been some useful criticism about Sebald’s engagement with “belatedness,” originally a 
concept Freud used in Beyond the Pleasure Principle to describe the compulsion to repeat a repressed 
trauma long after it occurred. Cf. Carolin Duttlinger and Mary Griffin Wilson, both of whom make good 
use of this photographic example to locate Sebald in scholarship on trauma. But the moment also recalls 
Donald Winnicott’s psychotic who, as discussed in the introduction of this study, is unable to incorporate 
trauma into his psyche and therefore continues to fear a catastrophe that has already occurred. Barthes 
likens himself to such a person in Mourning Diary, and the characterization seems perhaps more closely 
aligned with Austerlitz’s psychological position than belatedness. In Winnicott’s study, repressed trauma 
prompts the patient to search the future for events that have happened in the past, and this, Winnicott 
argues, is responsible for the feeling of living an unlived life. Despite Austerlitz’s attempts to reenact his 
trauma (taking the same train through Germany that he did as a child, returning the Estates Theater where 
his mother performed, etc.), he remains disoriented in an unsteady present where the future could 
somehow influence the past. The feeling that this page boy has come to collect his dues is exactly the kind 
of fear that Winnicott describes, and the ensuing sensation of living the wrong life a further symptom of 
the illness. Aciman’s treatment of “irrealis time” pinpoints this precisely in terms of the continued 
persecution of the Holocaust when he writes, “It’s not about what did not, will not, but about what could 
still but might never occur” (“Sebald, Misspent Lives,” 82). In this framework, the discussion about 
Sebald’s grappling with trauma expands into a nuanced consideration of the more broadly applicable 
psychological conditions that lead to the “counterfactual.” 
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they suggest for his characters that the divisions between past, present, and future are not 
absolute. The photograph snatches a moment away from time, and thrusts its subjects into a kind 
of parallel universe where time’s ravages are briefly suspended, yet reconciliation remains 
impossible.  
James Ashman, who has diligently preserved the billiards room just as his grandfather 
left it, invokes the descriptive power of the objects to express this irrealis time. These things 
provide an avenue behind the clock, so to speak, a simultaneous co-existence of all time. When 
Ashman opens the nursery and finds the cuts on the desk, he is at once a boy of eight about to be 
sent away and a grown man reencountering himself. He brings to this moment all he knows has 
transpired since those marks were carved. And this is Sebald’s game, his works are exercises in 
receiving objects from the past which his characters endow with their knowledge of what has 
transpired in the intervening time. These things and their associations are not memories so much 
as instigations, and beneath the weight of everything that has come since, they become infinitely 
complex, at once mathematically logical and impossible to decipher.  
 Sebald plucks these relics from the corners and animates this process of reencounter. “It 
seems to me,” Austerlitz muses, “as if all the moments of our life occupy the same space, as if 
future events already existed and were only waiting for us to find our way to them at last.”26 At 
another point, he wonders if “time did not exist at all, only various spaces interlocking according 
to the rules of a higher form of stereometry, between which the living and the dead can move 
back and forth as they like.”27 To some extent, the entire novel becomes a kind of study and 
measurement of solid objects that interlock spaces across time. Much like the rucksack, the 
rooms preserved at Iver Grove and the objects within them offer a distinct articulation of 
 
26 Sebald, Austerlitz, 257. 
27 Ibid., 185. 
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Austerlitz’s groundlessness in the present. The resonance of the untouched pool cue and model 
train, of the open record book and the marks on the desk, provide some means of parsing 
Austerlitz’s cryptic feeling that he has always had “no place in reality, as if I were not there at 
all.”28 These are not only symbols or reflections of Austerlitz’s situation, but expose the 
otherworldly feeling that Austerlitz means and stand an alternative to the rigid ticking of the 
clock. 
 The exact same consideration surrounds the “memento” from Hilary—the bit of lichen 
and a few willow leaves. Without context, these would be nothing but trash, but the knowledge 
that the leaves are from the island of Napoleon’s final exile, and the lichen snatched from Ney’s 
grave (a martyred hero of republican principle) on the very day that the Bourbon monarchy fell, 
establishing, for the first time in France, a popular sovereignty—all of this alongside the 
intimacy that Austerlitz shared with Hilary and the ways of thinking that he learned at his side, 
makes the framed leaves and fungus uniquely capable of collapsing chronology and extending a 
simultaneous co-existence of these different times.29 These things, precisely because they have 
been removed from time, retain their historical associations. In a sense, Austerlitz is only able to 
make his enquiry into the past through objects that have, like him, been removed from it.  
 
While Austerlitz is the story of a single man, through him Sebald broadly invokes the displaced 
and disappeared. In part, this seems to be one of the functions the unnamed narrator serves: a 
witness to the history of persecution, emigration, and loss. The narrator receives Austerlitz’s 
 
28 Ibid. 
29 There is an intentional association here with Bergsonian “duration” as developed by Gilles Deleuze into 
“coexistence” and “non-chronological time” in Cinema 2. Mary Griffin Wilson uses these terms to make 
her argument about the relationship between photographs and time in Sebald’s novel, yet she overlooks 
the image of the billiards balls, missing the connection between objects and time in a complimentary 
relationship to photography. 
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account of himself, and endows it with even further layering, augmenting Austerlitz’s story and 
providing a framework for conceiving such an outsized past.30 And perhaps the narrator’s role 
reflects how the reader is likewise engaged in the process of recovery, as though Sebald is 
pointing at his narrator and saying to his reader that our task is not so very different. The effect is 
one in which specific histories and lives evoke unnamed thousands, and the experience of 
encountering just one individual—Austerlitz—is broadly refracted. And just as the objects that 
affect Austerlitz signify in multiple directions, so do they link his narrative with many others. In 
short, a further consequence of lingering on the questions that surround a physical thing is to 
extend the subjective approach of the novel outwards and enunciate a collective reckoning. 
 After the narrator’s first encounter with Austerlitz, he visits the Breendonk fortress 
outside Antwerp that was requisitioned by the SS as a prison during the German occupation of 
Belgium. The narrator is not entirely sure why he has been drawn there other than Austerlitz’s 
description of its star-like design the previous day. He is aware of the gruesome history of the 
place and yet once there both can and cannot understand what he is seeing. In the anteroom of 
the fort, one of the wheelbarrows that was used by the prisoners to remove the millions of tons of 
soil that covered the fortifications is on display, a crude and clumsy object of rough-hewn planks 
and an iron-shod wheel, surely weighing at least a hundred pounds. And even though the 
museum displays this object as a kind of prop by which to imagine what life must have been like 
 
30 Marianne Hirsch has suggested that this is an affiliative role that characterizes second-generation 
engagement with trauma endured by the previous generation. In her discussion of “postmemory” whereby 
descendants of trauma survivors endure their own, related trauma, she writes, “Affiliative postmemory is 
thus no more than an extension of the loosened familial structure occasioned by war and persecution. It is 
the result of contemporaneity and generational connection with the literal second generation, combined 
with a set of structures of mediation that would be broadly available, appropriable, and, indeed, 
compelling enough to encompass a larger collective in an organic web of transmission” (The Generation 
of Postmemory, 36). Austerlitz, the narrator, and Sebald are all contemporaries who can, according to 
Hirsch, affiliate the same trauma inheritance.  
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for the prisoners forced to push it, full of wet earth, over the ground furrowed by ruts and mired 
by rain––prisoners who probably had never done any physical labor before and who were not 
only starved but constantly beaten––the narrator finds that “it was impossible to picture them 
bracing themselves against the weight until their hearts nearly burst.”31 It is an odd admission, 
for the narrator has, in fact, just described these people and their horrible chore. Yet Sebald 
seems to be saying something else: that even though we can look at a thing, describe the 
experience it signifies, and even conceptually admit the pain associated with it for another 
person, it is exceedingly difficult, perhaps even impossible, to truly understand the experience of 
living in such pain. Here, the object that so often plays the go-between from one subjective 
experience to another, refuses a transference. It is facile, Sebald suggests, to believe that in 
simply seeing a wheelbarrow (or looking at a photograph, visiting a memorial, recovering 
diaries, or so many of the other ways we attempt to assuage ourselves of history), we can know 
what it was like or claim to have done some justice.32 
In a 2001 interview with Michael Silverblatt, Sebald cautioned against depicting the 
Holocaust directly. He suggested that the terrible images of these camps seared into our minds 
actually “militate against our capacity for discursive thinking, for reflecting upon these things, 
and also paralyze, as it were, our moral capacity. So the only way in which one can approach 
these things . . . is obliquely, tangentially, by reference, rather than by direct confrontation.”33 
 
31 Sebald, Austerlitz, 22. 
32 There is a robust debate about what constitutes an “authentic” object of memorial (Cf. James Young on 
the insufficiency of symbolic memorialization, Gary Weissman on that fantasy of witnessing, and Steffi 
De Jong on the object as witness), and various scholars have suggested the strengths and shortcomings of 
Sebald’s overall approach to mourning and trauma (Stefanie Boese, Jens Brockmeier, Richard 
Crownshaw, Katja Garloff, Marianne Hirsch, J. J. Long, Samuel Pane, and others). The aim here is to 
invoke this vein of scholarly debate (one that Sebald himself engaged) by placing the object’s 
insufficiency as an authentic memorial within the context of the broader ways it determines the narrative 
of this novel. 
33 Sebald, W. G., “Michael Silverblatt, A Poem of an Invisible Subject (interview),” in The Emergence of 
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This echoes the warning of Hilary in the classroom on the day of the Austerlitz lecture, when he 
asserts that the performed images of history are the “images at which we keep staring while the 
truth lies elsewhere, away from it all, somewhere as yet undiscovered.”34 This is precisely the 
case for his narrator at Breendonk who finds that instead of being able to grasp the lives of the 
inmates, he has an easier time imagining the ones with the whip. After the anteroom, he sees the 
officer’s mess with scrubbed tables and bulging stove, and can “well imagine the sight of good 
fathers and dutiful sons . . . sitting here when they came off duty to play cards or write letters to 
their loved ones at home.”35 Not only does the object that is intended to facilitate empathy fail to 
foster a genuine connection, but in the mess hall the narrator admits instead a guilt-ridden 
sensitivity to the wrong group. The narrator (and anyone who visits the site of persecution) wants 
to be able to connect with the people who suffered, as if by doing so he might provide some 
retroactive justice or at least validation for the victims. And perhaps something else is in play 
too, the desire to clear one’s own sense of guilt, as though visiting the memorial and being 
appalled by the wheelbarrow absolves one of the blame.  
However the horror remains opaque, and it does so because of the presence of the 
wheelbarrow. The physicality of this cumbersome, primitive thing pushes the experience the 
narrator seeks further away. Meanwhile it is easy to imagine some part of the emotional 
experience of the officers in their mess hall, the men who were responsible for the terror that was 
so extreme in others as to be unfathomable. “After all,” the narrator admits, “I had lived among 
them until my twentieth year.”36 Sebald’s narrator catches himself in the act of paying moral lip-
 
Memory: Conversations with W. G. Sebald, ed. Lynne Sharon Schwartz (New York: Seven Stories Press, 
2007), 77-86.  
34 Sebald, Austerlitz, 72. 
35 Ibid., 23. 
36 Ibid. 
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service to his own culpability. The narrator wants to clear his conscience, yet realizes he is more 
like the SS guards than he is the people who suffered at their hands. And through the object of 
the wheelbarrow, Sebald not only articulates this bind for all Germans, but for all people. 
Furthermore he locates the experience of his narrator confronting himself in a scenario in which 
he is both implicated and helpless. Through the wheelbarrow, the narrator appears to be saying 
once again, “This is unbearable.”  
The quandary Sebald’s narrator is up against seems to be one of scale. When the narrator 
thinks back on his trip to Breendonk and reads the captions of the photographs of the stations of 
the fortress, his memory continues to cloud over, just as it did on the day when he was there, 
“because I did not really want to see what it had to show.”37 As he reflects on the trip he thinks 
about “how little we can hold in mind, how everything is constantly lapsing into oblivion with 
every extinguished life, how the world is, as it were draining itself, in that the history of 
countless places and objects which themselves have no power of memory is never heard, never 
described or passed on.”38 It is an unwieldy sentence in a novel where the histories of places and 
objects are so often the instigations of memory and constantly reengaged by Austerlitz and 
others. Sebald’s work seems to do the opposite of what his narrator claims is happening in this 
sentence. The history of Breendonk has been described, and the experience the narrator has at 
the museum is exactly the way the past, however imperfectly, is passed on. And yet Sebald 
returns to this feeling repeatedly, the sense that even though we can visit the sites of the past, 
perhaps see the objects that were a part of a lost life, history still slips away. A similar moment 
occurs when Austerlitz visits the Ghetto Museum in Terezín, immediately after standing 
transfixed in front of the Antikos Bazar.  
 
37 Ibid. 
38 Ibid., 24. 
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I went around the exhibition by myself, said Austerlitz, through the rooms on the 
mezzanine floor and the floor above, stood in front of the display panels, 
sometimes skimming over the captions, sometimes reading them letter by letter, 
stared at the photographic reproductions, could not believe my eyes, and several 
times had to turn away and look out of the window into the garden behind the 
building, having for the first time acquired some idea of the history of the 
persecution which my avoidance system had kept from me for so long, and which 
now, in this place, surrounded me on all sides.39  
 
This is a remarkable sentence, for without describing anything Austerlitz encounters, it conveys 
the overwhelming experience of his seeing. He is himself implicated, and we have a clear sense 
of both his horror and his shame, and he admits that for the first time he starts to have some 
sense of the history he has willfully denied. Yet the more he tries to reencounter or deepen his 
familiarity with this place and what has happened here, the more it slips away. In the pages that 
follow he partially catalogs his encounters in the museum—the framed ground plan of the star-
shaped fortifications, the items that belonged to the inmates (handbags, belt buckles, clothes, 
brushes), and the areas for agricultural exploitation—and it appears that once again a place and 
the things in it have passed on a history.  
Yet Austerlitz insists at the end of his visit that “I understood it all now, yet I did not 
understand it, for every detail . . . far exceeded my comprehension.”40 His understanding starts to 
sound like the conception of his own existence—both of and separate from this world. That this 
 
39 Ibid., 198. 
40 Ibid., 199. 
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repository of objects and information at once reveals the past and simultaneously withholds it is 
almost like the image of the Rose Queen’s page: the definite information, the picture, does not 
satisfy the mind. Rather, after the initial shock of realizing that there is indeed something 
meaningful within grasp—what Austerlitz describes at Terezín as an overwhelming emotion that 
forces him to pause, look out to the garden—the knowledge this expectation promises remains 
out of reach. Instead, it is the possibility of discovering an answer or finding the right photograph 
that becomes most meaningful.  
In her perceptive article, “‘Forever Just Occurring’: Postwar Belatedness in W. G. 
Sebald’s Austerlitz,” Stephanie Boese follows the same scenes outlined above at Breendonk and 
Terezín to draw conclusions about the material import of artefacts in Austerlitz. She notices that 
the German word begreifen means “to understand” but also “to grasp,” and suggests that the 
objects in these places are important not only as signifiers of trauma but because of their 
physicality, which has the potential to affect an experience of the past for someone like 
Austerlitz who cannot access it directly.41 Her reading is valuable in the context of Holocaust 
studies and expands the scope of the scholarship that surrounds Sebald’s reckoning with 
collective trauma. Yet while the physicality of the object may serve an important affective 
function, Boese does not explore how this happens or to what degree. It is the possibility of what 
these objects promise that inspires a desire or a yearning to understand (begreifen). And it is 
from this aspirational position, one that is both rooted in his present and reaching into the past, 
that Austerlitz experiences (is affected by) the full measure of loss.  
 
 
41 Journal of Modern Literature 39, no. 4 (2016): 117. 
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In his search for lost steps, Austerlitz’s most fervent wish is to reencounter his mother. He asks 
Vera about her persistently, and her final years become the initial focus of his research, 
prioritized over information about his father. When he returns to London after his first journey to 
Prague and Terezín, Austerlitz obsesses over Theresienstadt, trying to understand it and 
searching for clues that will bring his mother into view. After a monumental eight-page sentence 
in which Austerlitz circles his own shame at having waited so long to confront the past and pays 
tribute to H. G. Adler, he arrives at the discovery of an archival film from the ghetto. The 
prospect of such a film—that piece of media which more than any other proclaims to represent 
reality as it really was—promises to reveal something fundamental for Austerlitz. He spends 
months trying to find it, convinced that if he could, perhaps something would be resolved.  
 
I kept thinking that if only the film could be found I might be able to see or gain 
some inkling of what it was really like, and then I imagined recognizing Agáta, 
beyond any possibility of a doubt, a young woman as she would be by 
comparison with me today, perhaps among the guests outside the fake 
coffeehouse, or a saleswoman in the haberdashery shop, just taking a fine pair of 
gloves carefully out of one of the drawers, or singing the part of Olympia in the 
Tales of Hoffmann. . . . I imagined seeing her walking down the street in a 
summer dress and light-weight gabardine coat, said Austerlitz: among a group of 
ghetto residents out for a stroll, she alone seemed to make straight for me, coming 
closer with every step, until at last I thought I could sense her stepping out of the 
frame and passing over into me.42 
 
42 Sebald, Austerlitz, 245. 
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Austerlitz does not even know if this film exists, and yet his imagination takes off, raising up in 
front of him the desire to reclaim a connection with his mother. And it is not only that he might 
catch a glimpse of her and see what it was really like, but that Austerlitz would recognize her, 
and she in turn would come directly toward him. This is a particular desire, as if only Austerlitz’s 
mother could confer on him a true identity. Austerlitz’s ability to distinguish his mother might 
confirm that he is in fact her son and that despite all the years, a whole lifetime in another 
country with surrogate parents, he has not lost that most fundamental aspect of self-identity: the 
ability to know his mother “beyond any possibility of a doubt.” And in turn, if Agáta would look 
toward him, would pass over, through the screen that holds time at a distance, the two would be 
reunited, mother and son once again whole. 
 Surprisingly, the film does exist, and when Austerlitz finally gets his hands on it he 
spends months carefully watching it, even paying someone to slow it down so that he can 
examine each individual frame. And he convinces himself that she is there, behind a balding 
man, her face partly covered by the time stamp. Already this is completely different than the 
encounter Austerlitz fantasized. Nonetheless he brings a print of the still on his next visit to 
Prague, where in the theatrical archives he discovers another photograph that resembles the dim 
recollection he has of his mother. The reader is prepared for a revelation: two photographs! 
Austerlitz brings them to Vera, but instead of triumph, we find the most indifferent and 
roundabout description of her verdict. “Vera, who had already spent some time studying the face 
of the woman in the concert audience which I had copied from the Theresienstadt film, before 
shaking her head and putting it aside, immediately and without a shadow of doubt, as she said, 
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recognized Agáta as she had been.”43 This is followed by a stunning photograph of a woman 
emerging from darkness, and it seems impossible that such a relic would not command some 
definitive resolution. Immediately, however, Austerlitz’s narrative about this episode ends. He 
has nothing further to say about his mother, and limply gives the narrator an envelope with this 
photograph inside, “as a memento.”44  
 Just like the photograph of himself as the Rose Queen’s page, this image solves no 
mystery. Austerlitz does not even care to keep it—he hands the photograph over as if this picture 
of his mother, perhaps the only one he has, is nothing more than a cheap postcard. At the very 
moment when it seems Austerlitz might secure his grip on the past, satisfaction withdraws. 
Austerlitz has nothing to say about the image or about the disappointment of the film, as though 
the photograph’s factuality means nothing compared with the anticipation of the encounter. It is 
as though the film served its purpose well before Austerlitz ever saw it, the possibility of what it 
might reveal was more meaningful than the image it ultimately affords. And this is a crucial 
aspect of Sebald’s novel: Austerlitz’s desire is only fulfilled in the absence of what he desires. 
Here stands a fragile but evocative intersection with the human psyche. Sebald recognizes that 
what is satisfying is not what we have, but what we could have. And furthermore that the 
moment we firmly grasp something and call it our own, its allure and promise dissipates. The 
best things, the most meaningful moments, objects, and encounters, are those that we still 
imagine one day securing.45 Before it actually exists, the film is the answer Austerlitz is looking 
 
43 Ibid., 253. 
44 Ibid. 
45 The example recalls the moment Charles Swann is about to kiss Odette de Crécy for the first time. For 
months Swann obsesses over this possibility, is nearly driven mad by the tension of Odette’s touch and 
withdrawal. Pages and pages are filled with yearning, and yet at the moment when the kiss is within grasp 
he delays it for a moment longer, as if about to leave a landscape forever. And the kiss itself is never even 
described. Sebald of course assimilates many of Proust’s turns, but it is worth noting how he here 
converts the romantic desire that manifests in the anticipation of fulfillment into a kind of memorial 
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for, while the disappointment of reality is kept at bay. As in Proust’s novel, it is not the 
conclusive recovery of the past that Sebald is after, but the search for it. Austerlitz is not just a 
novel about how memory works, but a dramatization of the desire for memory, the story of its 
pursuit.  
 In her work on postmemory, Marianne Hirsch remarks on the indexical power of the 
Theresienstadt film. Initially it appears that what Austerlitz needs is some confirmation of his 
mother in this place, yet his fantasy before seeing the film reveals instead the desire for a 
preserved familial link. It is not actually what the image depicts that is important, but the 
relationship between the viewer and the photograph. Borrowing a term from Margaret Olin, 
Hirsch describes this altered dynamic as a “‘performative index’ . . . shaped by the reality of the 
viewer’s needs and desires rather than by the subject’s actual ‘having-been-there.’”46 Olin 
herself came to this term in an analysis of Roland Barthes’s description of a photograph by 
James Van der Zee that he describes incorrectly or perhaps misremembers. Olin uses this to draw 
into question the very existence of the Winter Garden photograph of Barthes’s mother, which 
may actually be an amalgamation and confusion of a different photograph of Barthes’s family as 
well as a description by Walter Benjamin of six-year-old Kafka.47 “If the immense power of the 
photograph does not come from that which was in front of the camera,” Olin writes, “it lies 
elsewhere. . . . We endow [photographs] with the attributes we need them to have.”48 This is the 
 
desire, as if drawing a parallel between the pursuit of love and reclaiming the past: both illusory 
destinations that are constantly just beyond reach. 
46 Marianne Hirsch, “The Generation of Postmemory,” in The Generation of Postmemory: Writing and 
Visual Culture After the Holocaust (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012), 47-8. 
47 Hirsch goes on to make a further comparison between Barthes and Austerlitz, who also mistakenly 
describes the woman he finds in the Theresienstadt film beneath the time stamp. Austerlitz mistakes the 
necklace his mother is wearing in a nearly identical manner as that in which Barthes mistakes the 
necklace in Van der Zee’s image (Hirsch, 47-8). 
48 Margaret Olin, “Roland Barthes’s ‘Mistaken’ Identification,” in Touching Photographs, (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2012), 68-9. 
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performative index of a photograph, and it aligns closely with the aura that Benjamin observes in 
an object. And Barthes is keenly aware of this same quality when he writes “I may know better a 
photograph I remember than a photograph I am looking at.”49 As Hirsch writes, “The need for a 
‘before’ is not a matter of reality or idexicality, but of fantasy and affect. As Austerlitz shows, 
photographs can provide the stage for just such an affective encounter that can bring back the 
most primal childhood fears and desires for care and recognition.”50  
 The needs that Austerlitz brings to a photograph also determine his encounters with 
objects. While the original context and history of an object are important, these are not the only 
attributes of physicality that instill in Austerlitz the feeling that an object might answer the 
questions he finds it impossible to ask. The same meticulous and subtle maneuvering of the 
object to evoke and then guide desire that Sebald employs helps explain the secondary language 
that Barthes courts with his fresh flowers. In the fantasy occasioned by the Theresienstadt film’s 
possible existence, Austerlitz lives out a desire that he cannot otherwise articulate for an 
experience he knows cannot exist. The impossible moment of mutual recognition with his 
mother and the fusion with her nonetheless transpires, as though Austerlitz really is living two 
separate lives in parallel realities. Likewise Barthes both is and is not with his mother so long as 
he keeps those flowers fresh. In both cases the object is a portal that reveals and withdraws, 
generating the conditions for desire and its fulfillment; a state of mind in which the past and the 
future coexist. Because objects only reveal themselves piecemeal, they help direct this longing.51 
 
49 Roland Barthes, Camera Lucida, trans. Richard Howard, (New York: Hill and Wang, 1981), 53. 
50 Hirsch, “Generation of Postmemory,” 52. 
51 There is a philosophical undercurrent here that lightly resembles what has recently been theorized as 
“object-oriented ontology” in which the relationship between object and subject determines the full extent 
of “reality” (cf. Ian Bogost, Graham Harman, Timothy Morton, et. al.). An important aspect of this theory 
is the extent to which objects are withdrawn from their surroundings—whether they should be considered 
self-contained entities or fundamentally relational. The kind of withdrawal I have in mind here is much 
more closely aligned with the way that a dream recedes upon waking, but for the epistemologically-
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The trinkets in the bazar raise questions, the rucksack dissimulates, the wheelbarrow confuses, 
the possible existence of a film draws out yearning. The physicality of these things inspires a 
sense that they might provide some clue, which in turn compels connections and interpretations.  
This performative aspect of the object and its aura becomes even more clear in 
Austerlitz’s visit to the Estate Theater where his mother once performed. The image that 
Austerlitz finds of his mother in the Prague theatrical archives recalls the first evening that he 
spent with Vera in the Šporkova apartment. She tells him of his mother’s debut in Prague in the 
role of Olympia in Jacques Offenbach’s opera, The Tales of Hoffmann, a part Agáta always 
dreamed of, and of a dress rehearsal that they all attended together. The next morning Austerlitz 
goes to the theater and sits for a long time in the empty seats, trying to conjure some recollection 
of being there as a child. But the harder he tries the more his mind seems to cloud over, until 
“someone or other” walks across the stage behind the velvet curtain, “sending a ripple through 
the heavy folds of fabric.”52 Without warning, the “shadows begin to move” and Austerlitz 
catches sight of the beetle-like conductor in tails, hears the disjointed sounds of the orchestra 
tuning and the flush of voices, and “all of a sudden I thought that in between one of the 
musicians’ heads and the neck of a double bass, in the bright strip of light between the wooden 
floorboards and the hem of the curtain, I caught sight of a sky-blue shoe embroidered with silver 
sequins.”53 That evening he asks Vera about the shoe and she tells him that yes, Agáta did wear 
such shoes for her part as Olympia, and further that Austerlitz was, as a boy, deeply affected by 
the dress rehearsal, perhaps because he was afraid that his mother had truly changed into a 
complete stranger. 
 
concerned discussion see Levi R. Bryant, The Democracy of Objects (Ann Arbor: Open Humanities 
Press, 2011). 
52 Sebald, Austerlitz, 161. 
53 Ibid. 
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 Two objects are essential to these revelations—the rippling curtain and the blue sequined 
shoe. Without these physical hooks, the recollection that Austerlitz seeks eludes him. Only when 
Vera recalls his distress after Agáta’s dress rehearsal does Austerlitz re-encounter the grief 
“previously unknown to me” when he lay in bed, listening to the clock strike the hour and 
waiting for his mother to return to him from the theater, “from that other world,” and sit beside 
him.54 And in an almost imperceptible shift in tenses form the past to the present, Sebald finally 
allows Austerlitz his full grief: “I see her wearing an ashen-gray silk bodice laced up in front, but 
cannot make out her face, only an iridescent veil of pale, cloudy milkiness wafting close to her 
skin, and then, said Austerlitz, I see the scarf slip from her right shoulder as she lays her hand on 
my forehead.”55 Much like the moment when Austerlitz imagines recognizing his mother in the 
Theresienstadt film and she in turn passes out of the frame and into him, here Sebald combines 
the past and the present in a gesture of physicality. Alongside the curtain rippling and the shoe 
appearing, a scarf falling from the shoulder creates the moment when Austerlitz suddenly feels, 
once again, the hand of his mother. 
 Part of these encounters contend with Austerlitz’s fear that Agáta is a stranger to him. 
Just as he wants to be able to recognize her in the film, the young boy wants his mother to return 
to him from the stage where he has seen her transformed into someone else. Not only does the 
young boy see his mother in unfamiliar clothes pretending to be an entirely different person, but 
her role in the opera is one of doubleness. Olympia is Hoffmann’s first love, but also a 
mechanical doll that only appears to be human. Everyone can see this except Hoffmann, who has 
been tricked into wearing special glasses that prevent him from seeing the truth about this 
woman. Austerlitz too strives for an ideal, and synthesizing the image he had of his mother as a 
 
54 Ibid. 
55 Ibid., 162. 
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boy with the one he desires as an adult also occurs in a scenario in which sight is confused. At 
the theater, the proscenium arch of the stage is like “a blind eye” but then Austerlitz sees the 
curtain ripple and “catches sight” of the sky-blue shoe. At home, as a boy, he lies with his “eyes 
wide open in the dark” waiting for his mother to return, and in the end he both can and cannot 
see her: there is the ashen-gray bodice but he cannot make out her face, and it is ultimately her 
hand on his forehead that transcends the unreliability of sight and brings her presence to him 
fully. 
 The physicality of these scenes is both real and imagined, consequential and fleeting. 
And the objects that substantiate them cannot be suspended, they slip beyond their immediate 
purpose to reveal something else: the fluttering curtain, the sky-blue shoe are like a faint piece of 
music, a brief scent. What these things mean to Austerlitz is not entirely subjective, though 
neither is it broadly obvious. He interprets the way in which his attention lands on them, and 
follows their suggestions down otherwise concealed pathways. We can never be entirely certain 
what an object might reveal, Sebald seems to suggest. The photograph of Austerlitz’s mother at 
the Estates Theater is not nearly as consequential as asking Vera about the flashing image of a 
blue sequined shoe. On the one hand Sebald does not settle for the obvious interpretations, yet on 
the other he insists that objects can mean or describe otherwise hidden aspects of our experience 
through their layered contexts.  
 
At the very end of the novel, Austerlitz stands on the eighteenth floor of the southeast tower of 
the Bibliothèque Nationale (the tour des lois) with his old friend Henri Lemoine, who tells him 
that between where they are on the pont de Tolbiac and the gare d’Austerlitz to the north, about 
as far as they can see, there was once an extensive warehouse complex where, during the war, 
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the Germans brought all the items requisitioned from some forty thousand apartments of Parisian 
Jews. Enormous resources were levied to perform the looting that was carried out by just about 
every institution in the city, from unions to banks, insurance agencies, landlords, police, and 
transport firms. “In the years from 1942 onwards,” Lemoine says, “everything our civilization 
has produced, whether for the embellishment of life or merely for everyday use, from Louis XVI 
chests of drawers, Meissen porcelain, Persian rugs and whole libraries, down to the last saltcellar 
and pepper mill, was stacked there in the Austerlitz-Tolbiac storage depot.”56 Tremendous care 
was taken to organize and catalogue these things, and high-ranking SS and Wehrmacht officers 
would come with their wives to select furnishings for their new homes. To this day, no one 
knows what happened to most of these objects, the whole affair literally buried under the 
foundations of the library in which the two men are standing. 
 This is a harrowing end to Austerlitz’s tale, and almost like the novel itself in miniature. 
So much of Austerlitz’s life has been realized in train stations—from Liverpool to Wilsonova to 
Antwerp Centraal—and here the station that shares his name, perhaps the only piece of himself 
that Austerlitz truly retains from his parents, arises at the far edge of what he can see. 
Meanwhile, he stands in a library, that other public institution that has been an intimate part of 
his life (“equally at home in the Bodleian, the British Museum, and the rue Richelieu”) and 
specifically the very place where he first met Marie de Verneuil.57 Between these two buildings 
stretches something of a wasteland of the Left Bank in the ‘80s—boarded-up warehouses, 
abandoned dockyards, garages—where years ago Austerlitz and Marie once came upon a 
travelling circus. A magician performed a conjuring trick with a bantam cockerel and then his 
entire family, dressed in Oriental clothing with long, fur-edged cloaks and green turbans, played 
 
56 Ibid., 188-89. 
57 Ibid., 282. 
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a haunting waltz on flute, tuba, drums, bandoneon, and fiddle, beneath stars painted on the 
ceiling of their tent, while a snow-white goose stood motionless at their side, “as if it knew its 
own future and the fate of its present companions.”58 And not a hundred yards away is the 
Salpêtrière Hospital, the enormous complex stretching over thirty hectares that “represents at any 
given time almost the entire range of disorders from which humanity can suffer” and where 
Austerlitz recovered from the first of several fainting fits that caused the temporary but complete 
loss of memory and where he may have perished were it not for Marie’s patient visits and 
ministrations.59  
 Here is the full scope of Austerlitz’s life—train station, name, library; Marie, amnesia, 
coincidence, and inscrutable fate. His transitory being, the search for knowledge, illness, and the 
sorrow of a funeral dirge all converge on this bit of land. The Oriental band of gypsies—an 
image evoked in photographs, dreams, and mirages in all of Sebald’s fiction—here manifests in 
the guise of the Bastiani Traveling Circus, delivering to Austerlitz his most specific sense of fate 
in a recurring Sebaldian object, a snow-white goose.60 As he looks from the tower of laws north 
past the towers of letters and of time, on toward the building of his very name, he learns that 
beneath it all, at the exact center point between the station, hospital, library, and the flowing river 
(that eternal image of time’s passage), as if substantiating the whole premise of his being, lies a 
collection of lost objects. This mass of Persian rugs and pepper mills, the porcelain figurines and 
furniture, “everything our civilization has produced” exemplifies the injustice and destruction of 
 
58 Ibid., 275. 
59 Ibid., 272. 
60 For example, see the third story of The Emigrants, “Ambros Adelwarth,” and the narrator’s visit to the 
New York insane asylum, Samaria Sanitorium. There he finds Dr. Abramsky with a white goose wing 
protruding from his coat pocket. The old man remembers the case of Adelwarth and after recounting his 
final days, says not a word of farewell to the narrator, but traces a gentle arch with the wing against the 
darkening sky.  
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so many, the very circumstances responsible for the unfolding of Austerlitz’s life, and the full 
enquiry of this novel. It recalls Vera telling Austerlitz about his mother’s deportation and 
lingering on the abrupt removal of everything Agáta once owned, “furniture, the lamps and 
candelabra, the carpets and curtains, the books and musical scores, the clothes from the 
wardrobes and drawers, the bed linen, pillows, eiderdowns, blankets, china and kitchen utensils, 
the pot plants and umbrellas, even the bottled pears and cherries which had been standing 
forgotten in the cellar for years, and the remaining potatoes . . . down to the very last spoon.”61 
These things do not just signify Agáta but somehow substantiate her—their disappearance asserts 
Agáta’s forced removal more fully than Vera can herself articulate. And perhaps for the same 
reason that the narrator has an easier time imagining the lives of the SS officers at Breendonk, 
the common objects that once belonged to people who have been murdered, objects that we too 
have in our lives, somehow makes the unfathomable just slightly more accessible.62 Sebald 
seems to suggest the things we leave behind—whether they outlast us or are stolen—have the 
capacity not only to exist outside of time, but to return to us to what is lost. This occurs not 
through recollection, but in the pursuit of interpretation. 
Perhaps this final geographical array that Austerlitz looks out upon suggests the system 
and intent that substantiates Sebald’s use of objects. The things that he singles out offer no 
simple interpretation but repeat and refine questions. Sometimes an object defines, at other times 
it accuses. Some things contain within themselves their own destruction, while others persevere. 
 
61 Ibid., 180. 
62 There are further extensions of this final image in relation to cultural memory and the means of 
memorializing the past. In What Remains: The Post-Holocaust Archive in German Memory Culture, Dora 
Osborne argues that collections of the material remnants of the past are essential to reparative 
memorializing in contemporary German culture. To some extent, Sebald’s final image of Austerlitz 
looking out over the city built upon lost objects might be considered alongside the recent scholarship on 
monuments of memory that can only be constructed from the material of the past. 
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Some things withdraw and refuse an inquiry, which in turn induces imagination and desire. And 
some objects, like the blue sequined shoe, are important because they disappear. All of these 
things sit at the center of Austerlitz’s experience—sometimes visible, other times buried. From 
the vortex of such contrast arises a sense that there are answers here to questions we do not know 
how to ask, and that if we could only look at these objects in the right way it would reveal some 
tear in the world, a ripple in the curtain.  
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CONCLUSION 
The Sensual Object: Material Association and Diligent Realism 
 
At one point in his memoir, Barthes praises the unexplained “sensual object” in a text: the dish of 
green peas cooked in butter and a peeled orange that suddenly materializes in Goethe’s Werther. 
“A double advantage,” Barthes writes, “sumptuous appearance of a materiality and a distortion, a 
sudden gap wedged into the intellectual murmur.”1 In the preceding chapters, I have analyzed 
objects across five distinct texts. While not always “sumptuous” (indeed sometimes stubbornly 
ordinary), in every case these objects are consequential: they validate, mirror, mean, say what 
words cannot convey, and guide desire. These objects—Barthes’s fresh flowers, Ferrante’s 
earrings, Knausgaard’s Thermos, Luiselli’s pink cowboy hat, Sebald’s porcelain figurines—
create gaps in the “intellectual murmur.” In the encounter with an object, a space opens between 
a character and her reality, which in turn can be interpreted. This gap distorts the language of 
these texts. The act of writing, I have argued, comes up against the bounds of experience and 
memory, but also against the artifices of plot and character, and yet something still needs to be 
said. “Thus, sometimes,” Barthes writes, “in Japanese haiku, the line of written words suddenly 
opens and there is the drawing of Mount Fuji or of a sardine which delicately appears in place of 
the abandoned word.”2  
 My interest in this topic arose from an observation about a proliferation of contemporary 
novels that use objects as central components of their structure. These novels appear to esteem a 
catalog of physical items over plot and sometimes even over character. Terms like archive are 
 




levied to imbue an object-filled text with an air of authority, and novels that collect small trinkets 
and flotsam present as especially authentic. In some works the mystery and disjointed 
chronology of the encounter with an object suggests intense drama, and in cultural and political 
journals scholars debate the agency of the object. Why, I wanted to know, was the object 
attractive to contemporary authors? And how did its appearance in these works expand or 
develop what has been, traditionally, only symbolic? My hope was that by investigating a few 
prominent examples, perhaps some further literary insight might arise. For if the object is indeed 
effective in the literature of this moment, then what could be said about the ambitions of 
contemporary writing? Might the articulation of a trend provide insight into the form as a whole? 
 I used Barthes as a starting point because his orientation toward objects, especially in his 
more personal writing, straddles linguistic limitations on the one hand and the wish (or perhaps 
need) to write on the other. In his autobiography, a few pages after the comment about the 
sardine, he admits, “Writing is that play by which I turn around as well as I can in a narrow 
place: I am wedged in, I struggle between the hysteria necessary to write and the image-
repertoire.”3 When he focuses on the fresh flowers or the white porcelain bowl with its imperfect 
glaze, Barthes brushes against the edges of the language available to him to express something 
he perceives to be essential. In these moments, Barthes holds out an object that may be 
meaningful, but declines to define that meaning as though the very presence of the object is what 
is evocative. Barthes suggests that analyzing objects corrodes their presence by converting them 
into signs. Only undefined flowers maintain the potential for the widest range of associations.  
The other four authors in this study are similarly caught between the linguistic and the 
interpretive, intent on their art yet aware of its limitations. Objects in these texts become the 
 
3 Ibid., 137. 
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means of subtle expression that is neither limited in its significance nor overdetermined by the 
author. When Ferrante dramatizes a collapsing marriage, she affects emotional distress through 
domestic objects. While Olga manages to hold herself together, the world around her 
malfunctions, and we grasp her horror not because Ferrante aptly describes abandonment, but 
because we know the anguish of a stuck lock. Knausgaard, on the other hand, emphasizes the 
materiality of objects to investigate his private self. The physical object, he suggests, sustains an 
inviolable personal narrative within the oppressively social act of writing. Luiselli, meanwhile, 
brings objects to the forefront of a story she does not feel entitled to tell, and uses them to bend a 
political reality through the playful consciousness of children. When the binoculars turn an 
airplane into a spaceship, or a broken phone becomes a camera, the visceral realities of refugees 
and political discrimination are reframed and rendered subjectively. Finally Sebald, who perhaps 
most closely resembles Barthes here, uses the object as a foil for Austerlitz’s desire. Sebald’s 
writing courts what is behind the curtain of language by endowing objects with the confusion 
and yearning of his characters, yet leaving these objects as incomplete signifiers. 
By peering at the dynamic between object and subject, I have tried to show how the 
object might unsettle language in just the way that Barthes suggests the sardine intrudes on a 
haiku, and consequently its capacity in a contemporary style of realism. In these texts, objects 
function as neither overt symbols nor as background scenery. Rather the physical entity carries 
some multiplicity, some associative potential that may or may not be relevant to the characters 
and their situations. These authors appear to suspect traditional plot and ornate description of 
being too blatantly artificial for the interiority they wish to explore. The mimetic mode with the 
most resonance, they seem to suggest, is one of accidental encounters and inconclusive 
associations. The object serves this style perfectly with its recognizable yet indeterminate 
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appearance. Objects are plucked from their common insignificance and made to stand for 
something fundamental that, if discovered, would be definitive. Perhaps the living through 
objects in these texts is not just a rhetorical move, but part of a larger literary endeavor: how to 
write reality without seeming to write it. There is a performance here, a kind of conspicuous 
displacement of the central concern of the text and in its place we find . . . a sardine.  
In a 2000 essay in The New Republic, James Wood coined the term “hysterical realism” 
to describe a trend he observed in the massive novels by Don DeLillo, Salman Rushdie, Zadie 
Smith, David Foster Wallace, and others in which the conventions of storytelling are exacerbated 
to a nearly absurd degree.4 In these novels every character is unremittingly tangled in a web of 
connection that is invisible to the characters themselves but insists on “vitality at all costs” to the 
reader. “Stories and sub-stories sprout on every page,” Wood writes, “as these novels continually 
flourish their glamorous congestion. . . . The conventions of realism are not being abolished but, 
on the contrary, exhausted, and overworked.” This criticism is centered on a perceived lack: “All 
these contemporary deformations flow from a crisis that is not only the fault of the writers 
concerned, but is now of some lineage: the crisis of character, and how to represent it in fiction.” 
The works in this study are of a different stripe. Even the extraordinarily long novels of 
Ferrante and Knausgaard do not traffic in the congested exaggeration that typifies Infinite Jest or 
Underworld, but proceed in calm, muted specificity. Sebald’s intricate novels are carefully 
layered and associative, but poised and restrained, letting the unexplained gesture speak for itself 
and eschewing hyperbole. And Lost Children Archive, which comes closest to the crowded over-
extension of hysterical realism (if we are to grant this term) with its intersecting narratives, 
maintains a focus on a few distinct characters and the specific parameters of their situation. 
 
4 James Wood, “Human, All Too Inhuman,” The New Republic, July 24, 2000, 
https://newrepublic.com/article/61361/human-inhuman 
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Nonetheless, questions of representation distinguish these works. These authors are concerned 
with psychological dimensions, but wary of the conventional realism that defined the twentieth 
century. Contemporary literature no longer supports plain mimesis, and rather than try to shroud 
this constraint in an overabundance of plot, the authors in this study appeal to the material 
surroundings of their characters to field a portrait of personality, desire, and interiority. In 
contending with the very same difficulty that Wood identifies in Smith, Wallace, and others, the 
authors here have used the inanimate to gesture toward an unsayable subjectivity.  
This technique develops a literary style Erich Auerbach observed in Flaubert’s Madame 
Bovary. Focusing on a passage early in the novel in which Emma and Charles are despondently 
eating together, Auerbach notices how Emma’s despair is revealed to the reader indirectly. 
Flaubert does not explain what Emma feels as she feels it, nor does he grant her the means to 
fully grasp her own situation. Rather he “bestows the power of mature expression upon the 
material” of their meal, filtering Emma’s discontent through the smoking stove, the steam of 
boiled beef, the way that Charles nibbles a few hazelnuts. Emma indistinctly encounters her own 
circumstances, but more importantly she “is herself seen as one seeing. . . . This ordering of the 
psychological situation does not, to be sure, derive its standards from without, but from the 
material of the situation itself.”5 Auerbach goes on to suggest that Flaubert’s refusal to practice 
any “psychological understanding” of his characters and instead let “the state of the facts speak 
for itself,” might be understood as “objective seriousness.” Such a style, he writes, “seeks to 
penetrate to the depths of the passions and entanglements of a human life, but without itself 
becoming moved, or at least without betraying that it is moved.”6 Not only does this approach 
 
5 Erich Auerbach, Mimesis: The Representation of Reality in Western Literature, trans. Willard R. Trask 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1953), 484-5. 
6 Ibid., 490. 
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afford Flaubert the means of criticizing nineteenth-century bourgeois culture, but solves for 
doing so artfully. In the style of objective seriousness, writes Auerbach, “things themselves 
speak and, according to their value, classify themselves before the reader as tragic or as comic, 
or in most cases quite unobtrusively as both.”7  
The focus on objects in contemporary novels advances this style by becoming even less 
overt about the psychological dimension on display and emphasizing the physicality of the 
object. In the paragraph that Auerbach analyses from Flaubert, the entire scene is cast in the light 
of Emma’s discontent; it begins, “But it was above all at mealtimes that she could bear it no 
longer.” As a result, the boiled beef and the smoking stove easily take on the airs of Emma’s 
misery. In contrast, these contemporary authors omit such an emotional framework, leaving only 
the object to reveal the sentiment. The “mature expression” that Auerbach notices in objective 
seriousness has been pushed further by the writers who withhold any opening statement about 
the theme of a scene, and instead allow the object alone to express and develop the full weight of 
the phrase, “she could bear it no longer.” 
Not only does this appearance of materiality (sumptuous or not) help ground what is 
fictional in what is easily recognizable, it also establishes a distance between the world and a 
character, and into this gap flows the qualities of subjectivity. As opposed to hysterical realism, 
the style outlined here might be thought of as diligent realism: the careful focus on common, 
material objects that reveals a psychological drama by pushing it out of the frame. This expands 
Auerbach’s objective seriousness, offering an iteration of realism that confers on an encounter 
with staid materiality a wholly generative potential. The method retains a distinctly modern 
flavor that to some degree recalls Walter Benjamin’s characterization of history as fundamentally 
 
7 Ibid., 491. 
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subjective. As he writes in The Arcades Project, “the course of the world is an endless series of 
facts congealed in the form of things.”8 And as he posits in “Theses on the Philosophy of 
History,” a fact is only causal once it is observed—it becomes historical “posthumously”—
forcing not only a consideration of what happened, but of who is doing the looking.9 The “aura” 
of an object suggests the facts without making absolute claims. It is at once mimetic, indicative 
of the “real” world, but also semiotic, offering a lexicon of association and interpretation 
regarding the experience of its encounter. 
The objects here indicate the veil of language; they constitute a diligent, understated 
realism that pursues what is manifest in experience but not always possible in language. The 
object transcribes sentiment into the fabric of a text while refusing the reductive analysis of 
language. In the performance of the novel, the object discloses the texture of desire and the 
claims of the self without betraying the apparatus of the stage. It repeats the same phrase with 
new inflections, what Barthes calls “the enigmatic copy” that “disturbs the infinite sequence of 
replicas,” and gestures toward an abstract idea through what is sensual and familiar.10 By itself, 
an object means nothing, but the moment it is encountered, it resonates. This, of course, is not an 
active quality of the object, but a condition of the human. What is latent in the object then, what 
draws our attention to the rippling curtain, is perhaps not so much a revelation as an affirmation, 
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